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Introduction 
In recent years economists and economic historians alike have reconsidered the role of 
the state as a determinant for a society’s prosperity. These scholars argue that 
institutions that facilitate broad taxation, support private markets and grant and protect 
private property are elementary prerequisites for economic growth.1 According to these 
authors, states can influence the prosperity of their society by the degree they are 
providing these institutions.2 
But states are no artificial machines that work according to a fixed setup. They are run 
by people, called bureaucrats. These bureaucrats face incentives which motivate them 
to implement formal institutional rules correctly or to misuse them for their personal 
benefit.3 Even when the formal institutional framework – e.g. the rules and laws that 
govern taxation, regulate markets and grant private property – is beneficial for growth, 
bureaucrats may face incentives to misuse these rules deteriorating the growth 
perspectives of a society. For these reasons, the rules and regulations that frame 
bureaucrats’ incentives to adhere to the formal institutional framework are an 
important component for a society’s economic fate. 
However, there are relatively few studies which consider the importance of an efficient, 
uncorrupt bureaucracy for economic growth. There are even fewer studies that ask how 
such an efficient bureaucracy can be established. The goal of the present thesis is to 
close this gap. Thereby it concentrates on the internal dynamics of an administration 
after the introduction of an efficiency-enhancing organization.4 More explicitly, this 
study asks how rules and regulations that govern employment dismissal, promotion and 
remuneration of bureaucrats shaped the latter’s incentives to implement or to misuse 
                                                                
1
 This list can be expanded by the ability of states to foster human capital and providing public 
health. 
2
 See: D. Acemoglu/J. A. Robinson, Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and 
poverty, London 2012; T. Besley/T. Persson, Pillars of prosperity. The political economics of 
development clusters, Princeton, NJ 2011; C. Buchheim, What causes successful late 
development? Insights from history, in: The South African Journal of Economic History 1&2, 2006, 
pp. 52–83; R. La Porta/F. Lopez-de-Silanes/A. Shleifer/R. W. Vishny, The Quality of Government, 
in: The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 1, 1999, pp. 222–279; D. North/J. Wallis/B. 
Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded 
Human History, Cambridge 2009 and M. Olson, Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity, in: R. J. 
Zeckhauser (ed), Strategy and choice, London 1993, pp. 131–157. 
3
 See e.g. J. E. Rauch, Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. 
Cities During the Progressive Era, in: American Economic Review 4, 1995, pp. 968–979 and A. 
Shleifer/R. W. Vishny, The grabbing hand. Government pathologies and their cures, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1999
2
. 
4
 The question why the reform was undertaken in the first place is not addressed here. 
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the formal administrative and legal framework. In a second step, I attempt to measure 
whether administrative reform had an effect on the efficiency of the bureaucracy. 
The thesis provides a detailed case study of local bureaucrats, called district magistrates 
(Amtmänner) in the German state of Baden during the late 18th and 19th century. The 
study builds on an extensive set of archival material from the Generallandesarchiv in 
Karlsruhe including information about district magistrates’ remuneration and their 
performance in regard to the implementation of the formal administrative and legal 
framework. 
During the period of investigation the small south-west German territory of the princes 
of Baden turned into a well-ordered state which was often referred to as 
“Musterstaat”.5 Indeed, during this period local bureaucrats changed from corrupt 
“despotic rulers” to loyal Civil Servants who were committed to common welfare.6  
The remainder of this introduction is dedicated to a short discussion of the relevant 
literature, including a more detailed motivation of the thesis. The introduction 
concludes with a short outline. 
States and Economic Growth 
The relationship between states and economic growth is a well-researched field. The 
strand of literature goes back to the works of Douglass C. North who re-introduced the 
analysis of institutions into economic theory.7 Together with Barry Weingast, North also 
emphasized the role of the state for the economic success of a society. In their paper 
“Constitutions and Commitment”8 the two authors argue that the Glorious Revolution 
which constrained the absolute ruler’s power was an important prerequisite for the 
ability of the English state to broaden its tax base. According to North and Weingast, 
arbitrary rule in the centuries before the Glorious Revolution led to very high interest 
rates for the English crown, because creditors feared expropriation. After the Glorious 
Revolution constrained the King’s power, interest rates declined, because the 
                                                                
5
 That is: archetype of state. See for this view L. Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei. Das 
Großherzogtum Baden zwischen Restauration und Reichsgründung, Wiesbaden 1968. 
6
 The term “despotic ruler” is derived from: J. Eibach, Der Staat vor Ort. Amtmänner und Bürger 
im 19. Jahrhundert am Beispiel Badens, Frankfurt a. M. 1994, pp. 162–163. 
7
 Cf. D. North/P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World. A new Economic History, Cambridge 
1973; D. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York 1981 and D. North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990. 
8
 D. North/B. Weingast, Constitution and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing 
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, in: The Journal of Economic History 4, 1989, pp. 
803–832. 
3 
 
parliamentary-controlled Crown was now committed to the re-payment of its debts. 
This made long-term lending at lower interest rates possible.9 
A similar argument is brought forward by De Long and Shleifer.10 The two authors show 
that European states that limited government power like republics or constitutional 
monarchies were growing faster than absolutist regimes.11 The difference in the growth 
rates of absolutist and limited regimes is explained by the regimes’ incentives whether 
or not to establish a growth-deterring tax system. Limited governments would tax their 
economies only moderately, because the former are led by merchants who are 
interested in the flow of commerce or parliaments have the possibility to veto heavy 
taxation. Absolutist rulers, one the other side, would be more interested in their private 
economic prosperity which could be increased by extracting citizens’ resources through 
high tax rates.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson also stress the importance of the absolute ruler’s 
control through the public. E.g. they can show that states which constrained their ruler’s 
power have been economically more successful during the age of Atlantic Trade. 
Moreover, economic success strengthened merchant groups which in turn increased the 
citizen’s possibility to control their rulers.12 In a more recent book Acemoglu and 
Robinson expand their analysis to the question how states shape the prosperity of a 
society.13 According to the two authors, economic institutions are shaped by the 
distribution of political power within a society; that is by the shape of its political 
institutions. If political institutions favor a narrow elite, this will normally lead to 
economic institutions that distribute resources to the political elite preventing the 
process of creative destruction through investments in new technologies which would 
promote sustained growth. On the contrary, if political institutions are open, economic 
                                                                
9
 For a critical review of the North and Weingast thesis see: B. G. Carruthers, Politics, Popery, and 
Property: A Comment on North and Weingast, in: The Journal of Economic History 3, 1990, pp. 
693–698 and S. Epstein, Freedom and Growth. The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300-
1750, New York 2000. While Carruthers calls for a more detailed historical analysis of the political 
processes that accompanied the Glorious Revolution, Epstein challenges the thesis at all. In his 
view, the strong decline of English interest rates during the 18
th
 century was due to a spread of 
more sophisticated banking techniques that occurred all over Europe (see pp. 16-29). 
10
 J. B. de Long/A. Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial 
Revolution, in: Journal of Law and Economics 2, 1993, pp. 671–702. 
11
 De Long and Shleifer use data on city growth as a proxy for economic growth. 
12
 D. Acemoglu/S. Johnson/J. Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change 
and Economic Growth, in: The American Economic Review, 2005, pp. 546–579. 
13
 Acemoglu/Robinson, Why nations fail. 
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institutions will favor sustained economic growth.14 The perspectives of a society’s 
prosperity are thus dependent on the outcome of conflicts about political power and 
their long term trajectories. 
North, Wallis and Weingast provide a similar study about the relationship between 
political and economic institutions and their effect on long-term economic growth.15 
However, the two studies differ in two important points. First, North, Wallis and 
Weingast emphasize the transition from personal, short lived institutions to impersonal, 
perpetual-lived institutions as the most important determinant for economic growth. In 
addition, the two studies differ in their analysis of the transition from a growth impeding 
to a growth enhancing state. While Acemoglu and Robinson stress critical historical 
junctures that could change the long-term development path of a society; North and his 
two co-authors concentrate on inter-elite processes as main explanation for the 
transition process. 
Another feature of the studies by Acemoglu and Robinson and North, Wallis and 
Weingast is that they underline the importance of centralization including the control of 
the state over jurisdiction and the means of violence as well as the ability of the state to 
enforce its laws. The latter is also discussed by Buchheim who argues that the ability of 
the German states to enforce compulsory education was an important component of 
Germany’s successful late development.16 The importance of jurisdictional centralization 
is also discussed by Epstein who argues that “coordination failures” which resulted from 
the absence of undivided sovereignty were a major impediment for growth in Europe 
during the Middle Ages.17 
Although the studies cited above emphasize the centralization of power, the structure 
and level of taxation and the overall (political) institutional framework as an important 
prerequisite for economic growth, they have relatively little to say about the exact 
working of these mechanisms. The bureaucracy plays an important role here. Without 
bureaucrats taxes will not be collected and laws will not be implemented in practice; 
that is, without an efficient bureaucracy the exertion of power including the possibility 
of a growth-enhancing agenda is precluded. Yet, except for the study of Buchheim, the 
                                                                
14
 According to Acemoglu and Robinson growth can occur in states with restrictive political 
institutions. However, growth will not be sustained, because elites will oppose new technologies 
which are threatening their gains from controlling a specific technology. 
15
 North/Wallis/Weingast, Violence. 
16
 Buchheim, Successful late Development. 
17
 Epstein, Freedom and Growth. 
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studies presented above have relatively little to say about the role of the bureaucracy 
for economic growth. Indeed, the literature concerning the effects of the quality of the 
bureaucracy on economic growth is relatively scarce. Employing cross-country studies, 
Knack and Keefer as well as Mauro can show that there is an empirical link between 
bureaucratic efficiency and growth.18 For a sample of 35 developing countries, Rauch 
and Evans also find support for the thesis that the quality of bureaucracy matters for 
economic growth.19 The two authors show a significant and very robust correlation 
between the degree of “Weberianism” and economic growth. Thereby “Weberianism” is 
defined as the degree by which a country recruits its bureaucrats according to merit as 
well as it offers rewarding and predictable long term careers in its civil service.20 Besley 
and Persson on the other hand, analyze the role of the bureaucracy from a more 
abstract point of view. In a series of papers as well as in a book the two authors develop 
a theory of state capacity.21 Their model analyzes the decision of the state to invest into 
fiscal and legal capacity; that is in the state’s ability to tax its citizens and to enforce 
private contracts as well as to provide public infrastructure like transportation and 
provision of power. Investment in state capacity therefore includes investment in the 
number as well as in the efficiency of the bureaucracy. 
The findings of the cross-country and theoretical studies are supported by some case 
studies. Thus, Rauch estimates the effects of municipal reforms in U.S. cities on city 
growth during the Progressive Era.22 The main finding of the article is that a 
professionalization of municipal bureaucracies during the Progressive Era increased the 
share of expenditures spent for long-term infrastructure projects which were conducive 
for city growth. Rauch builds on the work of Evans, who analyzes the role of the state for 
successful late development in several newly industrializing countries like Brazil, India 
and Korea.23 According to Evans, an important necessary condition for a state to be 
                                                                
18
 S. Knack/P. Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using 
Alternative Institutional Measures, in: Economics and Politics 3, 1995, pp. 207–227 and P. Mauro, 
Corruption and Growth, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 3, 1995, p. 681-712. 
19
 P. Evans/J. E. Rauch, Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of 
"Weberian" State Structures on Economic Growth, in: American Sociological Review 5, 1999, pp. 
748–765. 
20
 For a detailed description of the features of a Weberian bureaucracy, see also: M. Weber, 
Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, New York 1968. 
21
 T. Besley/T. Persson, Wars and State Capacity, in: Journal of the European Economic 
Association 2-3, 2008, pp. 522–530; T. Besley/T. Persson, The Origins of State Capacity: Property 
Rights, Taxation, and Politics, in: American Economic Review 4, 2009, pp. 1218–1244 and 
Besley/Persson, Pillars of prosperity. 
22
 Rauch, Bureaucracy. 
23
 P. Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural 
Change, in: S. Haggard/ R. R. Kaufman (ed), The politics of economic adjustment. International 
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“developmental” is a Weberian bureaucracy. Those bureaucracies seem to be very good 
in supporting free markets by providing collective goods as well as fostering long term 
entrepreneurial perspectives among elite groups. Weberian bureaucracies seemed to be 
very good in providing these features because long term career prospects made 
bureaucrats less prone to corruption and rent seeking. Meritocratic recruitment, 
furthermore, guaranteed a high level of professionalism. The observation that relatively 
uncorrupt and highly professionalized bureaucracies are conducive for growth was also 
made by Buchheim.24 
Given the importance of uncorrupt and professionalized Weberian bureaucracies for 
growth it is interesting to ask how such a bureaucracy was established. Surprisingly, 
although all studies presented above argue that efficient bureaucracies are conducive 
for growth, they do not ask how such an organization can be established. 25 Other 
studies just assume that a reform of the organizational design of a bureaucracy is 
immediately translated into a sound working system.26 This assumption is, however, not 
trivial. Missing rules of professional conduct or ill enforced administrative and legal 
processes could hamper the sound working of a well-designed Weberian bureaucracy. 
This can for example be seen in Russia. As Hay and Shleifer pointed out, Russia failed to 
transform its economy during the late 1990’s, although formal institutional reforms 
were introduced. However, bureaucratic corruption could not be curtailed which in turn 
reduced the security of property rights.27 Another, much debated example is Greece, 
where the reform packages that were enacted due to the pressure of the EU, the ECB 
and the IMF fail implementation through the administration.28 Likewise, it seems that 
the financial administration is unable to collect all tax liabilities.29 The low efficiency of 
                                                                                                                                                                               
constraints, distributive conflicts, and the state, Princeton, NJ 1992, pp. 139–181 and P. B. Evans, 
Embedded autonomy. States and industrial transformation, Princeton, N.J 1995. 
24
 Buchheim, Successful late Development. 
25
 La Porta et al. measure the drivers of the quality of government. The study concludes that the 
quality of government is mainly driven by geographical and cultural factors as well as by a 
countries legal origin. The size of a government does also matter. Larger governments seem to be 
better performing ones. However, it seems that La Porta et al. rather measure a spatial 
correlation than really explaining how quality-enhancing reforms of the bureaucracy can be 
implemented. See: La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer/Vishny, Quality of Government. 
26
 See e.g. Rauch, Bureaucracy. This is not true for Evans who argues that a Weberian 
bureaucracy can only work if it is autonomous of strong coherent elite networks. See Evans, 
Problem and Solution, here p. 179. 
27
 J. R. Hay/A. Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws. A Theory of Legal Reform, in: 
American Economic Review May, 1998, pp. 398–403. 
28
 Cf. Markus Bernath, Griechenland: Vize-Finanzminister in Athen räumt schwere Versäumnisse 
ein, in: F.T.D. - Financial Times Deutschland, July 26, 2012 and Michael Martens, Was 
Griechenland braucht, in: F.A.Z., October 29, 2012. 
29
 Cf. Rainer Hermann, Fessel Klientelismus, in: F.A.Z., August 28, 2012. 
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the Greek bureaucracy is also illustrated by the low score in Transparency International’s 
famous Corruption Perception Index in which Greece, in 2012, scored last compared to 
the rest of Europe. Therefore, one goal of the thesis is to analyze how an efficient 
Weberian bureaucracy was implemented into a sound working organization by posing 
the question of how administrative and legal processes and rules of professional 
conduct were enforced among district magistrates in the German state of Baden making 
Baden’s Civil Service a prototype of its time. A main finding of this thesis is that internal 
rules that governed employment, dismissal, remuneration and promotion of Civil 
Servants played an important role in enforcing rules of professional conduct and 
adherence to administrative and legal processes.30 However, enforcing these rules was a 
very costly and time consuming task. 
Furthermore, the thesis aims to measure whether the actual implementation of a 
professional Civil Service had an effect on the efficiency of the bureaucracy. In doing so, 
I construct an admittedly crude measure for legal capacity, that is the bureaucracy’s 
ability to enforce private contracts and to protect citizens’ property rights. According to 
this measure, legal capacity has risen in the second half of the 19th century. 
Bureaucracy and Local Administration in Baden 
The question how formal rules of professional conduct and adherence to formal 
administrative processes can be implemented and how – as a result – the efficiency of 
the bureaucracy developed can only be answered by employing a case study of a single 
country or territory. Since the question calls for a detailed analysis of the internal 
dynamics of the administration, a country cross-section analysis seems to be unsuitable. 
The case study presented in this thesis is that of local bureaucrats called district 
magistrates (or Amtmänner) in the south-west German state of Baden during the late 
18th and 19th century. During the period under examination, Baden developed from a 
small, fragmented territory within the Holy Roman Empire to a sovereign middle state.31 
The crucial period of state building took place in the years between 1803 and 1815 when 
Baden was an ally of Napoleon’s France. In this period Baden did not only gain 
                                                                
30
 In a cross-country study of 35 less developed countries, Rauch and Evans also find that 
meritocratic recruitment has a positive influence on bureaucratic performance. Yet, they do not 
find a significant link between bureaucratic performance and internal promotion or the level of 
remuneration. Cf. P. B. Evans/J. E. Rauch, Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in 
less developed countries, in: Journal of Public Economics 1, 2000, pp. 49–71. 
31
 The term middle state (or Mittelstaat) refers to those German states which were smaller than 
Austria and Prussia, but ruled over a considerable territory and number of citizens. Besides 
Baden, Bavaria, Hanover, the Hessian states, Saxony and Wurttemberg were also middle states. 
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sovereignty but also increased its territory fourfold from 3,900 km2 to 15,000 km2. The 
country’s population also rose fourfold during this period (from 250,000 to 1,000,000).32 
Politically the country was organized as a monarchy with a strong, hierarchically 
organized bureaucracy and a less strong diet which had to approve the budget. Although 
the country was a monarchy from the political point of view, the prince of Baden only 
had the rank of a Grand Duke. He resided in his capital Karlsruhe.33 
The thesis concentrates on the German state of Baden for two reasons: First, as Baten, 
Spadavecchia, Streb and Yin pointed out, Baden was representative for Germany34 as a 
whole in terms of real wages and its industrial structure.35 Baden is furthermore well 
researched in the fields of political, economic and administrative history.36 The focus on 
the local administration is also straightforward: district magistrates managed civil and 
legal issues at the local level (e.g. issuing trade licenses and building permits, but also 
solving civil and criminal cases).37 Executing these functions, district magistrates were in 
direct contact with citizens and the economy influencing everyday social and 
commercial life. District magistrates were also the biggest sub-group within the Civil 
Service. In total, 344 Civil Servants were employed at the three levels of the 
administration in 1849. Thereby 176 Civil Servants were employed at the local level, 
compared to 81 individuals at the intermediary level of the administration and 87 at the 
central stage.38 District magistrates were therefore an important sub-group within the 
                                                                
32
 However, a first step towards a greater political unit was undertaken in 1771 when the 
territories of the catholic and protestant line of the princes of Baden were re-unified. 
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Geschichte. Vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Ende der Monarchien, Stuttgart 1992 and H. 
Schwarzmaier, Baden: Dynastie - Land - Staat, Sigmaringen 2005. 
34
 More precisely, for Germany in the borders of the Kaiserreich. 
35
 See J. Baten/A. Spadavecchia/J. Streb/S. Yin, What Made Southwest German Firms Innovative 
around 1900? Assessing the Importance of Intra- and Inter-Industry Externalities, in: Oxford 
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 For the latter see Eibach, Staat and B. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft zwischen 
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Profil und politische Haltung, Stuttgart 1998. The pioneering work in the field of economic history 
is W. Fischer, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung in Baden 1800-1850. Erster Band. 
Die staatliche Gewerbepolitik, Berlin 1962 For an overview of Baden’s political history during the 
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th
 century see Schwarzmaier, Handbuch. 
37
 The legal administration was detached from the civil administration in 1857. From this time on, 
local judges (called Amtsrichter) were responsible for criminal and judicial issues at the local level. 
For the purpose of simplification I will use only the term district magistrate (Amtmann) including 
local judges after 1857. 
38
 The data is from Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 592–594. The number of local Civil 
Servants employed in the legal and administrative branch of the administration increased over 
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Civil Service. Furthermore, because of the hierarchic structure of the administration, 
many other positions at the higher levels of the administration were staffed with former 
district magistrates39. It therefore makes sense to study this sub-group if one wants to 
draw more general conclusions about the efficiency of the bureaucracy in Baden. 
Dealing with the questions how rules of professional conduct and formal administrative 
processes were implemented and whether this had an effect on the bureaucracy’s 
efficiency requires knowledge about four components: First, how did formal 
administrative and legal processes and rules of professional conduct change over time? 
Second, how did formal rules concerning employment, dismissal, remuneration and 
promotion evolve over time? Third, how did the internal dynamics of the administration 
look like; that is how were the formal labor market rules applied. Fourth, which outcome 
did the interplay between the three components described above produce? That is, how 
did local administrative practices look like? Were they beneficial for growth or did they 
hamper trade and investments? 
Concerning the first two questions the thesis basically draws on secondary literature. 
Information about the administrative and legal processes of the 18th century was mostly 
taken from Windelband and Lenel.40 Although the two authors published their works at 
the beginning of the 20th century, they give a very detailed overview of the country’s 
administrative structures. A more current study about the administrative organization of 
the country during the 18th and 19th century is provided by Grube.41 Administrative and 
legal processes were reformed at the beginning of the 19th century. These reforms are 
described by Knemeyer.42 Information about the reform of the legal institutions during 
                                                                                                                                                                               
time. While there were 125 persons in 1814 their number rose to 176 in 1849. In 1869 the 
number of local Civil Servants employed in the two administrative branches reached 213. Twenty 
years later the number was 237. (For the 1814-figure see Eibach, Staat, pp. 53–55.) 
39
 Cf. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft. 
40
 P. Lenel, Beiträge zur Kenntnis von Rechtsverfassung und Rechtsverwaltung der Markgrafschaft 
Baden im 18. Jahrhundert, Karlsruhe 1912; W. Windelband, Die Verwaltung der Markgrafschaft 
Baden zur Zeit Karl Friedrichs, Leipzig 1916. 
41
 W. Grube, Vogteien, Ämter, Landkreise in Baden und Württemberg, Stuttgart 1975. A very 
extensive work about Baden’s administrative and legal organization was written by Stiefel. See: K. 
Stiefel, Baden: 1648-1952, Karlsruhe 1979
2
. Yet, Stiefel does not meet scientific standards of 
documentation and referencing. 
42
 F.-L. Knemeyer, Regierungs- und Verwaltungsreformen in Deutschland zu Beginn des 19. 
Jahrhunderts, Köln 1970. The classical work concerning the administrative and legal reforms is 
from Andreas. See: W. Andreas, Der Aufbau des Staates im Zusammenhang der allgemeinen 
Politik. (=Geschichte der badischen Verwaltungsorganisation und Verfassung in den Jahren 1802-
1818), Leipzig 1913. However, Andreas work is worshipping the Grand-Duke and the state which 
makes it a less useful source of information.  
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the early 19th century is drawn from Schubert.43 A very detailed work about one part of 
the legal reforms – the introduction of a code of procedure for civil trials – is provided by 
Keller.44 Krapp, on the other side, concentrates on one detail of the administrative 
reforms – the organization of the districts between 1803 and 1815.45 
Besides administrative and legal processes, the rules that governed district magistrates’ 
employment, dismissal, remuneration and promotion were also reformed during the 
early 19th century. These reforms are most precisely described by von Müller and 
Wunder.46 Especially the latter provides a very detailed study about all aspects 
concerning the rights and duties of district magistrates. The labor market rules for 
district magistrates in Baden before 1800 are described by Fleischhauer and Roth.47 An 
overall picture about the rights and duties of district magistrates in German territories 
during the 17th and 18th century is provided by Agena.48 
Building on this literature, the present thesis proceeds with the analysis of the internal 
dynamics of the administration of the Grand-Duchy of Baden during the 19th century; 
asking how formal labor market rules were used in order to motivate district magistrates 
to implement formal administrative and legal processes. The only detailed analysis of 
the working of the local administration in Baden is from Eibach.49 However, Eibach 
focuses more strongly on the interplay between district magistrates and local elites. The 
interaction between district magistrates and their supervisory institutions is only briefly 
touched. 
Therefore, I analyze a new set of records from the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe. The 
Generallandesarchiv was the official archive of the Grand Duchy of Baden. In this 
function the archive collected materials from all parts of the administration during the 
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 W. Schubert, Französisches Recht in Deutschland zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Zivilrecht, 
Gerichtsverfassungsrecht und Zivilprozeßrecht, Köln 1977. 
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Die Badische Beamtenschaft. 
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1934; A. Roth, Die Rechtsverhältnisse der landesherrlichen Beamten in der Markgrafschaft 
Baden-Durlach im 18. Jahrhundert, Karlsruhe 1906. 
48
 C.-A. Agena, Der Amtmann im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Richter- 
und Beamtentums, Göttingen 1972. 
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 Eibach, Staat. See also J. Eibach, Konflikt und Arrangement: Lokalverwaltung in Bayern, 
Württemberg und Baden zwischen Reformära und 48er Revolution, in: E. Laux/ K. Teppe (ed), Der 
neuzeitliche Staat und seine Verwaltung. Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seit 1700, Stuttgart 
1998. 
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19th century. Nevertheless the archive also collected documents from Baden’s 
predecessor states.50 For this thesis, I especially used personal files of district 
magistrates. The Generallandesarchiv has a huge number of personal files at its disposal. 
These files cover almost every occupational class that was employed by the state. 
Among them is a huge collection of personal files which contains information about 
remuneration and promotion of district magistrates as well as about the supervisory 
institutions’ assessment of district magistrates’ performance in regard of their 
professional conduct and adherence to formal administrative processes. These records 
allow a deep analysis of remuneration and promotion decisions and their influence on 
district magistrates’ incentives to implement administrative and legal processes. 
The last part of this thesis deals with the question how everyday’s administration looked 
like in practice. For the 18th century there is a vast historical literature about the 
communication and enforcement of lordship at the local level. For Baden the works of 
Holenstein and Hohkamp are of special interest.51 For the 19th century the work of 
Eibach has to be mentioned.52 Actually measuring the efficiency of the bureaucracy, on 
the other side, is no easy task. For the 19th century I can solve this problem by using the 
criminal statistics of the Grand-Duchy as a tentative measure for legal capacity, the 
bureaucracy’s ability to enforce private contracts and to protect citizens’ property rights. 
Data on registered crime can be found in the Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege, an 
annually published series of the ministry of justice.53 A detailed historical analysis of the 
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material provided by the Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege can be found in Moses’ 
work.54 
Outline 
In order to deal with the questions how formal administrative and legal processes were 
implemented in Baden during the 19th century and whether the efficiency of the 
administration rose in the aftermath of reform, the thesis is organized in four chapters.55 
Chapter one gives an overview of the change of the administrative and legal processes 
as well as of the rules and regulations that governed district magistrates’ employment, 
dismissal and remuneration. While administrative and legal processes were only vaguely 
defined during the 18th century, they became more explicit during the first third of the 
19th century when a major reform of the state took place. Back then, also the rules of 
professional conduct were more clearly defined. But the early 19th century brought even 
further change: first, the rules of employment and dismissal were altered. From now on 
a university degree was obligatory for entering the Civil Service which increased the 
professionalization of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the right of the prince to 
dismiss a Civil Servant was confined. Dismissing a Civil Servant required a serious 
violation of the rules of professional conduct. At last, the methods and terms of 
payment of remuneration were also reformed at the beginning of the 19th century. 
While remuneration was mainly paid in kind or as participation in office fees during the 
18th century, district magistrates now received a fix cash payment paid quarterly by the 
government. The chapter argues that these widespread changes led to an increase in 
the bureaucracy’s efficiency around mid-19th century making property rights more 
secure. However, chapter one does not explain in detail how incentives of district 
magistrates to implement the formal administrative processes as well as to adhere to 
the rules of professional conduct changed during the 19th century and how this 
influenced the efficiency of the bureaucracy over time. These tasks are attacked in 
chapters two, three and four, respectively.  
Chapter two assesses the hypothesis that district magistrates’ remuneration rose during 
the 19th century in order to reflect the higher skill level as well as to compensate them 
for stronger controls and stricter discipline. The chapter tests the hypothesis by 
computing real living standards of district magistrates during the late 18th and entire 19th 
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century using a new consumption basket that reflects the material and social needs of 
members of the upper class. The empirical analysis shows that district magistrates had a 
high material living standard as well as a high position within the income distribution. 
However, living standards were already high during the 18th century in both absolute 
and relative terms. Furthermore, absolute and relative living standards decreased since 
the middle of the 19th century deteriorating district magistrates’ privileged position 
within society. Hence, the hypothesis that remuneration in the 19th century rose 
considerably compared to the 18th century does not hold. Higher skills and stricter 
discipline were not reflected by higher real wages during the 19th century. Nevertheless, 
it seems that district magistrates’ real remuneration was very competitive during the 
late 18th as well as for a long time during the 19th century. This may have attracted high-
skilled individuals who otherwise would have chosen a career in the private sector. 
Chapter three takes a closer look at the internal labor market for district magistrates in 
Baden. The chapter argues that the introduction of a hierarchy of pay levels and clearly 
defined rules of promotion at the beginning of the 19th century was a major incentive for 
district magistrates to implement formal administrative processes as well as to adhere 
to rules of professional conduct. During the 19th century, promotions were made 
dependent on supervisors’ assessments of district magistrates’ performance in regard to 
adherence to the rules of professional conduct and the implementation of 
administrative and legal processes. Thus, those district magistrates who stuck to the 
rules were rewarded with faster promotion and wider career prospects. The probability 
of promotion increased by 81 percent for those magistrates who received a positive 
assessment compared to magistrates with a neutral or negative assessment. But faster 
promotion in the case of adherence to the formal institutional framework was not the 
only incentive district magistrates faced during the 19th century. The relatively high real 
wages compared to their peer groups during the first half of the 19th century also 
constituted an incentive to stick to the rules. The high wage gap increased the potential 
costs of dismissal in the case of a violation of the rules of professional conduct or a 
repeated breach of formal administrative or legal processes.56 
Finally, chapter four measures the development of the bureaucracy’s efficiency during 
the 19th century. For the purpose of this chapter, efficiency is defined as legal capacity, 
that is: the bureaucracy’s ability to enforce private contracts as well as to protect its 
citizens’ property rights. Because of gaps in data availability, the chapter concentrates 
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on the latter part of legal capacity. Using data on local theft rates I can construct a 
measure for legal capacity. This measure indicates a rise of legal capacity during the 
second half of the 19th century. 
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1. The formal institutional framework of the Grand-Duchy 
of Baden in the 18th and 19th century and the Security of 
Property Rights 
This chapter analyzes the basic differences of the formal administrative and legal rules 
and processes of the Grand-Duchy of Baden between the late 18th and 19th century. 
Together these factors determine transaction costs and risk perception of individuals. 
But the formal institutional framework is not the only determinant of a country’s growth 
perspectives. The actual implementation of the latter trough state officials is also of 
great importance. Therefore, this chapter additionally discusses the role of state officials 
in the daily application of the formal institutional framework. 
1.1. The 18th Century State 
Analyzing the formal institutional framework of the 18th century state is difficult, mainly 
because the state known as the Grand-Duchy of Baden did not exist during the 18th 
century. The Grand-Duchy was the result of the integration of several territories in the 
course of the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss and the Napoleonic Wars.57 The core part 
of the later Grand-Duchy consisted of the magraviate of Baden with its center of power 
around Karlsruhe in the north and Lörrach in the south represented by the grey shaded 
areas in figure 1.1.58 Further important parts of the later Grand-Duchy were the parts on 
the right bank of the Rhine of the Palatinate and Further Austria. Because the 
magraviate was the most important part of the later Grand-Duchy, this chapter 
concentrates on this entity.59 
In total, one can argue that the 18th century core-territories of the later Grand-Duchy 
were all institutionally poorly developed. The small magraviate, for example, consisted 
of several disconnected territories around Karlsruhe in the north and Lörrach in the 
south. In the west and the east the territory adjoined the banks of the Rhine River and 
the Black Forest, respectively. The territories were ruled from Karlsruhe by the margrave 
and his central agencies.60 
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 For an overview of the political history of Baden see Schwarzmaier, Handbuch. 
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 The magraviate was itself the result of the integration of the territories of the catholic line of 
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 For the organization of the 18
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 century state see Grube, Vogteien, Ämter, Landkreise, pp. 98–
102 and Eibach, Staat, pp. 22-24; 31-33.  
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Figure 1.1: The Territory of Baden around 1800 
 
 
Source: (Grube, Vogteien, Ämter, Landkreise, p. 9) 
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There were three distinguishable institutions: the Rentkammer (responsible for financial 
issues), the Hofrat (the highest court in the territory) and the Geheimrat (or Privy 
Council), the advisory body of the prince which also had administrative, financial and 
judicial powers.61 These institutions were hardly specialized and heavily dependent on 
the prince’s power. For administrative purposes, the territory was divided into districts 
administered by state officials.62 These local magistrates were not only responsible for 
administrative issues – like public health, trade concessions, control of market rules, and 
other regulations concerning the daily life of subjects – but also for crime fighting and 
judicial issues at the first instance. Yet, administration and legal practice of the 18th 
century Baden lacked of clearly defined, comprehensive rules for everyday-practice in 
the districts. As a result of these drawbacks decision processes were not transparent and 
legal security was low during the 18th century. 
In the field of administration the main problem was the bulk of regulations produced by 
the absolute state.63 The aim of the absolute ruler was to control and regulate every 
aspect of his subjects’ daily lives. Therefore rulers produced a mass of regulations, called 
Policeyordnungen. The growing mass of regulations was hard to overlook; especially 
because of a missing ledger which would have bundled all regulations.64 Local 
magistrates dealt with this problem by ignoring the official regulations and applying local 
customs and ad-hoc solutions instead.65 Because such solutions were not codified and 
depended strongly on the actual distribution of power between district magistrates and 
local elites, the outcome of an administrative decision was not secure. 
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F. Hartung, Das Großherzogtum Sachsen unter der Regierung Carl Augusts 1775-1826, Weimar 
1923, pp. 204–206). 
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Legal institutions were also weak and favored intransparent and arbitrary decision 
making processes as well as the fragmentation of markets.66 During the 18th century 
three different law traditions were in use. Besides the Landrecht, a customary law and 
the natural law were used. The Landrecht was a written law code and mainly build on 
the unwritten customary law but was not identical with the latter. The Landrecht was 
first published in 1622, but over the years a bulk of by-laws was enacted which partly 
contradicted the original code. Thus, the law was open to the interpretation of the 
judges who could hardly be controlled by the parties, because the Landrecht was written 
in Latin. The customary and the natural law on the other side were not codified. As a 
result, these two traditions were subject of an active scientific debate, which meant that 
there were several interpretations. The lack of clearly defined legal principles led to 
severe differences in the actual legal practice of the districts. As in the case of 
administrative rules district magistrates often applied a mixture of the Landrecht and 
local customs. Yet, this mixture could change from case to case.67 This behavior made 
the outcome of a legal claim within the district unpredictable. 
The lack of a code of legal procedure made the problem of intransparent decision-
making processes even worse. District magistrates, for example, did not have to justify 
their judgments, which enlarged their scope of action. The high uncertainty about the 
outcome of a decision-making process, e.g. a building permission or a legal claim, thus 
increased transaction costs within the commune and hampered market transactions as 
well as capital investment in productivity-enhancing technologies.68 
A striking example for the insecurity about the outcome of a decision making process is 
the following incidence that occurred near Lörrach during the year 1775. Back then, a 
blacksmith was deterred from building a forge, although he had an official building 
permission. Nevertheless, the local magistrate countermanded the permission after he 
was bribed by the smith’s neighbor who wanted to prevent the construction of the 
forge. Even an appeal to the prince was unsuccessful, because the Smith’s petition was 
delayed by bribed clerks.69 Partial behavior of district magistrates and other state 
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furthermore possessed detailed knowledge about the local conditions. This suggests that the 
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officials was, however, not uncommon. There are also examples from other parts of the 
territory that later became the Grand-Duchy as well as from other German territories 
were state officials took bribes in exchange for granting personal benefits.70 But district 
magistrates also used the power they received from the intransparent decision making 
mechanisms described above to blackmail monetary and non-monetary benefits from 
subjects. 
Intransparent administrative and legal rules and processes were certainly one reason for 
the high incidence of corruption during the 18th century; but not the only one. The rules 
that governed remuneration and responsibilities also set up incentives to engage in 
corrupt behavior. During the 18th century, district magistrates were relatively 
independent from their employers, because of two reasons: 
First, remuneration was mainly paid in kind and not in cash. That is, district magistrates 
were paid with a legal claim on taxes, dues, court charges and administrative fees paid 
by the subjects. Normally the part of remuneration that was paid directly or indirectly by 
the subjects ranged from 45 to 90 percent. A striking example for such an arrangement 
is the remuneration that the Obervogt of Triberg – the district magistrate representing 
the government of Further Austria – received during the year 1753. The components of 
his remuneration are depicted in table one. The main part of his remuneration came 
from the participation in administrative fees and court charges followed by payments in 
kind and revenue sharing of incomes from dues and taxes. All these components of 
remuneration were paid by the subjects of the district that was administered by the 
Obervogt. Only a very small part of remuneration was paid by the government. If one 
only counts the fixed monetary income of the Obervogt, the share of the government’s 
part in his remuneration was 7.6 percent. But even when one adds the subsidy to the 
Obervogt’s housing costs, the governments share only increases to 9.6 percent of total 
remuneration (see table 1.1). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                               
author himself had a position within the administration of the magraviate. In this case one 
cannot exclude that the letter was intended to provide the author with a political or personal 
benefit, e.g. through the elimination of a rival for a seat in the Hofrat or the Privy Council. The 
letter can be found in the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, section 120, fascicle 1183 (thereafter 
cited as GLA 120/1183). 
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 For Baden see GLA 229/353. The fascicle contains a letter of the baron of Adelsheim to the 
elector of the Palatinate in which he complains about the corruption of one of his magistrates.  
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Table 1.1: Annual Remuneration of the Obervogt of Triberg in 1753 (in fl.) 
Monetary Income 58.20 
Subsidy to housing costs 20 
In Kind 142.26 
Participation in the revenue 
of dues and taxes 
130 
Administrative fees and 
court charges 
460 
Total 810.46 
Monetary income in (%) of 
Total 
7.2 
Source: Hohkamp, Herrschaft, p. 41. 
Second, district magistrates were hardly controlled through the higher administrative 
organizations. Although members of the central agencies visited the countryside, they 
were not interested in supervising local districts. The main focus of these visits was to 
record the country’s resources.71 
On the other hand, the rules that governed remuneration made district magistrates 
dependent on local elites whose co-operation was needed when the former would like 
to receive income from their legal claims against the district’s subjects.72 Therefore, it 
was not unusual that district magistrates helped local elites to embezzle taxes or to 
preserve or introduce economic privileges from which the latter received a monetary or 
non-monetary benefit.73 The lack of control through the central agencies supported this 
behavior. Corrupt activities were seldom detected and even when drawbacks were 
reported to higher agencies, district magistrates had to fear no consequences. The latter 
was one of the main complaints of Ernst Sigismund Herzog a member of the 
Rentkammer and later director of the Hofrat. In 1786 Herzog anonymously published a 
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collection of fictive letters in which he accused the majority of district magistrates and 
state officials to hush up any drawbacks that occur in the administration of the country. 
In his view this behavior could be explained with the officials’ snugness and 
slothfulness.74 
Another effect of the 18th century remuneration scheme was the high insecurity about 
the timing and the actual level of income. Problems of liquidity also arose, because 
magistrates were paid a quarterly instead of a monthly remuneration. Additionally, 
magistrates often had to pick up remuneration in kind at the manorial depositories.75 
Such problems of liquidity often were an incentive to embezzle taxes, asking subjects for 
additional rent-payments, higher office fees or court charges as well as to accept bribes 
or to abuse administrative power in order to extract higher rent payments.76  
The structure of remuneration furthermore set incentives to focus on such duties which 
allowed the collection of fees, while other, less profitable duties – like fighting crime – 
were neglected.77 Hence, district magistrates did not internalize positive external effects 
that would have increased (physical) security of property rights. 
The 18th century institutional framework, including formal administrative and legal rules 
as well as rules that governed the incentives for district magistrates to misuse and 
disregard these formal rules was hence relatively disadvantageous for economic growth. 
Intransparent decision mechanisms were used by district magistrates in order to grant 
themselves or their networks a monetary or non-monetary benefit. This behavior 
discouraged those individuals who were not network members to engage in economic 
activities by increasing the uncertainty about the security of property rights.78 
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1.2. The 19th Century State 
The 18th century institutional was reformed at the turn of the 19th century. The defeat of 
the Holy Roman Empire through Napoleon served as a promoter of reform.79 As a result 
of the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss in 1803 and the alliance with Napoleon in the 
following wars the small magraviate quadrupled in size and population forming the 
Grand-Duchy of Baden. In the period between 1802 and 1815 the territory of the 
country grew from 3.900 km2 to 15.000 km2. Likewise the country’s population 
increased from 250,000 inhabitants to one million.80 The new country incorporated 
parts of the Palatinate and Further Austria as well as myriads of smaller secular and 
clerical territories. As a result, the princes of Baden for the first time ruled over a 
cohesive territory that was defined by the Lake Constance in the south, the Rhine River 
in the West, the Black Forest in the east and the Odenwald in the north-east. This 
territory is illustrated by the grey shaded areas in figure 1.2. 
The fast and huge increase of territory made institutional reforms necessary.81 
Administrative and legal institutions were reformed in 1809 and 1810, respectively. The 
reform of the organization of administration was undertaken by minister of state 
Sigismund von Reitzenstein82 who introduced a three level hierarchy:83 Reitzenstein 
rearranged the old districts and formed 118 new districts called Ämter84. 
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Figure 1.2: The Grand Duchy of Baden during the Napoleonic Area 
 
Source: (Kerkhoff/Miller/Beck, Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg 1972-1988), vol.1 map 
VII. 
These new administrative units were smaller than the old districts and should consist of 
about 7000 inhabitants.85 As during the 18th century, the districts were made 
responsible for civil and criminal proceedings as well as for administrative issues like 
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public security, public health, administration of poor relief, the promotion of agriculture 
and industry, granting trade concessions, the supervision of public works, taxation and 
the financial issues of the communes in their district. Above the districts Reitzenstein 
created a new intermediary administrative level called Kreise or circles. The Kreise 
should serve as the link between the central agencies and the districts by 
communicating instructions to the districts, collecting and summarizing information 
from the districts as well as by controlling the work of district magistrates, called 
Amtmänner. At the top of the new administration were the ministries that replaced the 
central agencies of the 18th century. The ministries were more specialized than the 
collegial working councils and the Rentkammer. Reitzenstein introduced six ministries: 
the ministry of interior, finance, justice, foreign affairs and war. Their work was co-
ordinated by the ministry of the state which was directly controlled by the Grand–Duke. 
In contrast to the 18th century, the 19th century organization clearly defined the tasks of 
the different administrative stages. That is, administration was from now on organized 
by clearly defined and straightforward rules and not by an unmanageable and 
contradicting set of by-laws. Thus, in theory the outcome of a decision making process 
became more secure. By introducing an all-embracing organizational structure 
Reitzenstein also abolished the myriads of local customs and rules ending market 
fragmentation from this source.  
Legal institutions were reformed as well. As a result of the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, the country inherited territories with different law 
traditions. Thus, fragmentation of the law skyrocket after 1803 and made a reform of 
the legal system indispensable. This necessity together with slight French pressure 
caused Johann Nepomuk Brauer,86 the predecessor of Reitzenstein in the office of 
minister of state, to introduce a new Landrecht that mainly adopted the Code Napoleon 
in 1809.87 On one side the new law introduced clearly defined property rights – that is, 
clearly defined rights about resources and the right to write contracts on them. The new 
law also implemented more transparent decision mechanisms by abolishing the three 
old law traditions and replacing them with clearly defined principles which made the 
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outcome of a trial more predictable. Additionally, the introduction of the new civil law 
formally abolished local customs theoretically ending uncertainty and market 
fragmentation from this source.  
The reform of administrative and legal rules was accompanied by an exact definition of 
district magistrates’ duties and obligations. Furthermore there were stricter guidelines 
in respect to administrative processes and their professional conduct. These guidelines 
included e.g. the obligation to periodical report about several issues, rules how to 
organize the district’s depository as well as formal guidelines for civil trials.88 The latter 
defined the rights of the parties, confined the power of magistrates by allowing lawyers 
and introduced more transparency by making civil trials public.89 District magistrates 
were furthermore advised to show an exemplary way of living, e.g. abstaining from 
alcohol abuse and running into debts, and to treat citizens in a calm and politely way.90 
However, the standardization of formal administrative processes as well as the 
implementation of rules of professional conduct took a long time. First attempts in this 
direction were made with the Hofratsinstruktion of 1794; further regulations were 
added in the reform period around 1809.91 Yet, the reformer Reitzenstein was dismissed 
in 181092 and could not pass implementation rules for his new organization of the 
administration. The same is true for the legal system. Although the new code of civil law 
was introduced in 1810, this law was not accompanied by guidelines of how to organize 
a process. Detailed implementation rules therefore did not follow before the 1830’s.93 In 
the case of criminal law the situation was even worse. This part of the law was not 
reformed before 1852. Then the reform, however, included already practical guidelines 
for the criminal process which ameliorated legal security of the accused.94  
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At last, the rules and regulations that governed district magistrates’ employment and 
remuneration were reformed. An important step in this regard was the Civil Service 
Reform Law of 1819.95 The law basically addressed all state-employees with an academic 
(e.g. judicial) education, making them “Beamte” or civil servants. For district magistrates 
had to hold a degree in law, they became a part of the corps of civil servants. The Civil 
Service Reform Law thus excluded candidates who only had clerical training leading to a 
higher professionalization of the bureaucracy. The law introduced three important 
innovations: first, civil servants’ social status was increased, e.g. by making (verbal) 
attacks on civil servants a lèse-majesté and by introducing uniforms which was a symbol 
of power, because the Grand-Duke also appeared in uniform.96 Second, the law granted 
pension payments and widow’s allowance to all civil servants.97 This also was a social 
privilege, because civil servants were one of the few groups at this time which 
benefitted from these innovations. Third, the law defined civil servants’ duties against 
the state and introduced a set of sanctions for the case of a neglect of duty. 
Furthermore, the state had the right to relocate, retire or reactivate his employees at his 
will. 
The methods and terms of payment were also reformed during the second decade of 
the 19th century.98 Participation in office fees, court charges, taxes and other dues was 
abolished between 1809 and the early 1820’s.99 Payments of the communes and 
remuneration in kind were abolished during the same period, as well. In return a district 
magistrate would from now on receive a fix cash payment by the Grand Duke.  
These reforms had three effects: First, district magistrates were from now on more 
dependent on their employer – the prince and his central government. They faced clear 
rules of professional conduct and had to obey to formal administrative processes. If they 
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neglected these obligations, the government could sanction its employees, e.g. by 
relocating them to another, less attractive position or even by dismissing them. In this 
case, a Civil Servant would also have lost his claim on pension payments and widows’ 
allowance. Such a practice, however, made more detailed controls necessary. Therefore 
a control system was build up in which the Kreise should supervise the performance of 
district magistrates in regard of the adherence to formal administrative processes and 
the respect of rules of professional conduct. Supervisors should control district 
magistrates’ work by assessing their reports to the supervisory institutions. Because this 
system of control proved to be inoperable, it was replaced by a system of personal 
visitations during the 1830’s. Another mean of control was the establishment of the 
Gendarmerie, a security police force. The members of the police forces reported the 
number of individuals they arrested to the ministry of interior. Given these reports, the 
ministry could control if district magistrates actually started an inquiry.100 Besides of 
stricter rules, closer control and more options to sanction district magistrates, there was 
a further reason which made magistrates dependent on the government. Since the early 
19th century the government was the source of the magistrates’ power by increasing his 
social status, especially by granting them an exceptional position in the civil and criminal 
law. 
The second effect of the reforms is connected with the first. Besides increasing the 
dependency on their employer, the reforms also reduced the dependency on local elites. 
Remuneration and pensions were now fully paid by the state. Furthermore, every claim 
was paid in money at fixed intervals. Therefore, problems of liquidity could not occur 
anymore. At last, uncertainty about the actual level of income also vanished. Thus, the 
incentives to collude with local elites, to accept bribes, or to blackmail subjects did not 
longer exist.  
District magistrates now had no incentives to concentrate only on duties from which 
they could earn a considerable amount of fees. Indeed, remuneration was made more 
and more dependent on a magistrates’ performance in regard to the formal 
administrative processes and the respect of the rules of professional conduct.101 
Magistrates therefore internalized positive external effects they created through their 
sound administration of a district.  
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The reforms of the 19th century thus introduced more clearly defined rules as well as 
more transparent decisions mechanisms, including stricter guidelines for district 
magistrates. The rules of employment and remuneration were also altered in a way that 
increased the professionalization of the bureaucracy and confined incentives to engage 
in corrupt actions. Hence, the reforms should have reduced transaction costs and 
increased legal security creating an environment more conducive to growth than during 
the 18th century.102 However, there is one qualification that has to be made. Guidelines 
that regulated the implementation of the new laws as well as the system of controls 
were not effectively in work until the 1830’s. A sound working of the new institutional 
framework during the second and third decade of the 19th century was therefore not 
possible. Missing implementation rules granted district magistrates a high scope of 
action comparable to the 18th century and forced to improvise as during the previous 
century. As a result ad-hoc decisions remained the rule and legal practice still differed 
between districts. That is, local customs still played an important role in the 
administrative and legal practice of the districts. As in the preceding century, this 
environment favored intransparent and arbitrary decisions.103 This is not surprising given 
the fact that there was no change of the workforce directly after the reforms of the early 
19th century. Indeed, the workforce did not change considerably before the 1830’s when 
a large number of older district magistrates were retired and replaced with younger 
successors.104 The new administrative and legal rules therefore had to be implemented 
by employees who were used to totally different work customs. This was especially true 
for those district magistrates who formerly worked in the small clerical and secular 
territories.105 The first generation of district magistrates that worked under the new 
administrative and legal rules showed severe faults in the implementation of the new 
institutional framework because of two reasons: 
First, there were magistrates who were intellectually not able to understand and to 
implement the new institutional framework. This was often the case with those 
magistrates who were taken over from smaller territories.106 A striking example is the 
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case of district magistrate Christ who was retired in the late 1830’s, because he was 
apparently unable to catch legal problems at all. As a result a simple inheritance claim 
that could have been solved within three month was retarded by six years.107 With a 
similar motivation the leading magistrate108 of the district of Waldshut asked for the 
retirement of his employee, district magistrate Scheef. Before he was taken over as a 
district magistrate in the Grand-Duchy of Baden, Scheef worked in a small clerical 
territory. In his new position he was responsible for legal issues. However, he proved 
totally incompetent in this field.109 At last, there were some magistrates who did not 
only lack knowledge of the new administrative and legal rules and had problems to 
implement them but also did not possess basic literal skills.110 
Besides the intellectual incompetence to understand and to implement the new 
administrative and legal rules, district magistrates also denied the implementation of 
the latter, because they felt disempowered. While district magistrates had a high scope 
of action during the 18th century thanks to contradicting regulations and unclear defined 
processes, the reforms of the 19th century took a lot of this power by defining 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. The disempowerment of 
district magistrates was reflected by the new organization of the administration. While 
district magistrates were only responsible to the prince during the 18th century, the 
introduction of the Kreise as a new supervisory institution also relegated district 
magistrates within the hierarchy of the administration. Many older district magistrates 
who were used to the pre-reform customs did not want to accept their degradation and 
ignored the new administrative processes and rules of professional conduct whenever 
they could.111 This behavior can be best illustrated by an observation made by district 
magistrate Joseph Reichlin von Meldegg. In his memoirs he reports, that during his early 
years in the administration – von Meldegg entered the Civil Service in 1829 – older 
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district magistrates dumped letters and instructions of superior agencies when they 
received too many of them.112 
As Joachim Eibach reports in his book, district magistrates more and more adhered to 
the formal administrative processes and rules of professional conduct since the 1830’s. 
On the one hand, this may be a result of stricter and more clearly defined guidelines that 
were enacted since the 1830’s and a generational change in the corps of district 
magistrates. Although this explanation surely plays a role, it may be short-sighted, 
because it ignores the internal dynamics of the administration; e.g. the interaction 
between the supervisory agencies at the intermediary and central level on the one side 
and district magistrates on the other side. For a more detailed explanation of how 
adherence to formal administrative processes and respect for the rules of professional 
conduct was achieved since the 1830’s, an analysis of the staffing policy seems to be 
reasonable. Such an inquiry should concentrate on the incentives that motivated district 
magistrates to actually implement the new administrative and legal rules and processes. 
This analysis is undertaken in chapter two and three. 
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2. Civil Servants’ Living Standards in the Grand-Duchy of 
Baden, 1780-1913 
 
2.1. Introduction 
At the beginning of the 19th century Baden gained control over new territories. To rule 
its enlarged territories, the state introduced, even before Prussia, several legal and 
administrative reforms.113 In order to implement the new administrative and legal 
framework which established more clearly defined rules and rights and introduced more 
transparent decision mechanisms, the government built up a specialized Civil Service. 
This new organization was, unlike its 18th century predecessor, characterized by the 
professional education of its members and a stronger control through the prince.114 In 
return, it is argued, Civil Servants received a remuneration including old age pensions 
and widows insurance that ensured a good living115 and reflected social status.116 Yet, 
there are surprisingly few studies which actually test this hypothesis empirically.117 
Hence, it remains unclear whether remuneration could actually guarantee a good living 
and reflected social status. Furthermore, we do not know whether a high and socially 
adequate remuneration was a new phenomenon of the 19th century. This chapter is a 
first attempt to fill the gap by estimating real living standards of district magistrates in 
Baden during the late 18th and the 19th century.  
Existing studies about the living standards of Civil Servants often rely on anecdotic 
evidence118 or Abel’s concept of corn wages.119 But corn wages are a very rough 
measure of well-being, because people did not consume corn but bread and other 
foodstuffs as well as consumer goods. Thus, using corn wages may distort the picture of 
Civil Servants’ living standards. In this chapter, I will circumvent this shortcoming by 
introducing a consumption basket that reflects the needs of a member of the upper 
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 See e.g. Kübler, Besoldung und Lebenshaltung. An exception is Gerhard who constructs a price 
index composed of several basic goods to deflate nominal incomes. See Gerhard, 
Diensteinkommen. For the concept of corn wages cf. W. Abel, Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe 
from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, London 1980. 
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class.120 In contrast to the corn wage approach, my upper class consumption basket 
includes several foodstuffs as well as expenditure for sanitation, housing and luxuries 
and thus should reflect upper class consumption patterns more exactly.121 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section describes the 
development of district magistrates’ nominal incomes starting in the late 18th century. 
The third section focuses on the construction of the luxury consumption basket. The 
fourth section will then present real incomes of district magistrates in absolute terms. 
Furthermore the section compares district magistrates’ living standards with those of 
other social groups and analyzes the evolution of district magistrates’ incomes over 
time. The last section summarizes the results. 
2.2. Nominal Incomes between 1780 and 1860 
To compute real living standards, we need information about nominal remuneration. I 
therefore collected remuneration data since the late 18th century.122 Unfortunately, 
remuneration data are patchy until the first reform of remuneration in 1809 and suffer 
from the fact that some records only report parts of total remuneration. Most sources 
only report the margraves payments to his servants while others also include income 
from participation in office fees, court charges and dues. This leads to a distorted picture 
of the remuneration scheme in the late 18th century. As table 2.1 shows, a 18th century 
noble district magistrate earned between ca. 2400 and 3300 guilders (fl) per year 
(whether one accounts for office fees or not),123 while Gothein reports the typically 
remuneration of a non-noble magistrate to be approximately 1600 fl including office 
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 The consumption basket is based on the work of Robert Allen. Cf. R. C. Allen, The Great 
Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War, in: 
Explorations in Economic History, 2001, pp. 411–447. 
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 The luxury consumption basket presented below will concentrate on material living standards. 
This may be criticized, because the modern definition of living standard also includes immaterial 
factors like health, education and happiness. One way to consider some of these factors would 
be the construction of a Human Development Index, as Andrea Wagner did for Germany in the 
first half of the 20
th
 century. Cf. A. Wagner, Ein Human Development Index für Deutschland: Die 
Entwicklung des Lebensstandards von 1920 bis 1960, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2, 
2003, pp. 171–199. Yet, group specific data about these factors is hard to obtain. Therefore this 
article concentrates on material living standards. 
122
 During the 18
th
 century remuneration included non-monetary components. I translated these 
non-monetary components into money-equivalents using the Taxordnung; i.e. the official 
regulation of prices for foodstuffs and other goods. Using the Taxordnung for converting non-
monetary components of remuneration is feasible, because magistrates were bound to the prices 
of the Taxordnung. 
123
 See Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe section 120 fascicle 232; thereafter cited as GLA 120/232. 
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fees.124 Hence, the income of the noble magistrate seems to be very high and not 
representative. In contrast, the 738 fl earned by the second Amtmann of the Oberamt 
Yberg125 seem to be very low, given Gothein’s report of typical remuneration. These 
inconsistencies in the records combined with a small number of surviving records make 
it difficult to reconstruct the 18th century remuneration scheme directly from the 
sources. 
Table 2.1: Nominal Remuneration of District Magistrates in fl. 
 fl 
Noble magistrate (late 18th c.) 3289 – 2383 
City Manager (1819) 2800 – 2400 
Magistrate (since 1819) 2400 – 1200 
Noble magistrate (1808-1819) 2492 – 2192 
Non-noble magistrate (1808-1819) 1827 – 1258 
Non-noble magistrate (late 18th c.) 1600 – 738 
Junior civil servant (since 1819) 600 – 800 
Junior civil servant (1808-1819) 600 
Sources: GLA 120/232; 134/32, 57; 233/3387; Gothein, Johann Georg Schlosser, pp. 8–9 and 
Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, p. 615. 
In 1808 government passed a new remuneration scheme.126 The scheme granted a 
district magistrate at least 1258 fl including free lodging or a subsidy to housing costs of 
200 fl. Total remuneration consisted of a cash payment and remuneration in kind. The 
remuneration scheme was structured into six classes. During the 18th century, a non-
noble district magistrate could advance up to the fourth class from the bottom which 
gave him remuneration equal to 1822 fl. The fifth and the sixth class were connected 
with the title of an Obervogt and a Landvogt, respectively. While the position of an 
Obervogt (2192 fl) was opened for non-noble magistrates during the turn of the century, 
the position of the Landvogt (2492 fl) was reserved to the noble district magistrates. This 
discrimination between noble and non-noble district magistrates was even more distinct 
if one considers that the workload of non-noble magistrates was higher than that of 
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 This figure is reported by E. Gothein, Johann Georg Schlosser als badischer Beamter, in: 
Badische Historische Kommission (ed), Heidelberg 1899, pp. 1–109, here p. 8. However, it was 
possible to get a higher remuneration. 
125
 See GLA 134/32. 
126
 See GLA 233/3387. 
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their noble counterparts.127 Consequently, there is little wonder that non-noble district 
magistrates resented the traditional promotion policies.128 
In 1819, a new non-discriminating hierarchical pay scheme based on full cash payment 
was introduced. Within the local Civil Service four different ranks can be distinguished. 
New entrants into the Civil Service, called junior Civil Servants (or Assessor) constituted 
the lowest rank. An Assessor assisted the more experienced district magistrates 
(Amtmänner). In this position a Civil Servant earned between 600 and 800 fl.129 District 
magistrates could earn between 1200 fl and 2400 fl including free lodging or a subsidy to 
housing costs. Yet, this group can be divided between those magistrates who were only 
responsible for an individual branch of administration like civil and criminal justice or the 
police (called zweiter Amtmann) and the leading magistrates (Amtsvorstand) who were 
responsible for the administration of the entire district.130 Naturally, the remuneration 
of the latter was higher, ranging between 1600 and 2400 fl.131 At last, leading 
magistrates in the few big cities of the country – called city manager (Stadtdirektor) – 
could even earn up to 2800 fl.132 However, such positions were rare which makes a 
maximal remuneration of 2400 fl the more realistic threshold. Taking 2400 fl as 
benchmark, maximal nominal incomes decreased by 3.7 percent, compared to 1808. For 
those magistrates who earned up to 2800 fl, maximal nominal incomes rose by 12.4 
percent compared to 1808. Comparing the two lowest salary levels, nominal incomes 
slightly decreased by 4.6 percent. Thus, taking nominal values and the more realistic 
2400 fl threshold into account, one has to assert that nominal incomes decreased at the 
beginning of the 19th century. Yet, there were two developments which we do not have 
considered so far: First, there was a larger improvement for non-noble magistrates, 
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 Districts were officially run by a noble Landvogt who was assisted by a non-noble magistrate. 
In reality, however, the non-noble magistrate administered the district without much help of the 
Landvogt. 
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 Cf. Lenel, Beiträge, p. 40. 
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 There were some candidates who entered the Civil Service directly on the intermediary level. 
Yet, the bulk of new employees entered at the local level. 
130
 Some districts were staffed with only one district magistrate. In this case the magistrate would 
automatically become the leading magistrate. Other districts were staffed with two or more 
district magistrates. In this case, the magistrates divided the tasks among each other. Yet, one 
magistrate had discretionary power over the others. This magistrate was called leading district 
magistrate (Amtsvorstand). 
131
 The level of remuneration was also dependent on the size and population density of the 
district. 
132
 The remuneration scheme can be found in GLA 233/3387. Cf. also Wunder, Die Badische 
Beamtenschaft, pp. 613–615 and von Müller, Der öffentliche Dienst, p. 119. Wunder reports a 
remuneration scheme similar to the one cited above. This scheme displays only remuneration up 
to 2400 fl. Müller, in contrast, refers to another remuneration scheme which includes the 
position of a city manager who could earn up to 2800 fl.  
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because high positions in the hierarchy were not anymore reserved to noble 
magistrates; for this big group of district magistrates maximal nominal remuneration 
rose by 9.5 percent taken the 2400 fl income as benchmark and given that a non-noble 
magistrate could hold the position of an Obervogt right before the 1819-reform.133 
Second, government introduced pension payments and widow’s allowances. Before 
1819 there was no legal claim to pension payments and the number of granted pensions 
was small. The civil service reform law134 of 1819 granted pensions to all civil servants 
who had been employed for more than five years. Under this scheme, civil servants 
could retire with 70 percent of their last remuneration after ten years of service. 
Benefits rose by one percentage point for each additional year. Thus, after 40 years a 
district magistrate could retire with his full remuneration.135 
In the course of time, government reduced the level of pension payments by a 
considerable amount in order to cut costs:136 In 1831/32, benefits were reduced to 56 
percent for seniorities between five and ten years. Pensions increased about 0.8 
percentage points per annum for each additional year of service. Consequently, a district 
magistrate would be retired with 80 percent of his last remuneration after 40 years of 
service. This scheme remained in charge until 1890. Then, pension payments accounted 
for 30 percent after ten years of service, rose by 1.5 percentage points each additional 
year but were confined to a maximum of 75 percent of the servant’s last 
remuneration.137 
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 Compared to the 2800 fl threshold maximal nominal remuneration for non-noble magistrates 
even rose by 27.7 percent. 
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 For a brief history of the Civil Service Reform Law see Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, 
pp. 21–50. 
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 Großherzogtum Baden, Staatsdienerpragmatik, in: Staats- und Regierungsblatt, Karlsruhe 
1819, pp. 11–18. The assessment base of pension payments was fix remuneration; that was 
remuneration without service loads, forage and subsidies in favor of the employment of clerks. 
Reasons for retirement were illness, physical infirmity and administrative reasons. If the reasons 
which led to retirement disappeared, the civil servant had to return to duty. Pension payments 
were not allowed to exceed 4000 fl. This last regulation was only important for the higher 
branches of the Civil Service whose remuneration and therefore their pensions exceeded the 
maximum of 2800 fl that a district magistrate could earn. For a brief history of Civil Service 
pensions see Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 21-36; 51-70.Cf. also von Müller, Der 
öffentliche Dienst, p. 55. 
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 In 1831 government declared 20 percent of civil servants’ remuneration as functional. If the 
remuneration counted for more than 4500 fl even 100 percent of the amount exceeding 4500 fl 
was declared functional remuneration. The remaining 80 percent of remuneration were the new 
assessment base for pension payments. At first, this rule was applied for the fiscal years 1831/32 
and 1832/33. However, the rule was prolonged each year and in 1844 it was implemented 
irrevocable. Cf. von Müller, Der öffentliche Dienst, pp. 65-66; 110. 
137
 von Müller, Der öffentliche Dienst, pp. 64–65. 
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Widows insurance was first established in Baden in 1758. In its early stages, membership 
was not obligatory and the insurance had only little funds. As a result, pension payments 
fluctuated with the cash position of the insurance and usually paid only a pittance.138 
The shortly-lived first civil service law from 1809139 made membership obligatory. 
Pensions ranged from 15 to 20 percent of the husband's remuneration.140 
Eight years later, in 1818, the constitution introduced a legal claim to widow's insurance 
which has to be interpreted as a significant improvement.141 In 1819 the civil service law 
improved widow's pension further by allowing a bonus of 50 percent of the regular 
pension which was entirely paid by the state instead of private contributions.142 Since 
then, widow's pension accounted for 25 percent of the servant's remuneration.143 
Obviously, the prince was now willing to pay families of Civil Servants a decent standard 
of living. 
Pension payments and widows insurance, thus, both increased material well-being of 
district magistrates and their families after 1809/1819. Since the 1830’s, after 40 years 
of duty a magistrate could retire with 80 percent of his last remuneration while a widow 
received 25 percent of the last remuneration of her late husband.144 Although a benefit 
of 25 percent may seem modest, it has to be considered that widows often moved in 
with their son or son in law and thus had less expenditure.145 
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 Payments were about 52 fl and 63 fl in 1775 and 1792, respectively. Cf. von Müller, Der 
öffentliche Dienst, pp. 24–26; Wunder, Privilegierung und Disziplinierung, p. 144 and Windelband, 
Verwaltung, pp. 307–308. 
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 The first Civil Service Law was enacted in the April of 1809 and abolished in November of the 
same year. The reason for the abolishment was a change in the position of the leading minister 
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his predecessor, because of his great administrative reform which required dislocations and 
retirements that would have been too costly under the pension-rules of the civil service law. The 
paragraphs that regulated widow’s allowances were, however, not abolished. See Wunder, Die 
Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 36–37. 
140
 If the widow had to care for children she obtained an additional payment. When the widow 
re-married, allowance was reduced. Staats- und Regierungsblatt, Karlsruhe 1809, pp. 161–179. 
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 Großherzogtum Baden, Die Verfassung des Großherzogtums Baden vom 22. August 1818, mit 
allen Abänderungen bis zum Gesetz vom 24. August 1904, in: K. Binding (ed), Deutsche 
Staatsgrundgesetze in diplomatisch genauem Abdruck, Leipzig 1904, § 1–39, here § 25. 
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 Cf. Großherzogtum Baden, Staatsdienerpragmatik. 
143
 As before, allowance ceased if widows re-married or if orphans reached the age of 18. Cf. J. 
Eibach, Loyalität und "standesgemäße" Lebensweise. Zur Entstehung der staatlichen 
Beamtenhinterbliebenenpensionen am Beispiel Badens, in: Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des 
Oberrheins, 1991, pp. 503–513, here p. 507; Großherzogtum Baden, Staatsdienerpragmatik and 
Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, p. 145. 
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 Allowances were even increased up to 33.25 percent in 1876. Cf. Eibach, Loyalität, pp. 511–
512. 
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 Cf. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, p. 145. 
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Hence, the 19th century reform seems to have a pronounced effect on material 
maintenance of district magistrates and their families in the form of pension payments 
and widows insurance rather than on remuneration which seems to be already high 
during the 18th century. 
However, even if nominal remuneration was high before the reforms in the second 
decade of the 19th century, magistrates’ incomes have to be put in context with both 
price levels and real incomes of other peer groups in order to make secure propositions 
about the evolution of district magistrates absolute and relative living standards in the 
late 18th and 19th century. This is especially important for verifying whether living 
standards slightly deteriorated after the reforms, like the nominal evidence would 
suggest. Therefore the next sections develop a real income index based on an upper-
class consumption basket and compare district magistrates’ real incomes with those of 
peer groups. 
2.3. The Construction of the Luxury Consumption Basket 
In order to compare material well-being of district magistrates over time and relative to 
peer groups, I constructed a consumption basket that reflects the consumption pattern 
of the local upper class. Recently, Robert Allen introduced a very useful computation 
method.146 In his consumption basket, Allen reported information about the daily caloric 
contents as well as grams of proteins of the included items. The information about the 
nutritional value makes it possible to adjust the consumption basket to the needs of 
different social groups. In his original paper, Allen constructed a poverty line 
consumption basket using silver prices and quantities in Strasbourg. The price index is 
constructed as a Laspeyres index with the period between 1745 and 1754 as base 
period. The basket includes foodstuffs and some other basic goods like expenditure for 
clothing, sanitation, light and heat. In total, the basket provided 1940 calories and 80 
grams of proteins per day. According to Fogel, who estimated a distribution of the daily 
consumption of calories in late 18th century England and France, this would put an 
individual in the second decile in England and in the third decile in France.147 
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 See Allen, The Great Divergence and again R. C. Allen, The British industrial revolution in global 
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 R. Fogel, The Conquest of High Mortality and Hunger in Europe and America. Timing and 
Mechanisms, in: P. Higonnetet al. (ed), Favorites of Fortune. Technology, Growth, and Economic 
Development since the Industrial Revolution, Cambridge 1991, pp. 33–71, here p. 45. 
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Table 2.2: Allen’s Poverty Line Consumption Basket (Prices are Averages of Prices in 
Strasbourg between 1745-1754, in g Silver) 
 Consumption 
per year and 
head 
Price per 
unit (in g 
silver) 
Spending 
share  
(in %) 
Calories 
per day 
Proteins per 
day (in g) 
Bread 182 kg 0.693 30.4 1222 50 
Beans/peas 52 l 0.477 6.0 160 10 
Meat 26 kg 2.213 13.9 178 14 
Butter 5.2 kg 3.470 4.4 104 0 
Cheese 5.2 kg 2.843 3.6 53 3 
Eggs 52  0.100 1.3 11 1 
Beer 182 l 0.470 20.6 212 2 
Soap 2.6 kg 2.880 1.8   
Linen 5 m 4.369 5.3   
Candles 2.6 kg 4.980 3.1   
Lamp oil 2.6 l 7.545 4.7   
Fuel 5 M BTU148 4.164 5.0   
Total  414.754 100 1940 80 
Source: Allen, The Great Divergence, p. 421. 
However, district magistrates were members of the upper classes and thus had a higher 
consumption of food and other basic goods. But how much more goods would an upper 
class household consume? Allen’s analysis of Alexander Somerville’s workers’ budgets 
may give a hint.149 In the original publication Somerville presented expenditures of four 
different household types that only differed in their weekly income and thus also in their 
expenditures.150 Allen converted the information about weekly good-consumption of 
the different household types into a daily consumption of calories and proteins per 
head. According to Allen, the worker household with the highest weekly income of 318 
pence consumed 3937 calories and 147 grams of proteins per day and head.151 This is a 
little more than twice the amount of calories and proteins that the poverty line 
consumption basket provides. And it represents the caloric consumption of a member of 
the upper classes: according to Fogel, an individual who consumed 3937 calories per day 
was in the 10th decile of the French and in the 9th decile of the English caloric 
distribution.152 That is, in order to adjust the consumption basket to the consumption 
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 See Allen, Industrial Revolution, p. 47. The data was collected by Alexander Somerville in 1843. 
See A. Somerville, A Letter to the Farmers of England on the Relationship of Manufactures and 
Agriculture, by One Who Has Whistled at the Plough, London 1843. 
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 See Allen, Industrial Revolution, p. 47. 
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 See Fogel, Conquest, here p. 45. Unfortunately, there is no distribution for proteins. However, 
the picture should be similar. 
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pattern of the upper class, it would be possible to double the consumption of the goods 
that were included into Allen’s poverty line basket. 
However, there are two caveats to this simple rule. First, while a household with a 
weekly income of 318 pence had a yearly income, measured in grams of silver, of 7276 
grams, district magistrates could earn up to 26712 grams of silver p. a. One may 
therefore argue that district magistrates could have consumed even more calories and 
basic goods. Hence, the goods of the poverty line consumption basket had to be more 
than doubled. Although it is possible that members of the upper class would consume 
more than twice the poverty line consumption basket it is not plausible. As we know 
from consumption theory, the consumption of a good has a saturation point. That is 
individual goods are not consumed up to infinity. This is especially true for basic 
foodstuffs: up to a certain point the human body would not demand the ingestion of 
more calories or proteins. As Fogel’s caloric distribution shows, the consumption of 3937 
calories is close to such a saturation point: Thus, it is not very plausible to assume that 
an individual would consume much more food and other basic goods. Instead, 
individuals would consume new goods that were not included into the original poverty 
line consumption basket. 
The second caveat addresses the observation that the consumption of a good normally 
has a saturation point. Because of different income elasticities, the consumption of a 
good does not increase proportionally with rising income. That is, individual goods 
respond differently to income shocks. Therefore, in order to construct a “luxury” 
consumption basket, Allen’s poverty line basket has to be modified in two steps. In the 
first step, additional luxury goods will be added. In the second step, the consumption of 
the original items of the consumption basket will be increased according to the different 
income elasticities of the goods. Although the luxury consumption basket is constructed 
for Baden, prices will remain those of Strasbourg. This is necessary, because there are no 
reliable price series for Baden for the period under examination. The base period of the 
corresponding Laspeyres index was changed to the period 1780 to 1789, e.g. the last 
peacetime period before the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 
As a first luxury good, sugar was introduced into the consumption basket representing 
the consumption of luxury foodstuffs.153 Upper class households would furthermore 
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th
 century sugar was a luxury good. See R. Sandgruber, Die 
Anfänge der Konsumgesellschaft. Konsumgüterverbrauch, Lebensstandard und Alltagskultur in 
Österreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, München 1982, pp. 207–210. 
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spend on the provision of services, as studies about household budgets of different 
social groups show.154 This category includes expenditures for cultural goods and 
education, as well as for leisure, health, transportation and the employment of servants. 
Civil Servants’ households especially spend on cultural goods and education.155 Thus, 
adding this category to the luxury consumption basket would have been desirable. 
Unfortunately, price series for cultural goods and education (e.g. teachers’ wages, 
tuition fees) do not exist for the pre-industrial period examined here. The same is true 
for expenditures on leisure and health.156 In the case of servants, another important 
spending category, more information exists. There is a rich reservoir of records that 
report servants’ wages. From these sources long price series can be constructed. 
Expenditures on servants can therefore be integrated into the luxury consumption 
basket.157 
Transportation costs can also be added. Because many district magistrates were 
employed in regions were other means of transportation did not exist, I integrated 
transportation costs in the form of the variable maintenance cost of a horse represented 
by the main foodstuffs oats and hay. The latter can also be taken as further luxury 
consumption interpreting a horse as a symbol of status. At last, housing costs were 
included. Except for the latter, prices are those of Strasbourg and were taken from 
Hanauer.158 Information about rent data is hard to obtain for the early modern period.159 
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But remember, that under the 1808 remuneration scheme magistrates received free 
lodging or a subsidy of 200 fl.160 From this information one can infer that housing costs 
for a representative apartment of a district magistrate accounted for the silver 
equivalent of 200 fl.161 
In the second step, the consumption of the original goods was increased using 
information about 18th and 19th century income elasticities from England from where we 
have the best data.162 The evidence from these studies was supplemented by early 20th 
century data from Germany and the United States.163 As my computations based on 
Sommerville’s budgets as well as Houthakker’s computations – both depicted in table 
three – show, income elasticities vary with the level of income. In most cases, income 
elasticities decline with rising incomes.164 This is a sign of the existence of a saturation 
point which is reached when the income elasticity equals zero. Yet, there are some 
exceptions from this rule. For some goods – like clothing, fuel, soap and candles – 
income elasticities are u-shaped. Another caveat is that income elasticities vary between 
different studies of comparable social groups. E.g. Clark, Huberman and Lindert165 
estimate different income elasticities from diverse samples of poor household budgets. 
The same is true for the study of Schultz,166 whose results are also dependent on the 
underlying budgetary data. These caveat shows that it is difficult to determine the 
“right” income elasticity of a good.167 The problem can only be solved by making 
reasonable assumptions and comparing the results with other consumption baskets. 
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Puzzle; N. F. R. Crafts, English Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century: A Re-Examination of 
Deane and Cole's Estimates, in: The Economic History Review 2, 1976, pp. 226–235 and R. V. 
Jackson, Growth and Deceleration in English Agriculture, 1660-1790, in: The Economic History 
Review 3, 1985, pp. 333–351.  
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Table 2.3: Income Elasticities in England, Germany and the United States 
 Sommervillea Clark et al.c Schultzd Houthakkeri 
 66 d 
p. w. 
120 d 
p. w. 
186 d 
p. w. 
  All food 
Food 
products 
     Germany 
(1927/28): 
Manual 
workers:0.598 
Clerical 
workers: 0.501 
Government 
officials: 0.385 
Average: 0.473 
 
Germany 
(1907) 
Workers: 
0.537 
 
Bread 0.61 0.77 0.25   
Beans/ 
peas 
    -0.289e/0.093; 
0.034f 
Meat   1.53h 0.358/0.451/ 
0.617/0.853/ 
0.87 
0.522/1.32/ 
1.77g 
Butter   0.88 0.343/0.633/ 
0.644/0.718/ 
0.854 
0.3681e/0.327 
Cheese   0.67 0.509 0.5902e/0.503 
Eggs    1.281/1.454 0.308e 
Beer   3.82 0.468/0.817/ 
3.032 
 
Non-food 
products 
     Clothing 
Soap 0.69b 0.66b 0.76   Germany 
(1927/28): 
Manual 
workers: 1.297 
Clerical 
workers: 1.035 
Government 
officials: 0.918 
Average: 1.049 
 
Germany 
(1907): 
Workers: 
1.498 
 
Linen 
(Clothing) 
3.44 0.93 1.74   
Candles 0.69b 0.66b 0.76   
Lamp Oil      
Fuel 
(Coal) 
0.69 0.00 1.07   
Notes and Sources: 
a
 Own computation, derived from worker budgets in 1843. All elasticities are arc elasticities. 
b
 Joint elasticity 
for soap and candles. 
c
 Regression analysis based on consumption patterns of rural and urban poor in 1787-
96, 1837-41, 1863 and 1889-90. 
d 
Study of American budgets after WW II. 
e
 Low income groups in 1936. 
(Value of consumption, arc elasticities). 
f
 canned baked beans and canned peas, respectively. 
g
 Elasticity 
dependent on quality. Higher quality meat has a higher elasticity. 
h
 Butcher’s meat. 
At first, I categorized income elasticities into four different groups. The first two groups 
represent necessary goods, ranging from elasticities of 0 to 0.5 and 0.5 to 1.0, 
respectively. The latter two groups represent luxury goods. While the third group ranges 
from an income elasticity of 1.0 to 2.0, the fourth group is an open group that starts at 
an elasticity of more than 2.0. The available data from table three suggest that it is 
plausible to assume for the first two groups an income elasticity of 0.3 and 0.6, 
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respectively. Regarding luxury goods it seems reasonable to assume income elasticities 
of 1.5 and 3.0. Yet, knowledge about the right income elasticities alone does not suffice 
to adjust Allen’s poverty consumption basket. We also have to know how much income 
increased. Remember from page 38 that – according to Allen and Somerville – a well-to-
do workers household consumes roughly twice the amount of calories and proteins that 
the poverty line consumption basket provides. Hence, because doubling the nutritional 
content of the poverty line consumption basket seems to be reasonable, income has to 
double, in order to make the new consumption basket affordable. Given this assumption 
the consumption of goods should increase by the factor 1.3, 1.6, 2.5 and 4.0, 
respectively.168 
For the classification of goods I used income elasticities of poor households, wherever 
possible. These seem to be the most appropriate elasticities, because the poverty line 
consumption basket corresponds to very low incomes. An exception from this rule had 
to be made for meat, beer and fuel. The Somerville data only provide information about 
the meat consumption of better-situated households. For these households the income 
elasticity is 1.53. Clark. Lindert and Huberman, on the other side, report much lower 
income elasticities. Yet, the authors remark that they have no information about quality 
while Somerville reports data about high-quality meat. It is plausible to assume that the 
income elasticity of meat rises in quality. This is suggested by the data provided by 
Schultz as well as by Clark, Lindert and Huberman themselves who doubt their own 
estimates and argue that income elasticity between 1.1 and 1.5 seems to be more 
appropriate. Therefore, meat was classified as a moderate luxury good. 
In the case of beer, Somerville also only reports data for better-situated households 
(ε=3.82), while Clark, Huberman and Lindert report highly divergent elasticities ranging 
from 0.468 to 3.032. This high divergence may also be due to differences in quality or 
alcoholic content. However, I have neither information about quality nor about alcoholic 
content. Hence, it seemed the most plausible to classify beer as a moderate luxury. 
 
                                                                
168
 Technically I assumed that all income elasticities remain constant until income is doubled and 
then drop to zero. This is the easiest way to deal with declining income elasticities and the 
existence of a saturation point. It also makes sure that, when income more than doubles the 
household will spent his additional income on new “luxury” goods that were not included in the 
original poverty line consumption basket. 
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Table 2.4: Classification of Income Elasticities 
Necessary Luxury 
0≤ε<0.5 1≤ε<2 
   Beans/Peas    Meat 
0.5≤ε<1    Fuel 
   Bread    Eggs 
   Butter    Beer 
   Cheese ε≥2 
   Soap    Clothing 
   Candles  
   Lamp Oil*  
*Assumption that the elasticity for lamp oil is equal to candles 
At last, fuel was also classified as a moderate luxury good, although low-income 
households had income elasticity below 1.0. Yet, in the case of fuel the income elasticity 
rises with rising income, becoming a moderate luxury good for better-situated 
households. That is, richer households tend to spend more on heat when income rises 
than poor households.  
Applying all the rules described above to the poverty line consumption basket, leads to 
the luxury consumption basket that is depicted in table 2.5. This basket allows for the 
consumption of luxury goods and provides 3430 calories and 140 grams of proteins per 
day. The consumption of 3430 calories per day would put an individual, according to 
Fogel, in the 8th decile of the caloric distribution in England and in the 9th decile in 
France.169 Thus, given this measure, the consumption basket corresponds to the 
consumption of a member of the upper class.170 
Compared to consumption baskets of upper class households used in other studies the 
luxury consumption basket presented here had a higher share of housing and a lower 
share of foodstuffs: E.g. a well-to-do class family in Saxony in 1857 spent, according to 
Engels,171 50 percent of its total expenditures for food and twelve percent for housing 
while in the luxury consumption basket, the corresponding figures are 34.4 and 27.1 
percent. A comparison with the consumption pattern of elite-members in the 
Netherlands leads to similar results. Hoffmann, Jacks, Levine and Lindert present two 
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 Fogel, Conquest, here p. 45. 
170
 Albeit the consumption basket provides a little less than 3900 calories it still represents the 
consumption pattern of an upper class member. Furthermore, one has to take into account that 
upper class members did not work physically and thus needed less calories than workers. 
171
 E. Engel, Die vorherrschenden Gewerbszweige in den Gerichtsämtern mit Beziehung auf die 
Productions- und Consumtionsverhältnisse des Königreichs Sachsen, in: Zeitschrift des 
Statistischen Bureaus des Königlich Sächsischen Ministeriums des Inneren 8 a. 9, 1857, pp. 153–
182, here p. 170. 
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estimates for the periods 1800/52 and 1806/62, respectively.172 Expenses for food and 
drinks were 60.8 and 56.0 percent compared to 34.4 percent in my luxury consumption 
basket. Yet, the Netherlands households spent only 11.4 and 7.0 percent on housing. 
Table 2.5: The Luxury Consumption Basket (Prices are Averages of Prices in Strasbourg 
Between 1780-1789, in g Silver) 
 Consumption 
per year and 
head  
Price per 
unit (in g 
silver) 
Spending 
share (in %) 
Calories 
per day 
and head 
Proteins per 
day (in g) an 
head 
Bread 291.2 kg 0.772 9.6 1955 80 
Beans/peas 67.6 l 0.426 1.2 208 13 
Meat 65 kg 3.042 8.4 445 36 
Butter 8.32 kg 5.104 1.8 166 0 
Cheese 8.32 kg 2.915 1.0 85 5 
Eggs 130  0.133 0.7 28 2 
Sugar 1 kg 9.890 0.4 11 0 
Beer 455 l 0.581 11.2 531 4 
Soap 4.16 kg 4.042 0.7   
Linen 
(Clothing) 
20 m 9.460 8.0   
Candles 4.16 kg 5.723 1.0   
Lamp oil 4.16 l 6.985 1.2   
Fuel 12.5 M 
BTU173 
4.164 2.8   
Servants 1 249.400 10.6   
Total  1383.498  3430 140 
      
 Consumption 
per 
household 
    
Total*3  4150.493    
Housing 
Costs 
1 1908 27.1   
Oats 22,5 hl  21.513 6.9   
Hay 2700 kg 0.189 7.2   
Household 
consumptio
n 
 7053.373    
Source: Own calculation based on data from Hanauer, Études Économiques. 
In the case of clothing the figures are 18 percent for the Engel’s family, 15.4 and ten in 
the Netherland case and eight percent in the case of the luxury consumption basket 
presented here. 
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 Hoffman/Jacks/Levin/Lindert, Real Inequality, p. 327. 
173
 Million British Thermal Unit. 
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The figures for heat and lightning are relatively close. In Saxony an upper class family 
spent five percent on these items, in the Netherlands households spent between 1.0 
and 8.9 percent while the corresponding share for the luxury consumption basket is also 
five percent. The same is true for servants: a district magistrate’s household spent 10.6 
percent of its total expenditure for services while the corresponding share is 8.0 in the 
Netherlands.174 Yet, also accounting for the differences in the expenditure for food and 
drinks and housing, the luxury consumption baskets seems to be – in total – comparable 
to other 19th century consumption baskets of members of the upper class. 
This picture is confirmed if one compares the luxury consumption basket with household 
budgets of Civil Servants during the Kaiserreich. In his recent book, Fischer computes 
several consumption clusters. The consumption cluster that was mainly consumed by 
Civil Servants is quite comparable to my luxury consumption basket in terms of 
expenditure shares. While Fischer’s households spend 36.4 percent for foodstuffs, 26.6 
percent for housing, 12.9 percent for clothing and ca. nine percent for services the 
shares in the luxury consumption basket are 34.4, 27.1, 8.0 and 10.6 percent, 
respectively.175 
A major problem of the construction of the luxury consumption basket is the absence of 
detailed price information for Baden in the period under consideration. Long price series 
of foodstuffs and staple goods for German states are very rare.176  
Information about prices of these goods is almost only provided by Elsas177 and the 
works of Gerhard and Kauffold178, who carried Elsas work forward. Yet, most of their 
price data is for northern or eastern German towns and thus not feasible for computing 
real wages in Baden.179 Yet, as I will argue in the following paragraphs, prices in the 
Alsace and Baden were highly correlated. We also have good information about prices in 
                                                                
174
 For the 1800/52 household the expenditure for servants is believed to be zero. 
175
 See Fischer, Konsum im Kaiserreich, pp. 232–237. Fischer calls the described consumption 
cluster “cluster 2.4”. 
176
 Cf. for example W. von Hippel, Armut, Unterschichten, Randgruppen in der frühen Neuzeit, 
München 1995, pp. 60–61. 
177
 J. M. Elsas, Umriss einer Geschichte der Preise und Löhne in Deutschland. Vom ausgehenden 
Mittelalter bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, Leiden 1936. 
178
 H.-J. Gerhard/K. H. Kaufhold, Preise im vor- und frühindustriellen Deutschland. 
Grundnahrungsmittel, Göttingen 1990 and H.-J. Gerhard/K. H. Kaufhold, Preise im vor- und 
frühindustriellen Deutschland. Nahrungsmittel - Getränke - Gewürze - Rohstoffe und 
Gewerbeprodukte, Stuttgart 2001. 
179
 This is not quite true for the Elsas data which provides information for Speyer. However, data 
for Speyer does only cover a small set of goods and shows many gaps in the data. Therefore it 
cannot serve as a proxy for prices in Baden. 
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Strasbourg, provided by Hanauer.180 Therefore Strasbourg prices can be used as a proxy 
for prices in Baden. 
Table 2.6: Comparison of Selected Goods from Baden and Strasbourg at the Beginning of 
the 1870’s 
Category Difference between 
Baden and Strasbourg 
(in percent) 
Weights in the original 
consumption basket (in 
percent) 
Weighted 
Difference (in 
percent) 
Bread 2.6 13.1 0.35 
Peas 28.3 1.7 0.48 
Butter - 1.3 2.5 - 0.03 
Meat - 12.0 11.5 - 1.38 
Eggs 3.8 1.0 0.04 
Fuel 
(Wood) 
83.3 3.8 3.17 
Sum - - 2.62 
Source: Own Calculation. Großherzogtum Baden, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Großherzogtum 
Baden, vol. 1868-1870, pp. 200-201; 140-141; 138-139, respectively and Hanauer, Études 
Économiques. 
For some goods of the consumption basket we have price information for Baden since 
1869. Because Hanauer reports his price series until 1875, we can compare the two 
price levels during the 1870’s. Given the weights of the original Strasbourg consumption 
basket, prices in Baden were only 2.62 percent higher than in the contiguous Alsace at 
the beginning of the 1870’s (table 2.6).181 Furthermore, the two regions had a similar 
economic structure182 and grain prices were quite correlated (table 2.7) during the 18th 
and 19th century.  
Table 2.7: Grain Price Correlation 
Region Period Correlation Coefficient 
Strasbourg – Mannheim 1813 – 1860 0.90 
Mannheim – Wurttemberg 1813 – 1860 0.91 
Strasbourg – Wurttemberg 1766 – 1819 0.87 
Strasbourg – Wurttemberg 1766 – 1788 0.74 
Strasbourg – Paris*  1766 – 1788 0.52 
Source: Statistisches Reichsamt, Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1935, pp. 
273–307 (Mannheim); M. Baulant, Le prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788 1968, in: Annales 3, 
1968, pp. 520-540 (Paris); Hanauer, Études Économiques (Strasbourg) and Königreich 
Württemberg, Württembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik und Landeskunde 1897 (Wurttemberg). 
*Prices are for the Departement Seine which is almost identical with greater Paris. 
                                                                
180
 Hanauer, Études Économiques. 
181
 Taking coal instead of wood would let the difference between Alsace and Baden shrink to 1.6. 
182
 Cf. E. H. Meyer, Badisches Volksleben im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1984, p. 6. 
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Figure 2.1: Grain Prices in Strasbourg, Mannheim and Württemberg 
 
Source: Statistisches Reichsamt, Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1935, pp. 
273–307 (Mannheim), Hanauer, Études Économiques (Strasbourg) and Königreich Württemberg, 
Württembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik und Landeskunde 1897 (Wurttemberg). 
The correlation between grain prices in Mannheim and Strasbourg was 0.90 in the 
period 1813-1860,183 while it was 0.91 for Mannheim and the German state of 
Württemberg in the same period (compare table 2.7 and figure 2.1). For the second half 
of the 18th century there are no prices for Baden. However, the correlation coefficient 
between grain prices in Strasbourg and Württemberg is 0.87 for the period 1766-1819. 
Because Baden was located between Württemberg and the Alsace it seems plausible to 
assume that there was a similar correlation between Strasbourg and Baden between 
1766 and 1819. This assumption is sustained by the fact, that the correlation coefficients 
between Mannheim and Strasbourg and Mannheim and Württemberg were quite 
similar in the 1813-1860 period. The assumption that there was a regional rather than a 
national convergence of grain prices is further sustained by the observation, that for the 
18th century the correlation between Strasbourg and Württemberg was significantly 
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 Note that this was before the transportation revolution and the emergence of a global grain 
market in the 1860’s and 1870’s.  
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higher than between Paris and Strasbourg. Hence, grain price correlation suggests that 
price data from Strasbourg can be used to estimate a consumption basket for Baden.184 
Grain price correlation was a result of the high economic integration of the two regions: 
the Alsace and Baden were only separated by the Rhine River and faced the same 
climatic conditions and exogenous shocks, e.g. the Napoleonic Wars or floods. 
Furthermore, the Rhine provided an easy, and compared to land transportation, cheap 
way to transport goods.185 At last, there were no major trade barriers between Baden 
and France throughout the examination period.186 Though France was not Baden’s main 
trading partner, there were considerable trade flows between the two countries.187 
Furthermore, Baden was an important transit route for French goods sold at the German 
market. There is also some evidence, that entrepreneurs from Baden employed skilled 
French workers. Thus, relatively low trade costs between Baden and France were the 
main driver for grain price correlation. 
2.4. Real Income of 18th and 19th Century District Magistrates 
This section will analyze how district magistrates’ real living standards developed during 
the late 18th and the first half of the 19th century using an index of real living standards. 
Following the lines of Allen, who constructed welfare ratios for a hypothetical family of 
two adults and two children between 4-6 and 1-3, I developed a luxury ratio based on 
the luxury consumption basket. The luxury ratio is defined as annual earnings divided by 
the cost of the luxury consumption bundle of the family.188 The costs of foodstuffs, 
drinks, clothes, heat and sanitation were multiplied by the factor three, assessing the 
requirements of the two children as half the adult’s daily caloric needs. Then the costs of 
                                                                
184
 I also run several regressions were grain prices in Strasbourg are regressed on a constant and 
grain prices in Mannheim and Württemberg, respectively. All regressions have a R
2 
above 0.70 
and a very high t-statistic. 
185
 See W. von Hippel, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 1800-1918, in: H. Schwarzmaier (ed), 
Handbuch der baden-württembergischen Geschichte. Vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Ende 
der Monarchien, Stuttgart 1992, pp. 477–784, here pp. 534–535. Though there were a strong 
current and many rapids river transportation was much cheaper than land transportation.  
186
 For the trade relations between Baden and France cf. von Hippel, Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte 1800-1918, here pp. 549; 486-487; Fischer, Anfänge der Industrialisierung, pp. 
108; 124-128; M. Kutz, Studien zum deutschen Außenhandel, insbesondere zum Handel mit 
England und Frankreich von der französischen Revolution bis zur Gründung des Zollvereins. Eine 
statistische Strukturuntersuchung zur vorindustriellen Zeit, Bonn 1968 and G. Seybold, 
Württembergs Industrie und Außenhandel vom Ende der Napoleonischen Kriege bis zum 
Zollverein, Stuttgart 1974, p. 281 Even if Baden would had have erected trade barriers, the 
country would not had have the capability to control its long borders. Indeed, the tariff increase 
on French goods as a response to high French tariffs in 1822 could not prevent French goods 
from flowing into Baden via Switzerland. 
187
 Baden mainly exported agricultural products into France and imported French industrial 
goods. 
188
 Cf. Allen, The Great Divergence, p. 425. 
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provender of a horse were added. In a last step housing costs were added to the 
consumption basket.189 
A luxury ratio of 1.0 then means that the household can just afford the luxury basket. 
Because the basket includes the caloric and social needs of an upper class member, a 
luxury ratio of one can be interpreted as representing a very decent standard of living 
for an upper class member. A welfare ratio greater than 1.0 means, that the household 
can afford even more luxury goods and would have a living standard that would be more 
than adequate considering its social status. Because its caloric needs are more than 
satisfied, it will spend most of his excess income on consumer goods or will invest in 
assets and the education of children.190 If the ratio is smaller than 1.0 the household 
cannot afford the luxury consumption basket. In a physiological view, this is not harmful, 
because the family members will still be above the subsistence level. However, the 
household would have a living standard that is not suitable to his social status.191 
2.4.1 Absolute Living Standards 
In order to quantify the absolute level of well-being over time we have to examine 
district magistrates’ luxury ratios. Because it is interesting to ask whether or not living 
standards deteriorated in real terms after the reform of remuneration – as the results 
from the nominal evidence would suggest – , we have to compare real incomes right 
before and after the reform. The relevant luxury ratios are reported in table eight. The 
table shows, that in the decade before the 1819-reform, non-noble magistrates could 
consume up to more than twice the luxury consumption basket regardless of using the 
1808 remuneration scheme or the figures reported in the late 18th century records.192 A 
noble magistrate could reach an even higher luxury ratio. The lowest paid magistrates 
had a luxury ratio between 1.0 and 1.3 (depending on which source is used). That is, also 
before the 1819 reform even the lowest paid magistrates had an income that can be 
interpreted as very decent. Only junior Civil Servants (Assessor) had a luxury ratio less 
than one. However, they had fewer expenses than magistrates, because, in general, they 
were not allowed to marry. Accounting for that factor, the luxury ratio of a junior Civil 
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 Cf. table 2.5. 
190
 In such cases the share of foodstuff in the consumption basket will decrease and the basket 
will converge more and more to a modern consumption basket. Additionally, the household has 
the possibility to substitute foodstuffs according to his own preferences.  
191
 It may be harmful in a social view, because the family can be forced to abstain from sending 
their children to university or is not able to participate in the local upper class society. 
192
 Nominally the remuneration in 1808 was higher but inflation reduced real values to the late 
18
th
 century level. 
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Servant was about 1.2.193 Furthermore, magistrates did not remain on the lowest salary 
level and could spend more money on luxury goods after some years of service. 
Table 2.8: Luxury Ratios of District Magistrates over Time 
 Late 18th 
century 
Pre-reform 
(1808-1819) 
Post-reform 
(1819-1830) 
1830’s 1860’s 
Noble magistrate 4.8 – 4.1 2.6    
City Manager   2.9 2.8 2.3 
Magistrate 2.2 – 1.0 2.3 – 1.3 2.5 – 1.2 2.4 – 1.2 2.0 – 1.0 
Junior civil servant  0.6 0.8 – 0.6 0.8 – 0.6 0.7 – 0.5 
Source: Own calculations, based on GLA 120/232; 134/32, 57; 233/3387 and Wunder, Die 
Badische Beamtenschaft, p. 615. 
The reform of remuneration between 1809 and 1819 did not improve incomes much in 
real terms. Comparing the upper bound of the 1819 pay-scheme with that of non-noble 
magistrates in 1808, real incomes rose slightly by about 7.8 percent. Comparing the top 
incomes – that is the income of a noble magistrate in 1808 with a city manager 
(Stadtdirektor) in 1819 – real incomes rose by ten percent. At the lower bound real 
income decreased by six percent. That is, unlike nominal values real living standards only 
decreased at the lower bound and not overall. Yet, because of ongoing inflation real 
incomes seemed to decline during the first half of the 19th century falling below the level 
of the early 19th century during the 1860’s.  
Furthermore, one has to take into account that district magistrates benefitted from 
pension payments after 1819 and their widows received an allowance payment. The 
average years of service for a sample of 80 district magistrates was 32.1 years while the 
average last remuneration for the same sub-sample accounted for 2202 fl.194 Between 
1831 and 1890 this would have implied an average nominal pension of 1622 fl. In real 
terms this would have induced an average real pension payment of 1.6 in the 1830’s, 
and 1.5 in the 1850’s. During the 1820’s, under the original pension scheme, average 
real pension benefits would have even accounted for 2.1.195 Thus, pension payments 
were significantly above a luxury ratio of 1.0 implying that district magistrates’ living 
standards remained high after their retirement while before 1819 there was no 
guarantee that the servant could preserve his living standard. Yet, the welfare effects of 
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 In 1819 the luxury ratio of a single Assessor who earned between 600 and 800 fl was 1.6 and 
1.2, respectively. Yet, the prohibition to marry may have reduced junior Civil Servants’ happiness 
and thus their immaterial living standard. 
194
 The sample includes district magistrates that were employed between 1797 and 1902 
whereas the bulk of the data is between 1820 and 1860. Wage data was available for a sub-
sample of 30 magistrates. 
195
 Nominal pension benefits were 2028. 
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pension payments are depend on retirement age and life expectancy. For a sample of 40 
district magistrates Wunder estimates an average age of retirement of 66.1 years.196 
Average life expectancy of a 65 year old male accounted for 9.2 years during the first 
half of the 19th century and rose to 12.5 years in the second half of the century.197 The 
welfare effect of pension payments thus seems to be quite considerably.198 
Since 1819, widows received 25 percent of their husbands’ last remuneration. Assuming 
an average last remuneration of 2202 fl widows insurance benefits were about 550 fl. 
This implies a luxury ratio of 0.6 during the 1820’s and 1830’s and 0.5 during the 1860’s. 
Yet taking into account that widows usually did not had to sustain a family and that they 
often lived in the household of their son or son-in-law real widow benefits were above 
the 1.0 threshold. Unfortunately, further statements about welfare effects are not 
possible, because I have no information about widows’ age at the time of their 
husbands’ death.199 
2.4.2 Relative Living Standards 
A major drawback of the luxury ratio approach described above is that it merely 
measures satisfaction of caloric and social needs, and therefore is a measure of absolute 
wealth, rather than giving information about relative wealth. Nevertheless, information 
about relative wealth is important if one wants to test if district magistrate’ 
remuneration reflected social status or, in other words, was high compared to other 
social groups. Though it is plausible that an individual with a luxury ratio explicitly above 
one would have a relatively high position in the income distribution this hypothesis has 
to be tested. Therefore district magistrates’ real income will be compared with the 
income of other high income groups as well as with the income of low income groups. 
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 Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 309–310. 
197
 A. E. Imhof/H.-U. Kamke, Lebenserwartungen in Deutschland, Norwegen und Schweden im 19. 
und 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin 1994, p. 409. 
198
 Welfare effects may have been even higher if one considers that income and mortality were 
correlated negatively. Cf. e.g. J. Vögele, Sozialgeschichte städtischer Gesundheitsverhältnisse 
während der Urbanisierung, Berlin 2001, p. 204. 
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 Some district magistrates complained that they could not sustain a socially adequate living 
standard. See for example Krapp, Die badische Ämterorganisation, pp. 61–62 and Eibach, Staat. 
Cf. also the personal files of the district magistrates Bauer (GLA 76/357), Beck (GLA 76/256), 
Bleibimhaus (GLA 76/838) and Jägerschmid (GLA 76/3894-6). For the second half of the 18
th
 
century compare GLA 120/230. In most cases these grievances were due to higher prices for both 
luxury goods and foodstuff as well as for education (sons of district magistrates had to visit 
schools in distant towns). Yet, in these cases government often granted a pay rise in order to 
assure an adequate standard of living. 
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According to Schulz the upper and middle class in Baden was dominated by civil servants 
– including clergymen – merchants, rich innkeepers and brewers.200 The lower classes 
mainly consisted of farmers, craftsmen, day laborers and workers. Unfortunately, we 
have no data about incomes of farmers who represented about half of the labor force in 
1810 and more than a third in 1843/44.201 However, we know that, because of the 
dominance of small scale farms, most farmers did not earn much more than subsistence. 
Though for 18th century Baden no wage or income data for other income groups can be 
found, it exists for the contiguous Duchy of Wurttemberg which makes a loose 
comparison possible. For the 19th century data was obtained from Baden, Brunswick-
Wolfenbüttel, Magdeburg and Nuremberg. Because the data covers a long period, 
inflation effects had to be eliminated by deflating 18th and 19th century incomes with an 
average of 1750/1799 and 1800/1849 prices, respectively using the luxury ratio 
approach.202 
Table 2.9 shows that 18th century-magistrates’ real income was relatively high compared 
to other high income occupations of the time. Compared to the annual capital income of 
a partner in a joint stock company, non-noble magistrates had a similar or at least 
comparable standard of living. Living standards of the less representative noble 
magistrates were even identical with the incomes of the company’s partners. Compared 
to other academic occupations like managers or clergymen, district magistrates had a 
considerably higher living standard. Compared to workers and day laborers district 
magistrates real income was extremely high. Together with agricultural labor those 
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 Cf. A. Schulz, Wirtschaftlicher Status und Einkommensverteilung - die ökonomische 
Oberschicht, in: L. Gall (ed), Stadt und Bürgertum im Übergang von der traditionalen zur 
modernen Gesellschaft, München 1993, pp. 249–271, here p. 256. 
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 For a survey of the economic structure of Baden, see Fischer, Anfänge der Industrialisierung, 
pp. 197; 277; 288 Industry accounted for 36 percent of the labor force in 1810 and 49 percent in 
1843/44 including craftsmen, workers, as well as factory owners, merchants and innkeepers. 
However, industry was dominated by small scale business which accounted for 30 percent in 
1810 and 36.4 percent in 1829 (there is no information for 1843/44) while manufacturing 
accounted for one percent in 1810 and 4.9 percent in 1843/44. Day laborers accounted for six 
percent in 1810 and 5.6 percent in 1843/44. Unfortunately, Fischer only reports a distribution of 
the labor force rather than a personal distribution of income. However, because we know that 
most of the farmers, small scale business men factory workers and day laborers belonged to the 
lower middle class and the lower class (however the transition between these groups was 
permeable) we can estimate the lower classes to represent between 85 and 84 percent of the 
labor force in 1810 and 1843/44, respectively which corresponds with the share of the lower 
classes in early modern societies. For example, von Hippel depicts the share of the lower class to 
up to 70 percent for the 18
th
 century. See von Hippel, Armut, Unterschichten, Randgruppen, p. 
15. 
202
 Note, that, because price levels varied notably between regions, the depicted luxury ratios of 
peer groups from foreign countries rather display the purchasing power of these foreign incomes 
in Baden than actual domestic living standards. 
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groups – marked by the dotted line – represented about 85 percent of the labor force.203 
That is, district magistrates belonged at least to the top 15 percent of income earners in 
the 18th century which supports the results of ranking magistrates in the 8th and 9th 
deciles of the caloric distribution computed by Fogel. 
Table 2.9: Comparison of 18th Century District Magistrates’ Income with High and Low 
Income Groups (in 1750/1799 Prices) 
Occupation Luxury Ratio  
Capital income of a partner in a joint stock 
companya 
3.9 – 3.1 
Noble magistrate  3.8 – (3.4)b 
Non-noble magistrate 3.4(2.8)b – 1.9 
Manager of a faience manufactory 1.2 – 0.8 
Clergymen (average)a 1.0 
Skilled (factory) workera 0.5 – 0.4 
Day laborera/unskilled workera/weavera 0.2 –0.1 
a
Wurttemberg 
b
 dependent whether or not a non-noble magistrate could become an “Obervogt”. 
Source: Luxury ratios for district magistrates: own calculation based on GLA 120/232; 134/32, 57 
and 233/3387. Peer group data was obtained from E. Troeltsch, Die Calwer 
Zeughandelskompagnie und ihre Arbeiter. Studien zur Gewerbe und Sozialgeschichte 
Altwürttembergs, Jena 1897, pp. 152-153; 222-226; 234-237 (partners in joint stock company, 
day laborers, weavers and workers); T. Meyer, Die Fayence-Manufaktur des Johann Mathäus 
Babeck in Mergentheim 1785-1798, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, pp. 52–53 (managers of faiance 
manufactory), and M. Hasselhorn, Der altwürttembergische Pfarrstand im 18, Jahrhundert, 
Stuttgart 1958, pp. 3-4; 16 (clergymen). 
The overall picture did not change in the 19th century which becomes clear by comparing 
district magistrates’ living standards with the well-being of merchants in Magdeburg.204 
Only a small number of very rich wholesale merchants, called Großhändler, earned more 
than magistrates and magistrates’ income was not far away from merchant’s income 
when it is compared to the income of the less affluent marchand en gros and average 
merchants income.205 The top remuneration of the few city managers (Stadtdirektoren) 
almost matched those incomes. Compared to small merchants in Magdeburg incomes 
were slightly higher at the upper bound and slightly lower at the lower bound. Thus, in 
sum, magistrates’ living standards were comparable to the living standards of wealthy 
merchants from Magdeburg. In relation to factory owners, clergymen, retail dealers in 
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 Cf. Fischer, Anfänge der Industrialisierung, p. 277. 
204
 Cf. R. Straubel, Kaufleute und Manufakturunternehmer. Eine empirische Untersuchung über 
die sozialen Träger von Handel und Großgewerbe in den mittleren preußischen Provinzen, 
Stuttgart 1995. 
205
 The average excludes the very rich but few wholesale merchants and bankers. The exclusion 
of these two groups from the average is justified because their incomes are outliers in the 
distribution of merchant’s incomes. See Straubel, Kaufleute und Manufakturunternehmer, p. 249. 
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Wolfenbüttel and skilled workers, district magistrates in Baden had considerably higher 
living standards. The same is true in comparison to innkeepers, artisans, unskilled 
workers and journeymen. As well as in the 18th century magistrates earned considerably 
more than the lower 85 percent of the labor force marked by the dotted line in table 
2.10.206 Thus, also in the first half of the 19th century district magistrate belonged to the 
top 15 percent of income earners.207 
Table 2.10: Comparison of 19th Century District Magistrates’ Income with High and Low 
Income Groups (in 1800/1849 Prices) 
Occupation Luxury Ratio 
Wholesale Merchant (“Großhändler”; Magdeburg) 7.5  
Merchant (“marchand en gros”; Magdeburg) 3.1 
Average merchants income (Magdeburg)a 3.0 
City Manager 2.8 
Magistrate 2.4 – 1.2 
Small merchant (Magdeburg) 2.3 – 1.4 
Factory Owner (Wolfenbüttel) 1.2 
Clergymen (Average) 1.1 
Retail Sector (Wolfenbüttel) 1.0 – 0.7 
Skilled Worker 1.1 – 0.6 
Innkeeper (Wolfenbüttel) 0.8 – 0.5 
Artisans (Baden, Nuremberg, Wolfenbüttel) 0.6 – 0.1 
Unskilled Worker/Journeymen (Baden, Nuremberg, 
Wolfenbüttel) 
0.4 – 0.2 
a
 The average excludes incomes of rich “Großhändler” and bankers. 
Source: Luxury ratios for district magistrates: own calculation based on GLA 233/3387 and 
Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, p. 615. Peer group data was obtained from K. Aßmann/ G. 
Stavenhagen, Handwerkereinkommen am Vorabend der industriellen Revolution. Materialien aus 
dem Raum Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Göttingen 1969, pp. 11-12; 33 (factory owners, retail 
sector and innkeepers in Wolfenbüttel); R. Straubel, Kaufleute und Manufakturunternehmer. 
Eine empirische Untersuchung über die sozialen Träger von Handel und Großgwerbe in den 
mittleren preußischen Provinzen, Stuttgart 1995, p. 250 (merchants in Magdeburg); H. Niens, 
Kirchengut, Pfarrbesoldung und Baulast in der Evangelischen Landeskirche in Baden. Entstehung 
– Entwicklung – Probleme, Heidelberg 1991, p. 165 (clergymen); Fischer, Anfänge der 
Industrialisierung, pp. 364-365; 371-372; R. Reith, Auswirkungen der Not- und Teuerungskrise 
1846/47 auf Erzeuger und Verbraucher am Beispiel Konstanzer Handwerkerhaushalte, in T. 
Pierenkemper (ed.), Haushalt und Verbrauch in historischer Perspektive. Zum Wandel des 
privaten Verbrauchs in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Sankt Katharinen 1987, pp. 125-
147, here pp. 130–132 (workers, artisans and journeymen in Baden) and R. Gömmel, Wachstum 
und Konjunktur der Nürnberger Wirtschaft 1815-1914, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 103-104; 107 (artisans 
and journeymen in Nuremberg). 
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 Cf. Fischer, Anfänge der Industrialisierung, p. 297. 
207
 Note, however, that the situation for members of the lower classes ameliorated. Skilled 
workers could now, for example, reach a luxury ratio above one which was a result of the 
industrialization. 
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Unfortunately, a more detailed comparison between the pre- and post-reform period is 
not possible, because the two – admittedly provisional – income distributions in table 
2.9 and 2.10 are based on household types which partly differ in occupation and 
location. However, it does not seem that the relative position of district magistrates 
within the income distribution had changed much until the 1850’s which supports the 
earlier finding of only little change of district magistrates’ real remuneration during the 
first half of the 19th century.208 
2.4.3 The Development of Relative Living Standards in the Second Half of the 19th 
Century 
Until now I concentrated on the first half of the 19th century. Yet, as Kübler209 and 
Henning210 argue, the relative position of Civil Servants in Germany deteriorated 
significantly in the second half of the century. Was this also true for district magistrates 
in Baden? To answer this question I will compare the development of district 
magistrates’ real incomes with the living standards of blue collar workers. 
To this end, I used Gömmel’s index of nominal wages of blue collar workers and incomes 
of artisans.211 The index represents the lower 85 percent of the income distributions 
presented in table nine and ten. In a second step, I constructed subsistence ratios similar 
to the luxury ratio approach. In doing so, I used Allen’s poverty line consumption basket 
with the new base period 1780-1789.212 The subsistence ratios will be compared to the 
development of district magistrates’ luxury ratios during the second half of the 19th 
century. As figure 2.2 shows, subsistence ratios of blue collar workers and artisans 
stagnated until the late 1860’s. During the 1870’s real living standards commenced to 
rise. This development continued until the eve of WW I.213 The lower bound of the 
luxury ratios of district magistrates, on the other hand, slightly decreased during the 
second half of the 19th century. At the upper bound district magistrates’ luxury ratios 
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 The comparison rather shows a decreasing living standard over the century. However, as 
argued above, when split up in smaller time periods living standards first increase and then seem 
to stagnate. 
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 Kübler, Besoldung und Lebenshaltung. 
210
 Henning, Die deutsche Beamtenschaft. 
211
 R. Gömmel, Realeinkommen in Deutschland. Ein internationaler Vergleich, Nürnberg 1979, pp. 
19–29. 
212
 Allen also constructed subsistence ratios but called them welfare ratios. 
213
 This view is confirmed by Baten who estimates living standards using anthropometric 
evidence. J. Baten, Anthropometrics, consumption, and leisure: the standard of living, in: S. C. 
Ogilvie/ R. Overy (ed), Germany: a new social and economic history, London 2003, pp. 383–422, 
here pp. 389-390; 400-401. See also J. Baten, Ernährung und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in 
Bayern. (1730 - 1880), Stuttgart 1999, pp. 88-112; 151-164. 
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first decreased, then rose and decreased again.214 Yet, as mentioned above, positions at 
the top of the hierarchy were relatively rare and not every district magistrates reached 
the upper strata of the hierarchy. Thus, figure two confirms the Henning-Kübler view. 
That is, district magistrates lost ground compared to other social groups during the 
second half of the 19th century.  
Figure 2.2: Welfare Ratios of Blue Collar Workers and Artisans and Luxury Ratios of 
District Magistrates, 1819 – 1913 
A comparison with white collar workers further illustrates the deterioration of district 
magistrates’ privileged position in the second half of the 19th century: During the 1870’s, 
district magistrates’ average real entry-level salary kept falling and slipped below the 1.0 
threshold. In the next two decades average real entry salaries stagnated around 0.9 and 
dropped to 0.85 in the 1900’s. White collar workers, on the other side, reached luxury 
ratios above 1.0 since the 1880’s. And their luxury ratios grew further: in the 1880’s they 
averaged 1.11, in the 1890’s 1.30 and in the 1900’s 1.63. Thus, also compared with 
better-situated households, district magistrates started to lose their privileged position 
within the income distribution of the economy since the last quarter of the 19th century. 
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 Cf. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 620–622. The upper bound was increased by 
400 fl from 2400 fl to 2800 in 1871. Remuneration also rose because of the conversion to the 
Mark in 1875. Wherever necessary, remuneration was rounded. The second pay rise took place in 
1888 when a new civil service law was introduced. 
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Table 2.11: Average Luxury Ratios of District Magistrates and White Collar Workers in 
the Machine Factory Esslingen 
Period District Magistrates White collar workers  
 Upper Bound Lower Bound  
1870’s 2.02 0.87 0.90 
1880’s 2.33 0.93 1.11 
1890’s 2.74 0.92 1.30 
1900’s 2.54 0.85 1.63 
Sources: Own calculation. Nominal data is from Großherzogtum Baden, Gesetz- und 
Verordnungsblatt für das Großherzogtum Baden 1888, pp. 466–469 and Wunder, Die Badische 
Beamtenschaft, pp. 615; 620-622 and W. Fischer/ J. Krengel/ J. Wietog, Sozialgeschichtliches 
Arbeitsbuch I. Materialien zur Statistik des Deutschen Bundes 1815-1870, München 1982, pp. 
149–152. 
2.5. Conclusion  
The results of the chapter can be summarized as follows: Real living standards of district 
magistrates in Baden were already high during the 18th century and did not change 
much during the first third of the 19th century. This is true for measuring living standards 
in absolute terms using the luxury ratio approach as well as in relative terms comparing 
district magistrates’ living standards with those of other social groups. Nevertheless, 
district magistrates benefitted from the abolishment of the discriminatory 18th century 
remuneration scheme and the introduction of better pension schemes and widows 
insurance after 1809. Yet, while the welfare effects of pension payments were quite 
considerable the effects of the former improvement were small. Although 
discriminatory rules that favored noble magistrates were abolished between 1809 and 
1819, high-paid positions at the top of the hierarchy remained scarce and thus hard to 
achieve.  
The relative position of district magistrates in the income distribution seemed to 
deteriorate since the second half of the 19th century. During the last quarter of the 
century real wages of blue collar workers and artisans started to increase while district 
magistrates’ remuneration decreased or stagnated for most of the time. While blue 
collar workers did not reach district magistrates’ real income in absolute terms, white 
collar workers did. Since the 1880’s, luxury ratios of white collar workers exceeded 
district magistrates entry salaries. 
The empirical analysis thus confirms the hypothesis that district magistrates’ 
remuneration granted a good living and reflected social status. Until the mid 19th 
century, real remuneration was also very competitive which may have attracted high 
skilled individuals who otherwise would have chosen a career in the private sector. 
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However, material well-being of local Civil Servants in Baden was already high during the 
late 18th century and thus not a result of the Napoleonic Reforms at the beginning of the 
19th century. From a material point of view, it also seems that the hypothesis only holds 
for the first third of the 19th century, for district magistrates’ privileged position 
deteriorated in absolute as well as in relative terms since the second half of the century. 
The deterioration of district magistrates’ relative living standards in Baden is, at first 
impression, a result of Germany’s industrialization which gained momentum in the last 
quarter of the 19th century. However, there is no reason why Civil Servants should not 
have participated in the country’s growth through the redistribution of the gains from 
industrialization. Hence, there has to be a deeper reason why relative living standards of 
district magistrates decreased during the late 19th century. A possible explanation for 
Baden is that Civil Servants lost influence as a pressure group compared to the rising 
power of the working class and the bourgeoisie:215 While the former emerged as an 
important political factor since the 1860’s, citizens’ control over the administration rose 
during the same time. The administrative reform of 1864 introduced institutions of self-
government and thus weakened district magistrates’ freedom of action. Furthermore, 
the second chamber of the diet (state parliament) increased its control over the budget 
restricting the government’s possibility to raise Civil Servants’ remuneration.216 There is 
also a further explanation. During the 19th century a more and more well-working 
system of audits was established reducing the government’s need to discipline its Civil 
Servants by paying them a high real wage. This explanation is studied in further detail in 
the following chapter. 
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 Cf. T. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte. 1800 - 1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat, München 
1983; T. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918. Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist, München 1994 
and T. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918. Machtstaat vor der Demokratie, München 
1995
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 Cf. R. v. Krosigk, Bürger in die Verwaltung! Bürokratiekritik und Bürgerbeteiligung in Baden; 
zur Geschichte moderner Staatlichkeit im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts, Bielefeld 2010. 
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3. Implementing Administrative and Legal Reforms in 
Baden during the 19th century 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the question of how administrative processes and the 
rules of professional conduct were enforced in Baden during the 19th century. Its main 
contribution lies in the quantitative analysis of the incentive mechanisms of the labor 
market for state officials. 
In this chapter I suggest that the Civil Service reforms217 in the first two decades of the 
19th century established an internal labor with a hierarchy of pay levels and clearly 
defined rules of promotion.218 These rules of promotion made advancement in the 
hierarchy, and therefore an increase of remuneration, inter alia dependent on the 
performance in regard to administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. 
This rule generated an incentive to implement the new formal administrative and legal 
rules, because sticking to the rules led to a monetary reward. However, because it is 
impossible to observe directly whether or not bureaucrats – called Civil Servants – 
obeyed administrative processes and adhered to the rules of professional conduct, this 
hypothesis cannot be tested directly. Fortunately, there exist records that include 
supervisors’ assessments about the ability and willingness to obey to these rules for 
district magistrates (Amtmänner). For the sub-group of district magistrates I could 
therefore test my hypothesis by asking in a first step whether or not promotion was 
dependent on the assessment of a district magistrate’s performance in regard to 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. In a second step I will then 
test whether or not career prospects of district magistrates in the Grand-Duchy of Baden 
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 The Civil Service reforms culminated in the Civil Service Reform Law of 1819. For a detailed 
description see Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft. 
218
 The classic work about internal labor markets is: P. B. Doeringer/M. J. Piore, Internal labor 
markets and manpower analysis, Armonk 1985. For further theoretical literature see: E. P. 
Lazear/Rosen Sherwin, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, in: The Journal of 
Political Economy 5, 1981, pp. 841–864; J. M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and 
Internal Labor Markets, in: The Journal of Political Economy 3, 1984, pp. 486–507 and M. A. 
Meyer, Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles, in: Annales 
d'Economie et de Statistique 25/26, 1992, pp. 165–187. 
The internal labor market model has already been used in other empirical studies. See for 
example: H. Shpayer-Makov, Career Prospects in the London Metropolitan Police in the Early 
Twentieth Century, in: Journal of Historical Sociology 4, 1991, pp. 380–408 and P. Howlett, The 
internal labour dynamics of the Great Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1913, in: The Economic 
History Review 2, 2004, pp. 396–422. 
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during the 19th century were dependent on these assessments employing a logit as well 
as panel regression analysis. 
In total, 79 districts (Ämter) existed in 1841 which were managed by 163 district 
magistrates. Some districts were only staffed with one magistrate (30 Percent), but most 
districts were managed by two magistrates (70 percent).219 My sample contains 73 
district magistrates that were employed between 1803 and 1866 and retired between 
1832 and 1902, thus covering the entire 19th century.220 This figure represents 22 
percent of the 331 district magistrates about whom information can be found for this 
period in the archive of the Grand-Duchy of Baden – the Generallandesarchiv in 
Karlsruhe.221 I have analyzed the entire sample of available records. Unfortunately, not 
every file contained information about remuneration which reduced the number of 
district magistrates that I could integrate into my dataset to 73 individuals.222 I could 
found no clear patterns for missing information about remuneration, except for the fact 
that the probability of finding information about remuneration rose slightly with time. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The following two sections 
describe the labor market for state officials. While the second section focuses on the 
hierarchy and district magistrates’ career prospects, the third section analyzes the 
central government’s promotion rules and the determinants of their staffing decisions. 
The fourth and the fifth sections introduce the panel regression model and the logit 
model, respectively. The sixth section discuses some qualifications and caveats while the 
last section concludes. 
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 There were few districts that were staffed with three or more magistrates. These districts are 
subsumed in the figure for districts that were managed by two magistrates. For a more detailed 
description see Eibach, Staat and Krapp, Die badische Ämterorganisation. Since 1814 the number 
of district magistrates had increased (125 in 1814) while the number of districts had decreased 
(91 in 1814). As a result two-third of all districts were staffed with only one magistrate in 1814. 
(See Eibach, Staat, pp. 53–54). The number of district magistrates rose further during the 
following decades reaching 213 in 1869 and 237 in 1889. (See Wunder, Die Badische 
Beamtenschaft, pp. 592–594). 
220
 The names and shelf marks of all district magistrates included into the dataset can be found in 
the appendix. 
221
 Because the catalogue is structured alphabetically, one needs a key that allows the 
identification of district magistrates. Such key is provided by Wechmar, who in 1846 published a 
volume that contained the names and ranks of all Civil Servants (Wechmar, Handbuch für Baden 
und seine Diener oder Verzeichnis aller badischen Diener vom Jahr 1790 bis 1840, nebst Nachtrag 
von 1845, Heidelberg 1846). Wechmar’s work was supplemented by the Hof- und 
Staatshandbuch, a periodical that too provided information about names and function of all Civil 
Servants that were employed in the year of its publication. See: Großherzogtum Baden, Hof- und 
Staatshandbuch des Grossherzogtum Baden, Karlsruhe 1834-1924, here I used the issues of 1834 
and 1857. 
222
 Information about nominal incomes can be found on a loose sheet at the end of the personal 
file which could be a reason for the high loss rate. 
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3.2. The Hierarchy 
For the existence of an internal labor market, it is necessary to observe a hierarchy of 
pay levels and one or several clearly defined entry ports to the hierarchy.223 Baden 
introduced such a hierarchy for its Civil Servants including a sole entry point in 1819.224 
Internal labor markets are also characterized by a correlation of rank and the level of 
remuneration, e.g. a higher rank should be connected with a higher level of 
remuneration.225 As I will argue in the following paragraphs, this was also true for the 
hierarchy in Baden. 
Entry into the hierarchy was made dependent on education:226 since 1803 a three year 
study of law was indispensable to enter the Civil Service.227 In 1823 the examination at 
the universities became standardized and the exams had to be authorized by the 
ministry of justice. During the same time, the nine year curriculum of the high school 
(Gymnasium) became compulsory to visit the university. Academic education was 
followed by two years of practical training in several administrative positions. 
Employment was then made dependent on the superiors’ assessments and a sample 
work candidates had to send to the ministry of justice.228 If they passed, the trainees 
(called Rechtspraktikanten) could enter the Civil Service. Additionally, successful trainees 
earned the right to make submissions at the courts and at agencies which allowed them 
to work as lawyers. 
The career path of a district magistrate was determined by the structure of the 
administration. The organization of the administration was reformed in 1809 using the 
French organization as a blueprint.229 The reform introduced a three level hierarchy for 
all branches of administration. In the case of the civil administration, which is of most 
interest here, the ministry of interior was at the top of the hierarchy. At the 
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 Cf. Doeringer/Piore, Internal labor markets, pp. 43–50. 
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 See Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 613–614 
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 Cf. Doeringer/Piore, Internal labor markets, p. 70. 
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 For the following see Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 267–292. 
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 However, this was only true for those civil servants who were employed after 1803 and not for 
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 In 1854 the work sample was replaced by an exam which was supervised by the ministry of 
justice, called 2. Staatsexamen. The training of the Rechtspraktikanten (trainees) was reformed 
too. Training became more practice-oriented. Before 1854 trainees often were used as cheap 
clerks. Now, they assumed the daily duties of district magistrates but were supervised by an 
experienced magistrate. 
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 For the administrative reforms see: Knemeyer, Regierungs- und Verwaltungsreformen in, pp. 
146–162 See also Schwarzmaier, Baden: Dynastie - Land, pp. 162-176; 198-203; Lee, Politics of 
harmony and Weis, Französische Revolution. Andreas was the first who described the reforms at 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Andreas, Aufbau. 
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intermediary level a new agency, called Kreisdirektorium or Kreisregierung, was 
introduced. In 1809 ten such agencies were created. Yet, because of missing qualified 
employees their number was reduced to six and then to four in 1819 and 1832, 
respectively. The Kreisregierungen should summarize the information of the districts, 
communicate the central agency’s instructions to the districts and supervise and 
sanction district magistrates. The districts were at the bottom of the new structure but 
were responsible for the daily administrative as well as legal issues. As mentioned 
above, similar hierarchies existed in other branches of the administration. The legal 
administration, for example, was also organized as a three level hierarchy. Above the 
districts, four appellate courts, called Hofgerichte, and a supreme court (the 
Oberhofgericht) were established in 1809. 
After we have described the organization of the administration, we can now turn to the 
question whether the Civil Service was characterized by a hierarchy. This question may 
be analyzed by examining the stylized career path of a typical district magistrate. In most 
cases successful trainees entered the Civil Service on the local level as Assessor (junior 
Civil Servants), who assisted experienced district magistrates.230 After a while they were 
promoted to the position of a district magistrate. Some districts were endowed with 
only one Assessor and one district magistrate. In such a case, the magistrate would 
automatically become the leading district magistrate (called Amtsvorstand). He then was 
responsible for all administrative and judicial issues. Yet, many districts were endowed 
with two or more positions for district magistrates. In such a case the magistrate would 
become second or third district magistrate and was responsible for one or two specific 
areas like the police or judicial issues. After a time, a magistrate could then be promoted 
to the position of a leading magistrate in such a larger district. Furthermore, there was 
the possibility to become a leading magistrate in one of the big cities231 of the country. 
In the latter case the magistrate was called Stadtdirektor (city manager). Some 
magistrates even were promoted to an intermediary agency like a Kreisregierung or 
appellate court; there, they could become a director or a chief justice. A very small 
fraction advanced to the central agencies and became secretaries or even presidents or 
directors of these institutions.232 
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 There were some candidates who entered the Civil Service directly on the intermediary level. 
Yet, the bulk of new employees entered at the local level. 
231
 The biggest cities were Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Freiburg and Heidelberg.  
232
 Cf. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 307–311. 
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As table 3.1 shows, each rank in this career ladder was connected to another pay level. 
E.g. a higher rank in the hierarchy was correlated with a higher pay level. Furthermore, 
there existed several pay levels within one rank. Thus there were two types of salary 
increase: district magistrates could be promoted within a position and to a higher rank 
in the hierarchy. 
Table 3.1: Scheme of District Magistrates’ Career Prospects 
Rank Remuneration in fl. (guilders) 
Trainee (Rechtspraktikant) no remunerationa 
Junior Civil Servant (Assessor) 600 – 800 – 1000 
District magistrate (Amtmann) 1200 – 1400 – 1600 – 1800 –  
2000 – 2200 – 2400 
City Manager (Stadtdirektor) 2600 – 2800 
Director of an intermediary agencyb 3000 – 3500 – 4000 
a
 Trainees did not receive a fixed remuneration, but some individuals succeeded to get a small 
compensation. 
b
 There were other positions at the intermediary and central levels of the administration which a 
district magistrate could achieve. Yet, these positions were paid similarly.  
Source: (Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft zwischen Rheinbund und Reichsgründung (1806-
1871) 1998, p. 615) and (von Müller, Der öffentliche Dienst in Baden im 19. Jahrhundert 1974, p. 
119) See also GLA 233/3387. 
This stylized career path can be illustrated with the particular career of the district 
magistrate Julius Fecht.233 During his career Fecht experienced both types of promotion 
(see table 3.2). He started his career as Rechtspraktikant at the ministry of Justice in 
1840. In this position he even received a small compensation of 440 fl.234 Three years 
later he became an Assessor in Gernsbach where he earned a salary of 800 fl (guilders) 
p.a. Later, he was removed to the appellate court in Bruchsal where he earned 1000 fl. 
In 1847, Fecht received a salary increase of 100 fl without being promoted to another 
rank. Two years later, Fecht became the leading district magistrate in Pforzheim and 
received a yearly remuneration of 1600 fl. In 1854 he received a salary increase of 200 fl, 
again without being promoted to a higher rank. This kind of salary increase was 
repeated in 1856 and 1858. In 1861, Fecht was promoted to the position of the 
Stadtdirektor of Heidelberg with a remuneration of 2200 fl. Four years later, Fecht even 
get hold of a position in the ministry of interior that was donated with 3000 fl. In this 
position he received two salary increases to 3100 fl and 3300 fl in 1866 and 1868, 
respectively. In the last stage of his career Fecht was the head of the administrative 
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 Information about the career of district magistrate Fecht can be found in his personal file in 
the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, section 76, fascicle 2174 (thereafter cited as GLA 76/2174). 
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 Monetary compensation was an exception and not granted to all trainees. 
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court where he first received 3200 fl.235 However, since 1871 he received, until his death 
in 1874, 3800 fl. 
Table 3.2: Career Path of District Magistrate Julius Fecht, 1840-1874 
Period Position Remuneration in 
fl. (guilders) 
1840 – 1843 Trainee (Rechtspraktikant) at 
the ministry of Justice 
440 
1843 – 1845  Junior Civil Servant (Assessor) 
in Gernsbach 
800 
1845 – 1849 Junior Civil Servant (Assessor) 
at the appellate court in 
Bruchsal 
1000 
1100 (since 1847) 
1849 – 1861 Leading magistrate 
(Amtsvorstand) in Pforzheim 
1600 
1700 (since 1854) 
1800 (since 1856) 
2000 (since 1858) 
1861 – 1864 City Manager (Stadtdirektor) in 
Heidelberg 
2200 
1864 – 1869 Landeskommissar at the 
ministry of interior (stationed 
in Mannheim) 
3000 
3100 (since 1866) 
3300 (since 1868) 
1869 – 1874 Head of the administrative 
court in Bruchsal 
3200 
3800 (since 1871) 
Source: GLA 76/2174. 
3.3. Promotion Rules and the Determinants of Staffing Decisions 
Besides the existence of a hierarchy, a clearly defined rule that binds promotion to the 
performance in regard to administrative processes and the rules of professional conduct 
is necessary for the working of a an incentive to implement this new formal institutional 
framework, e.g. the new administrative and legal rules. Yet, the mere existence of such a 
rule does not suffice. The rule has also to be relevant, that is it has to be used in 
promotion decisions. Therefore this section is divided in two parts. While the first 
section describes the formal rules of promotion, the second part analyses the actual 
determinants of staffing decisions. 
3.3.1 Promotion Rules 
Formally, all staffing decisions were made by the Grand-Duke according to a 
recommendation of the ministry of interior and the Kreisregierungen.236 In most cases 
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 The drop from 3300 fl to 3200 fl in 1869 when Fecht was promoted to the position of the head 
of the administrative court can be explained by the loss of a compensation that Fecht received 
because of his job of a Landeskommissär. In this position Fecht travelled a lot and thus received a 
high allowance for his special expenditure. This allowance was removed when he became head of 
the administrative court. 
236
 Cf. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, p. 325. 
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the final decision of the ministry of interior was countersigned without an objection by 
the ministry of state that represented the Grand-Duke. Yet, in some cases during the 
first half of the 19th century, district magistrates successfully intervened on the Grand-
Duke’s behalf against decisions of the ministry of interior.237 Full independence in 
staffing decisions was won by the ministry around mid-century.238 
Regarding staffing decisions like employment, relocation and promotion the ministry of 
interior demanded more and more adherence to the rules of professional conduct and 
the implementation of administrative processes. In 1830 the ministry announced to the 
Kreisregierungen that it would use personal records as a basis of decision making and 
that they therefore should document district magistrates’ “abilities and misbehavior”.239 
But the government became even more precise. In 1835 and 1844 the ministry of 
interior and the ministry of justice passed two detailed regulations about the inspection 
of district magistrates in administrative and judicial issues, which provide information 
about the central agencies’ definition of “ability and misbehavior”.240 The regulations 
instructed supervisors on which issues they should pay particular attention when they 
visited the district. Both regulations instructed supervisors to verify magistrates’ ability 
to manage a district in general as well as their knowledge in administrative and legal 
issues. Furthermore, supervisors should control, if district magistrates implemented 
administrative processes and if they obeyed to the government’s instructions. At last, 
supervisors should report about magistrates’ conduct and personality. In this context 
government demanded also a calm and friendly demeanor vis-à-vis citizens; this was 
especially emphasized for magistrate’s behavior during court hearings. The government, 
thus, controlled exactly for the performance in regard to the newly introduced 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. 
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 This can be seen as a hint to patronage networks through which district magistrates tried to 
circumvent the formal promotion process. Yet, given the available records patronage seems not 
to be very common at the beginning of the century and lost more and more ground when the 
ministry of interior gained full control over promotion decisions. 
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 von Meldegg, Aus den Erinnerungen, p. 4. 
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 See GLA 236/8989 (Ministry of interior to Kreisregierungen, Karlsruhe, September 18, 1830. 
The record is also cited by Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 164–165. Cf. also Lee, 
Politics of harmony, p. 68, who states that the ministry of interior announced to made 
promotions dependent on merit since the 1820’s. However, Lee also finds several examples were 
seniority played the bigger role in staffing decisions during the 1820’s. 
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 The regulation of 1835 concerning administrative issues can be found in GLA 233/30343 
(Ministry of interior to ministry of state, Karlsruhe, January 20, 1835). The regulation of 1844 
concentrating on legal issues can be found in the Staatsarchiv Freiburg section 16/1 fasc. 122 
(Instruktion über die Visitation der Justizverwaltung, Karlsruhe June 24, 1844). 
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Yet, even when promotion decisions were announced to be linked to the performance in 
regard to the implementation of the new formal institutional framework, this rule had to 
be actually used by the ministry of interior, if it should serve as an incentive for district 
magistrates to adopt this new formal institutional framework. The next section deals 
with this question by analyzing employment decisions of the ministry of interior on the 
basis of the communication between district magistrates, the ministry of interior and 
the Kreisregierungen. 
3.3.2 The Determinants of Staffing Decisions 
Promotion to a higher rank as well as promotion within a rank may be determined by 
performance or seniority or, most probable, by both features. In this sub-section I 
analyze the staffing policy on the basis of personal files that are available in the 
Generallandesarchiv in Karlsruhe. These files contain information about the magistrates’ 
remuneration, the results of audits, reprimands, petitions of district magistrates as well 
as edicts and instructions of the ministries and Kreisregierungen. Furthermore, the 
records provide information about the communication about remuneration related 
issues between district magistrates and their superiors from which we can deduce the 
determinants of the staffing decisions made by the ministry of interior. 
Communication covered mainly three topics: Rechtspraktikanten (trainees) asked the 
ministry of interior about an employment in the Civil Service, district magistrates wanted 
to be relocated, or asked for a pay rise. Magistrates mainly argued with their loyalty and 
seniority, especially in comparison with their peers, as well as with high costs of living 
and the need to support their family on a socially adequate level.241 Sometimes, 
magistrates also argued with their personal convenience. District magistrate Kaiser, for 
example, refused his relocation from Heiligenberg at the Lake Constance to the nearby 
Pfullendorf, because of the proximity to his parents and parents in law. He furthermore 
argued that the climate in Pfullendorf would not be good for his wife. At last, he 
mentioned that Heiligenberg had better schools for his children.242 
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 Cf. for example the file of district magistrate Franz Josef Bauer. GLA 76/357 (District 
magistrate Bauer to Grand-Duke, Überlingen, October 25, 1821 and district magistrate Bauer to 
Grand-Duke, Lörrach, October 15, 1823). Cf. also the file of district magistrate Gustav Friedrich 
Jägerschmidt. GLA 76/3894-6 (District magistrate Jägerschmidt to ministry of interior, 
Gengenbach, February 7, 1811). These arguments can also be found in later years. Cf. for 
example the file of the district magistrate Philipp Pfeiffer (District magistrate Pfeiffer to Grand-
Duke, Adelsheim, May 31, 1840). 
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 Cf. for example magistrate Kaiser; GLA 76/4035 (District magistrate Kaiser to ministry of 
interior, September 31, 1849). 
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The ministry of interior on the other side accepted not every argument brought forward 
by the magistrates. As table three shows, it discriminated between three different 
policy-types. Decisions about permanent employment of Rechtspraktikanten and 
relocation to another position were mostly made dependent on the performance in 
regard to administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. This procedure can 
be illustrated by the example of district magistrate Demetrius Messmer: In 1828 the 
then-Rechtspraktikant Messmer had tried for several years to receive a fix employment 
in the Civil Service. In doing so, he referred to his good grades and favorable references 
about his administrative and legal skills that he received from his supervisors. He also 
argued with his seniority and the remark that he was one of the oldest 
Rechtspraktikanten in the whole country and all his peers were already employed in the 
Civil Service.243 Yet, when the ministry of interior finally employed Messmer as Assessor 
it emphasized his good grades and references and not his seniority as reason for its 
decision.244 
Table 3.3: Ministry of Interior’s Determinants of Staffing Decisions 
 Reason for Decision: 
Pledge for: Observation of admn. processes 
and rules of prof. conduct 
Tenure Granting adequate 
living standard 
(fix) Employment X - - 
Relocation X - - 
Promotion - X X 
 
The ministry was also keen to staff important and complex districts only with those 
magistrates who met the appropriate requirements. In 1840 district magistrate Philipp 
Pfeiffer asked the Grand-Duke for relocation from the small district of Adelsheim in the 
Odenwald to the larger district of Neckargemünd, which the ministry of interior had 
refused for several times.245 Apparently, Pfeiffer missed all the skills that would be 
necessary in a larger and more complex district like Neckargemünd. He did not 
implement the new administrative processes, neglected the rules of professional 
conduct, did not adopt the new legal rules, did not recognize important issues, ignored 
instructions, possessed no authority and was stubborn, for he repeated these errors 
again and again. For these reasons the Kreisregierung and the ministry of interior 
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 See file of the district magistrate Demetrius Messmer. GLA 76/5285 (Messmer to ministry of 
interior, Lahr, February 2, 1828 and Messmer to ministry of interior, Lahr, June 13, 1828). 
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 Ibid, concept of the ministry of interior, Karlsruhe, September 12, 1828. 
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 See file of the district magistrate Philipp Pfeiffer. GLA 76/5862 (District magistrate Pfeiffer to 
Grand-Duke, Adelsheim, May 31, 1840). 
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refused Pfeiffer’s relocation when the Grand-Duke asked them to reconsider their 
decision. Both agencies emphasized that the appointment to a district had to be 
dependent on the magistrate’s administrative and legal skills.246 E.g. the Unterrheinkreis 
argued in particular that: 
“[der] Dienst nicht nach den Wünschen der Personen, sondern 
die Personen nach den Bedürfnissen des Dienstes 
auszuwählen [seien].“247 
On the other hand, promotions within a position were mostly made according to 
seniority. For example, while the Kreisregierung advised the Grand-Duke not to relocate 
Pfeiffer to Neckargemünd, it saw no reason to deny Pfeiffer a pay rise because of his 
seniority.248 Furthermore, the ministry was keen to grant its employees a decent 
standard of living. This was especially true when the district magistrate argued that he 
could not support his family249 or when the costs of living were considerably above-
average like in Lörrach.250  
The analysis of district magistrates’ personal files shows that performance in regard to 
administrative processes and the rules of professional conduct mattered in the 
promotion decisions of the ministry of interior.251 Thus, promotion according to these 
features could serve as an incentive for district magistrates to implement the new 
formal institutional framework, e.g. the new administrative and legal rules. But 
promotion was not only dependent on these skills. Seniority and the government’s 
effort to grant his employees a decent standard of living were also important 
determinants of the promotion decision. Furthermore, it also seems that the availability 
of funds limited the government’s expenditure for district magistrates’ remuneration as 
well.252 On the basis of the anecdotic evidence presented in this section it is however 
hard to quantify the importance of performance, seniority and other factors for the 
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 Ibid, report of the Unterrheinkreis, Mannheim June 13, 1840 and ministry of interior to 
ministry of state, Karlsruhe, November 11, 1841 (The ministry of state represented the Grand-
Duke). 
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 Ibid, report of the Unterrheinkreis, Mannheim June 13, 1840. Transl.: “a position cannot be 
filled according to the wishes of a person, but has to be filled according to the requirements of 
this particular position.” 
248
 Ibid. 
249
 See for example the personal file of district magistrate Julius Betz. GLA 76/738 (District 
magistrate Betz to ministry of interior, Ladenburg, August 9, 1844). 
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 See for example personal file of district magistrate Carl August Baumüller. GLA 76/416 (District 
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promotion decision. Other studies face similar problems. Wunder, for example, 
mentions that merit was an important factor in employment and promotion 
decisions.253 But he also emphasizes tenure as another important determinant of 
staffing decisions.254 However, Wunder’s analysis is also based on anecdotic evidence 
and fails to quantify the importance of the different promotion-criteria. 
A panel regression analysis that explains the level of real remuneration with district 
magistrates’ tenure and performance; that is his ability and willingness to implement 
administrative processes as well as to adhere to the rules of professional conduct, may 
help to overcome the shortcomings of the classic heuristic method. If the regression 
analysis finds a link between remuneration and performance, this link can be 
interpreted as an incentive for district magistrates to implement the new formal 
institutional framework. That this hypothesis is true may have two reasons: As I have 
argued above, the skill-level was an important determinant for relocations. In particular, 
the ministry of interior sought to staff larger and more complex districts like towns or 
districts with a high population density with high-performing magistrates. But these 
districts were also those with the highest ranks on the local level. E.g., while 
remuneration in smaller districts was limited to 1800 fl, a district magistrate in one of 
the big towns of the country could earn up to 2800 fl.255 Relocation according to 
performance may thus have increased the possibility to be relocated to an important 
district and thus to jump to a higher rank in the hierarchy of pay levels. The same 
argument holds for positions above the local level. Positions at the intermediary level of 
the administration were also mostly allocated according to performance.256 And these 
positions were even better paid than the top-positions on the local level. Remember 
from table 3.1 that the directors of the Kreisregierungen and the Hofgerichte, for 
example, earned up to 4000 fl. 
3.4. Panel Regression 
In order to quantify the impact of performance and seniority, a fixed-effects panel 
regression model is introduced in this section. The model will explain real income of 
district magistrates as a function of performance, tenure and further variables. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to observe district magistrates’ performance in regard to 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct directly. This variable is 
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therefore measured by analyzing supervisors’ assessments about magistrates’ 
administrative and legal skills, their ability and willingness to obey to administrative 
processes as well as to adhere to the governments’ instructions and to treat citizens in a 
friendly manner. In doing so, I am using the available information about nominal 
incomes and assessments from 73 district magistrates that were employed between 
1803 and 1866.257 This represents ca. 22 percent of all accessible personal files of district 
magistrates in the Generallandesarchiv.  
Figure 3.1: Year of Initial Employment and Retirement 
 
Before we construct the empirical model it would be desirable to look on some 
descriptive statistics that can give a first hint of how real incomes varied with tenure and 
supervisors’ assessment of the performance in regard to administrative processes and 
rules of professional conduct. Referring to real income data is necessary, because the 
sample covers almost the entire 19th century. As mentioned above, district magistrates 
in the sample were employed between 1803 and 1866 and retired between 1832 and 
1902, whereby the bulk of data concentrates around 1820 and 1880 (cf. figure 3.1). In 
order to eliminate possible inflation effects, real income was constructed by deflating 
nominal incomes with the luxury consumption basket presented in the previous chapter. 
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Figure 3.2: Development of Real Incomes over Time 
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Figure 3.2 depicts the detailed development of real incomes over time of six selected 
district magistrates. All curves show a concave shape. That is, real incomes rose with 
tenure but with a decreasing slope. The empirical model should reproduce this concave 
shape. The model should also mirror another development. In 1865 the government 
introduced a rule that granted judges a salary increase every three years. In 1888 a 
similar rule for the civil branch of administration followed.258 This rule may have 
accelerated promotion. That this was really the case is suggested by figure 3.3 that 
indicates the dates of promotion for all 73 district magistrates in the sample. District 
magistrates, who were employed after 1850, seemed to be promoted more often and 
more regularly. In order to account for this phenomenon, the model should include time 
dummies for each year. 
Figure 3.3:  Promotion Paths of 73 District Magistrates 
Note: Each number between one and 73 defines one district magistrate. The dots define the year 
of promotion of a particular district magistrate. 
Real incomes rose with seniority. But how did supervisors’ assessments about 
performance affect income. Figure 3.4 gives a first answer to this question. The figure 
compares a pair of district magistrates who differ in the results of the audits that were 
carried out by the Kreisregierungen and the ministry of interior. Magistrate Hübsch, for 
example, received several poor assessments which criticized his administrative and legal 
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skills as well as his bearish behavior vis-à-vis citizens.259 In contrast, district magistrate 
Fecht received very good assessments. In two visitation reports from 1855 and 1858 the 
responsible supervisors were content with his management of the district.260 Besides of 
different assessments I tried to hold other variables constant: both magistrates were 
employed in 1840 and were located to districts in the same Kreis at the beginning of 
their career.261 Career paths should therefore not be biased, because of time effects or 
of a different staffing policy of the director of the Kreis in the early years of a 
magistrate’s career.262 
Figure 3.4: Comparison of Different Career Paths of two District Magistrates 
 
The career paths of the two magistrates differed in three aspects. First, the magistrate 
with the better assessments, Fecht, received after ten years of service a higher real 
remuneration than the one with the poor assessments. The two magistrates also 
differed in their deployment. Fecht managed the more important and better paid 
districts. He was, for example, leading magistrate in the bigger town of Pforzheim and 
city manager (Stadtdirektor) in Heidelberg, one of the countries four biggest towns. 
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Fecht also became Landeskommissär, a supervisory position at the ministry of interior, 
and president of the higher administrative court. Hübsch, on the contrary, was located 
in the smaller districts of Oberkirch, Stühlingen and Phillipsburg. These differences in the 
location of the two magistrates can explain the income gap, for, as I mentioned above, 
the larger and more important districts were classified at a higher level within the 
hierarchical pay scheme. At last, the comparison of the two career paths shows that 
Fecht also had a longer career and thus was promoted more often than Hübsch. The 
latter was mainly due to the fact that Fecht succeeded to leave the local Civil Service and 
to achieve positions at the top of the hierarchy like the position of the Landeskommissär 
and the presidency of the higher administrative court. 
Thus, it seems that a magistrate’s performance in regard to administrative processes 
and rules of professional conduct influenced his real income as it was suggested in the 
last section: Magistrates with better assessments had higher real incomes. This was a 
result of the hierarchical pay scheme. High performing individuals were deployed in the 
large and important districts of the country. But these positions were considerably 
better paid than those in the smaller districts of the countryside. High performing 
district magistrates could also leave the local Civil Service for high-paid positions at the 
intermediary and central level of administration. Yet, if the correlation between 
supervisors’ assessments and income should be tested formally, I have to construct a 
variable that measures these assessments of district magistrates’ performance. Such a 
variable should be available for many points in time, because of the panel structure of 
the regression. Unfortunately, assessments are distributed very unequally in time and 
between district magistrates. E.g., for some magistrates only one assessment exists, 
while for other magistrates more assessments are available. But these assessments 
could be concentrated at the end of the magistrate’s career. I dealt with this problem in 
two steps: 
I a first step, I divided each report about a district magistrate’s performance in regard to 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct into several categories. 
These categories were legal and administrative skills, effort, assertiveness, behavior vis-
à-vis citizens, remarks about a neglect of duty and the individual assessment of the 
supervisor. The latter included the supervisor’s judgment whether the magistrate met 
the requirements of his actual position and whether he would recommend a promotion. 
The supervisors also mentioned whether a magistrate changed to a better after he was 
criticized in some points. The supervisor’s report was translated into metric variables. A 
76 
 
good assessment in an individual category was translated into 1; a bad assessment was 
assigned to -1 and a neutral to 0. Note that the definition of an assessment is my 
subjective interpretation of the supervisor’s subjective report to the ministry. In regard 
to the first drawback I made sure to define a report only as good or bad if the statement 
of the supervisor was clearly pronounced. The latter drawback was alleviated by the fact 
that the same supervisor seldom controlled a magistrate twice. Next, I computed the 
simple average of all categories that were mentioned in the report.263 An assessment 
was defined as good, if the simple average over all categories was greater than 1/3.264 
Inversely, an assessment was defined as bad, if the simple average over all categories 
was smaller than -1/3. For all other cases the assessment was defined as neutral. Yet, 
one could argue that the simple un-weighted average of the categories presented above 
might distort the actual picture of a district magistrate’s performance in regard to 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct, because it included too 
many soft skills as well as the subjective assessment of supervisors. Therefore, I 
computed a second specification, which only includes magistrates’ administrative and 
legal skills which are the key competences in regard of the implementation of the new 
formal administrative and legal rules. 
In the second step, I dealt with the problem that the observations were distributed 
unequally across magistrates and time. I solved this problem by generating a variable 
that measures the share of good assessments which a magistrate received over his total 
time within the Civil Service. This variable serves as a proxy of the magistrate’s 
performance in regard to administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. 
Formally, the variable represents a magistrates’ fixed effect that is modeled explicitly. 
This procedure may be criticized by arguing that there are learning curves and 
magistrates’ ability and willingness to implement the new formal institutional 
framework may therefore converge over time. Yet, this was apparently not the case. In a 
detailed study of the local Civil Service in Baden, Eibach could show that learning effects 
were more pronounced between different generations of district magistrates rather 
than within individual magistrates.265 Especially those magistrates that were employed 
before and during the extended reform period until the 1830’s had problems to accept 
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 Not every report addressed every category. Some reports only contained one or two 
categories. In sum there were 121 observations in the category administrative skills, 92 for legal 
skills, 109 for effort, 46 for assertiveness, 87 for behavior vis-à-vis citizens, 36 demerit remarks 
and up to 65 subjective assessments of supervisors. 
264
 The average ranged from -1 to +1.  
265
 Cf. also for the following Eibach, Staat, pp. 81-83; 112-114 and 162-165. 
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their new role within the administration. In most cases, district magistrates worried 
about the fact that they had to give up their high scope of action that they enjoyed 
before the reform period. For this generation of magistrates it was also hard to learn the 
new administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. The code of legal 
procedure, for example, had over 1300 paragraphs which differed significantly from the 
procedure of the 18th century. Therefore it is not astonishing that some older 
magistrates never adopted this new code of procedure. 
Figure 3.5: Good, Bad and Neutral Assessments over Time 
 
Note: The size of a circle represents the number of assessments in a given year. 
The results of the assessment variable that includes all categories are summarized in 
figure 3.5.266 The figure points to one important point: Bad and neutral assessments are 
concentrated in the three decades between 1830 and 1860. Before and after this period 
almost only good assessments can be observed. This is interesting, because it coincides 
with a change in the praxis of supervision. Until the early 1830’s bureaucratic controls 
dominated in the process of supervision.267 Assessments were mainly based on reports 
or court decisions that were handed in to the Kreisregierungen or Hofgerichte, 
respectively. Yet, the obligation to report was limited to only some issues. Thus, the 
intermediary and central agencies often did not receive full information about the state 
of the local administration. Public unrest, critical reports in the press and especially the 
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 The size of the circles indicates the frequency of equal assessments at one time. The picture is 
almost the same for the assessment variable that only includes the categories administrative and 
legal skills. 
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 See for the following: Eibach, Staat, pp. 56-58; 74; 85-87; 98-102 and 105-109. 
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liberal opposition in the diet revealed the miserable state of the local administration 
during the 1830’s and 1840’s. As a reaction, the government introduced periodic 
visitations that were based on detailed reports of supervisors who visited the districts in 
regular intervals. At the same time, government instructed supervisors to be stricter in 
regard to a breach of the rules of professional conduct.268 In this context, the 
government passed the detailed regulations on which issues the supervisor should 
concentrate during the visitation.269 Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of these visitations 
in the sample. Detailed visitation reports are not available before the end of the 1830’s. 
Thus, it is possible that the increase of bad and neutral assessments is a result of the 
introduction of the more detailed and more critical visitation reports.270 Yet, this 
phenomenon can be controlled for by employing the time dummies mentioned above. 
Because visitation reports were more detailed than bureaucratic controls, the former 
should reflected a district magistrate’s performance more correctly. It is therefore 
reasonable to test whether the share of good visitation reports explains district 
magistrates’ real income more accurately than the overall share of good assessments. 
To summarize the argument so far, it would be helpful to formulate the two empirical 
baseline models:  
                                    
                                   (1) 
and 
                                    
                       
                                                                                                                         (2) 
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 Cf. the several edicts of the ministry of interior that instructed the Kreisregierungen to control 
district magistrates more strictly. These edicts can be found in GLA 236/8989. They are also cited 
by Wunder. Cf. Wunder, Die Badische Beamtenschaft, pp. 164–165. 
269
 The regulation also instructed supervisors to keep a diary about the visitation. The supervisor 
should make notes on all important points. After the visitation a copy of the diary was send to 
the Kreisregierung and the ministry of interior. An abstract of the report was stored in the 
personal files of the district magistrates. 
270
 It is interesting that bad and neutral reports started to increase before the revolution of 
1848/9. Thus, stricter control of district magistrates was no reaction to the temporarily loss of 
monarchial power during the revolutionary years. 
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Different Types of Assessments over Time 
 
The models explain real income of district magistrate i at time t as a function of the 
magistrate’s time of service at time t, the share of good assessments for each district 
magistrate i and the volume of the government’s budget for remuneration in the civil 
and legal branch of administration at time t. The latter was included, because the 
available funds for remuneration could act as a natural limit to promotions. Hence, we 
would expect a positive correlation. In order to reflect the concave shape of the 
magistrates’ live time income, the square of the tenure variable is added. Furthermore, 
time fixed effects are included. 
The two models differ in one respect. While equation (1) only considers the share of 
good assessments, equation (2) also incorporates the interaction effect between the 
tenure variable and the share of good assessments. The two variables differ in their 
interpretation. The former represents the level effect and can be interpreted as the fix 
additional income that a district magistrate receives from a change in the share of its 
good assessments at every point during his career.271 The latter variable influences the 
slope of the income function and therefore can be interpreted as the velocity of 
promotion. Comparing the two equations will give us information about the relative 
importance of the two effects. The baseline model will be expanded by further 
specifications which include the positive share of detailed visitation reports as well as 
the share of positive assessments based on the index that only considers administrative 
and legal skills. 
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Table 3.4 summarizes the results of the regression analysis. In the case of the tenure 
variable all coefficients have the expected positive signs. Quantitatively the coefficients 
do hardly change between the different specifications. For each additional year of 
service, real income increases by 0.07 luxury consumption baskets. Measured in grams 
of silver, a district magistrate’s real wage would rise by almost a pound p.a. The squared 
tenure variable has also the expected negative sign reproducing the concave shape of 
the income curves. 
The share of good assessments is only positive and significant when the interaction 
effect is ignored. Quantitatively, the effect differs between specifications which include 
all assessments and those which only include the detailed visitation reports. In the latter 
case the coefficients are smaller. Between the different methods of measuring the 
magistrates’ performance in respect to administrative processes and rules of 
professional conduct, no differences in the coefficients can be observed. 
The picture changes, when the interaction effect is incorporated. In the baseline model 
and in specification two, which both include all available assessments, the level effect 
becomes negative while the interaction effect is positive. Thus, the overall effect of the 
share of good assessments is only positive after six years of service in the baseline model 
and after five years in specification two, respectively. In specification one and three, 
which only use the detailed visitation reports, the level-effect loses its significances 
while the interaction effect is positive and significant. These differences may be a result 
of the fact that the effectiveness of the control mechanism was limited during the first 
three decades of the 19th century. Remember that bureaucratic audits which 
predominated until the mid 1830’s did only catch a smaller part of the magistrate’s 
ability to implement the formal institutional framework. Under this regime, the ministry 
of interior therefore based its promotion decision also on private information that we 
cannot observe. As Meldegg reports in his memoirs, this private information often 
stemmed from personal contacts between the minister or one of his assistants and 
district magistrates.272 The practices of patronage and nepotism disappeared, according 
to Meldegg, during the 1840’s; at the same time when bureaucratic controls were more 
and more replaced by detailed visitations. The defective control mechanism during the 
first three decades of the 19th century may thus explain the observed bias in the 
statistical results in the baseline model and in specification two. 
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 von Meldegg, Aus den Erinnerungen, pp. 1; 4-5; 92; 106. 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of District Magistrates’ Promotion within the Internal Labor Market (Dependent Variable: Real Income) 
Dependent variable: real income Baseline Spec.1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
 a b a b a b a b 
Tenure 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
Tenure2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 
Share Good 0.29*** -0.15***       
Tenure*Share Good  0.03***       
Share Good (only detailed Visitations)   0.17*** -0.03     
Tenure*Share Good (Only detailed 
Visitations) 
   0.01***     
Share Good (only admin. & legal skills)     0.23*** -0.08**   
Tenure*Share Good (only admin. & legal 
skills) 
     0.02***   
Share Good (only detailed visitation reports & 
admin. & legal skills) 
      0.17*** 0.04 
Tenure*Share Good (only detailed visitation 
reports & admin. & legal skills) 
       0.02*** 
Budget (in 1000 fl.) 0.01** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1862 1862 1219 1219 1724 1724 1136 1136 
Adj.-R2 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.78 0.67 0.71 0.77 0.79 
F-Test 67.9 79.9 64.7 68.9 60.0 65.1 66.4 67.5 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one-percent-level, respectively. 
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Overall, it seems that the interaction effect is more important than the single level-
effect. That is, the effect of a change in the share of good assessments will increase with 
the time that a district magistrate spends within the Civil Service. In other words, a 
change in the share of good assessments will mainly influence the velocity of promotion. 
This is not astonishing given the mechanism of promotion described above. Remember 
from the last section that we have observed different career paths for magistrates with 
a different performance in respect to administrative processes and rules of professional 
conduct. These career paths were linked to different pay levels in the hierarchy and thus 
can explain the differences in real incomes. Yet, this mechanism needs some time to 
work, because all district magistrates start at the same level in the hierarchy and it takes 
some time to identify high-performing employees. But when the high performing district 
magistrates were identified, they were promoted faster and more often. 
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Panel Model 
Variable Obs. Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real Income 2295 1.56 0.11 3.78 
Tenure 2295 17.2 1 48 
 
The budget for remunerations in the civil and legal branch of the administration, at last, 
is also significant and has the expected sign. The magnitude of the coefficient remains 
more or less constant regardless of the specification. Furthermore all specifications 
include time dummies and a constant. The latter is significant at least at the five percent 
level in all specifications. 
Figure 3.7: Frequency Distribution of the Share of Good Assessments 
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The panel regression illustrates the importance of district magistrates’ performance in 
regard to administrative processes and rules of professional conduct as well as 
magistrates’ seniority for the level of real income and the velocity of promotion. But, 
how important are the two variables quantitatively. In order to answer this question we 
have to analysis marginal effects. 
Table 3.6 compares the effect of an increase of one year of tenure on the average real 
income with the effect of an increase in the share of good assessments by 10 percentage 
points at an average tenure of 17 years (cf. descriptive statistics, table 3.5). Both effects 
are not negligible ranging from 4.5 to 3.2 percent in the case of the tenure variable and 
from 3.4 percent to 1.8 percent in the case of the assessment variable. Measured in 
grams of silver and given average income this represents a range of 495 to 352 grams for 
the former variable and a range of 374 to 198 grams for the latter variable. Given these 
values, the tenure effect is larger. Yet, the performance-effect will increase with tenure. 
Therefore, the performance effect will gain importance with increasing tenure. There is 
a second caveat. In table 3.6, I assume a marginal effect of 10 percentage points. 
However, the share of good assessments is distributed very unevenly with a high 
concentration at the two ends of the distribution 0.0 and 1.0 and at 0.5 (cf. figure 3.7). 
Thus, an increase of at least 50 percentage points is more plausible which would lead to 
a higher performance effect. 
Table 3.6: Marginal Effects of Tenure and Assessment 
  Tenure 
Δ1a 
 
Share 
Good Δ 
10% 
Share 
Good*Tenure Δ 
10%b 
Total Effect 
Share Good Δ 
10%b 
Baseline 
Total 4.5 % 2.9 %    
Only detailed 
Visitation 
3.2 % -1.5 % 4.9 % 3.4 % 
Spec. 1 
Total 4.5 % 1.6 %   
Only detailed 
Visitation 
3.8 % -0.2 % 2.0 % 1.8 % 
Spec. 2 
Total 4.5 % 2.3 %   
Only detailed 
Visitation 
3.8 % -0.77 % 3.4 % 2.63 % 
Spec. 3 
Total 4.5 % 1.6 %   
Only detailed 
Visitation 
4.2 % 0.44 % 1.36 % 1.8 % 
a
 The computation is based on the average real income of 1.56. 
b
 Note: The computation is based on the average tenure of 17 years. 
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3.5. Logit Model 
Another way to look at the correlations discussed in the last section is to estimate the 
effect of a single assessment on a district magistrate’s probability to be promoted. In 
doing so, I have constructed a simple logit model that explains the probability of being 
promoted within one year after an assessment with a dummy for a good assessment, 
the centered tenure at the time of the assessment and a constant. The latter can be 
interpreted as the probability of getting promoted at average tenure if the assessment 
was bad or neutral. Together with a centered tenure variable that is unequal from zero, 
the variable measures the influence of seniority if the assessment was bad or neutral. 
The dummy variable, then, quantifies the additional probability of getting promoted if 
the assessment was good. The model can be written as follows:  
                                                                         (3) 
 
Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics of the Logit Model 
Variable Obs. Mean  Std. Dev Min Max 
Promotion 196 0.52 0.5 0 1 
TENURE|Assessment 196 14 9.7 0 41 
Dgood 193 0.58 0.50 0 1 
Dadmin_skill_good  152 0.67 0.47 0 1 
 
In a second specification I replace the dummy for a good assessment with a dummy that 
only contains good assessments of the magistrate’s administrative and legal skills. Note, 
that both models depict a probability that is conditional on the occurrence of an audit. 
In total 193 assessments that include all categories and 152 assessments that only 
include the magistrate’s administrative and legal skills were available (cf. table 3.7). Of 
the 193 observations of the Dummy Dgood, 86 assessments were bad or neutral and 110 
were good.273 In 56 cases a bad or neutral assessment coincided with no promotion 
within one year. Only in 30 cases a promotion occurred. In the case of good assessments 
72 assessments were followed by a promotion within one year. In 38 cases no 
promotion followed (cf. table 3.8). In the case of the 152 observations of the Dummy 
Dadmin_skill_good, 50 assessments were bad or neutral and 102 were good. In 34 cases a bad 
or neutral assessment coincided with no promotion within one year. Only in 16 cases a 
promotion occurred anyway. In the case of good assessments only 35 assessments were 
not followed by a promotion, compared to 67 cases were a promotion followed within 
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 Bad and neutral observations were merges, because there two little individual observations. 
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one year (cf. table 3.9). Thus, the descriptive statistics imply a positive correlation 
between a good assessment and a promotion. This first impression is confirmed by the 
regression analysis. 
Table 3.8: Good Assessments and 
Promotion within One Year after 
Assessment 
Dgood Promotion Total 
 0 1  
0 
 
58 24 82 
1 
 
35 76 111 
Total 93 100 193 
 
Table 3.9: Good Administrative and 
Legal Skills and Promotion within One 
Year after Assessment 
Dadmin_skill_good Promotion Total 
 0 1  
0 
 
34 16 50 
1 
 
35 67 102 
Total 69 83 152 
Table 3.10 illustrates the results of the logit regression. In both specifications the 
coefficient of the dummy-variable is positive and significant at the one-percent level. 
Compared to individuals with a bad or neutral assessment, a good assessment thus 
increased the probability of promotion by 81 percent in the baseline model and 78 
percent in the second specification. In other words, given a good assessment the 
probability of being promoted at average tenure was 67 percent in the baseline model 
and 64 percent in the second specification. This is quite twice the probability of being 
promoted at average tenure when the assessment was neutral or bad. The 
corresponding figures here were 31 percent in the baseline model and 33 percent in 
specification two. 
Table 3.10: Probability of Promotion (Logit Model, Dependent Variable: Promotion 
within one Year after Assessment) 
 Specification 
 1 2 
C -0.82*** - 0.70** 
CTENURE|Assessment -0.04** -0.04** 
Dgood 1.54***  
Dadmin_skill_good 
 
 1.29*** 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.097 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -115.93 -94.5 
Correctly Classified 69.95 67.76 
Observations 193 152 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one-percent-level, respectively. 
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The coefficient of the centered tenure variable is negative and significant at the five-
percent level in both specifications. This represents the simple fact that the probability 
of promotion decreased with tenure for values beyond the average but increased for 
values that were smaller than the average reflecting the concave shape of the tenure-
income curves presented in the last section. 
Hence, the logit model confirms the results of the previous section: A higher 
performance in respect to administrative processes and rules of professional conduct 
was an important determinant of promotion and led to higher real incomes. This 
mechanism could therefore serve as an incentive for the implementation of the new 
formal institutional framework. Yet, there may be further incentives and disincentives in 
the Civil Service. The next section will discuss some of these issues. 
3.6. Discussion 
There is one qualification and one caveat to the incentive mechanism presented in the 
previous sections. The qualification refers to the described mechanism itself, the caveat 
points to a further incentive mechanism.  
Remember from the previous sections, I already mentioned that it will take some time 
until the described incentive mechanism could work. District magistrates had to identify 
the rules according to which the ministry of interior and the Kreisregierungen made its 
promotion decisions. Furthermore, they had to learn that the superior agencies would 
enforce these rules. This was especially hard for the first generations of district 
magistrates during the 19th century. These magistrates were used to the late 18th 
century administration which gave them a high scope of action at the local level.274 The 
need to observe clearly defined rules and regulations was thus new to them. 
Furthermore, even when administrative and legal rules were reformed in the first 
decade of the 19th century, more precisely defined implementation rules did not follow 
before the 1830’s.275 The 18th century system of district magistrates’ high scope of action 
thus survived in part until the 1830’s. Additionally, the ministry of interior had only little 
information about local conditions until the late 1830’s and therefore could not use its 
promotions rules efficiently. It is, for these reasons, not astonishing that first learning 
effects cannot be observed before the late 1830’s and that learning mainly took place 
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 For 18th century conditions see for example Gottschalk, Alkoholische Gärung. 
Herrschaftskompetenz; Hohkamp, Herrschaft; Holenstein, "Gute Policey". 
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 Eibach, Staat, p. 60. 
87 
 
between different generations of district magistrates and not within individual 
magistrates as it was described by Eibach and in chapter one.276 
Besides this qualification, there is a further caveat to the argument that the system of 
promotions was the sole incentive for district magistrates to implement the new formal 
institutional framework. In his study about the Civil Service reforms in Bavaria and 
Wurttemberg, Wunder has already in the late 1970’s suggested that the introduction of 
social and material privileges was a device to commit Civil Servants to the state and its 
monarchical rulers. Unaware of the shirking wage theory, Wunder argues in a similar 
way: in his view, a Civil Servant would stick to administrative processes and rules of 
professional conduct in order to not to lose his social and material privileges.277 
Social privileges included the wearing of uniforms as a symbol of power and a special 
treatment before the law, e.g. Civil Servants could only be accused by the state itself and 
not by the citizens. Furthermore, verbal attacks on Civil Servants were defined as a lèse-
majesté. Unfortunately, it is hard to measure social status quantitatively. It is therefore 
quite impossible to make substantial predictions whether or not a potential loss of social 
status was an important incentive for district magistrates to implement administrative 
processes as well as to adhere to the rules of professional conduct.  
Table 3.11: Comparison of 18th Century District Magistrates’ Incomes with High and Low 
Income Groups (in 1750/1799 prices) 
Occupation Luxury Ratio  
Capital income of a partner in a joint stock 
companya 
3.9 – 3.1 
Noble magistrate  3.8 – (3.4)b 
Non-noble magistrate 3.4(2.8)b – 1.9 
Manager of a faience manufactory 1.2 – 0.8 
Clergymen (average)a 1.0 
Skilled (factory) workera 0.5 – 0.4 
Day laborera/unskilled workera/weavera 0.2 –0.1 
a
Wurttemberg 
b
 dependent whether or not a non-noble magistrate could become an “Obervogt”. 
Source: see previous chapter. 
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 It is also arguable that district magistrates did not learn at all but the selection mechanism of 
the ministry of interior would have become better. Yet, this would not change the result: with 
time the ministry of interior identifies those district magistrates that implemented the new 
institutional framework. 
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 See Wunder, Privilegierung und Disziplinierung, pp. 323–324. 
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Table 3.12: Comparison of 19th Century District Magistrates’ Incomes with High and Low 
Income Groups (in 1800/1849 prices) 
Occupation Luxury Ratio 
Wholesale Merchant (“Großhändler”; Magdeburg) 7.5  
Merchant (“marchand en gros”; Magdeburg) 3.1 
Average merchants income (Magdeburg)a 3.0 
City Manager 2.8 
Magistrate 2.4 – 1.2 
Small merchant (Magdeburg) 2.3 – 1.4 
Factory Owner (Wolfenbüttel) 1.2 
Clergymen (Average) 1.1 
Retail Sector (Wolfenbüttel) 1.0 – 0.7 
Skilled Worker 1.1 – 0.6 
Innkeeper (Wolfenbüttel) 0.8 – 0.5 
Artisans (Baden, Nuremberg, Wolfenbüttel) 0.6 – 0.1 
Unskilled Worker/Journeymen (Baden, Nuremberg, 
Wolfenbüttel) 
0.4 – 0.2 
a
 The average excludes incomes of rich “Großhändler” and bankers. 
Source: see previous chapter. 
In the case of material privileges, on the other side, a more detailed analysis is feasible. 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show district magistrates’ real wage measured in luxury ratios 
compared to real incomes of other social groups during the 18th and the 19th centuries. 
The table shows that district magistrates’ real incomes were high compared to other 
social groups in both centuries. District magistrate were members of the top fifteen 
percent of the income distribution which is marked by the dotted lines in table 3.11 and 
3.12. Hence, there was a wage premium that could be lost after a potential dismissal. 
This may have served as an additional incentive to implement administrative processes 
and to adhere to the rules of professional conduct. Yet, there are two developments 
which may have hampered the shirking wage incentive mechanism: First, it seemed that 
the wage premium declined during the second half of the 19th century. This 
development is clarified by table 3.13 which depicts district magistrates’ luxury ratios in 
the decades until 1870 and table 3.14 which compares district magistrates’ luxury ratios 
with those of white collar workers at the end of the 19th century. The mechanism 
therefore may have become less effective since the last quarter of the century. 
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Table 3.13: Luxury Ratios of District Magistrates over Time 
 Late 18th 
century 
Pre-reform 
(1808-1819) 
Post-reform 
(1819-1830) 
1830’s 1860’s 
Noble magistrate 4.8 – 4.1 2.6    
City Manager   2.9 2.8 2.3 
Magistrate 2.2 – 1.0 2.3 – 1.3 2.5 – 1.2 2.4 – 1.2 2.0 – 1.0 
Junior civil servant  0.6 0.8 – 0.6 0.8 – 0.6 0.7 – 0.5 
Source: see previous chapter. 
Second, as the analysis of the determinants of staffing decisions during the 19th century 
shows, dismissals occurred only seldom. In general, magistrates that did not implement 
administrative processes and did not adhere to the rules of professional conduct were 
promoted more slowly and retired earlier but were not dismissed before their 
retirement could be justified with age or illness. This view is confirmed by the logit 
approach which estimates the probability of being dismissed after an unfavorable 
assessment to only ten percent.278 Nonetheless, in the first decades of the century there 
were cases in which district magistrates were dismissed because of negative supervisory 
reports about their performance in regard to administrative processes and rules of 
professional conduct.279 Furthermore, even when we would observe no dismissal due to 
the neglect of the implementation of the institutional framework, this could be a sign of 
a very effective threat. 
Table 3.14: Average Luxury Ratios of District Magistrates and White Collar Workers in 
the Machine Factory Esslingen 
Period District Magistrates White collar workers  
 Upper Bound Lower Bound  
1870’s 2.02 0.87 0.90 
1880’s 2.33 0.93 1.11 
1890’s 2.74 0.92 1.30 
1900’s 2.54 0.85 1.63 
Source: see previous chapter. 
Pension payments were a new element of material compensation in the 19th century. 
With the introduction of retirement benefits, Civil Servants were among a privileged 
group within society. Widows insurance, on the other side, already existed during the 
18th century but was ameliorated significantly in the 19th century.280 Pensions and 
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 The regression was based on all available assessments. The coefficient is significant at the five 
percent level. Log Likelihood is -43.5, pseudo R
2
 is 0.24 and Prob. > chi
2
 is 0.000. The model 
classifies 91.2 percent of all observations correctly. 
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 Eibach, Staat, pp. 56–58. 
280
 Cf. the discussion in the previous chapter. 
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widows insurance were bound to the last remuneration of the late magistrate. For the 
73 district magistrates in the sample, average nominal pension payments were about 
1827 fl. In terms of luxury ratios real pension payments fluctuated between 1.5 and 1.9 
in the first half of the 19th century. On average a district magistrate would receive old 
age pensions for nine years. Thus pension payments were considerably high. Average 
nominal widows’ benefits accounted for 620 fl. In real terms this corresponds to a luxury 
ratio of 0.6. This does not seem much. However, most widows did not have to sustain a 
family and often lived with the family of their sons or son-in-law. Therefore, they had 
less expenditure which would have increased their living standard. This additional 
monetary benefit had to be added to the wage premium that is depicted in tables 3.11 
and 3.12. The introduction of pension payments and widows’ insurance thus increased 
the power of the threat of dismissal. 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter is based on the difference between a formal institutional reform and its 
actual implementation trough state officials’ implementation of administrative 
processes and adherence to the rules of professional conduct. Thereby, the chapter 
addresses the question how Civil Servants were motivated to obey to the latter. The 
study concentrates on the local level of the administration analyzing district magistrates’ 
incentives to implement the newly introduced administrative processes and adhere to 
the rules of professional conduct.  
The empirical analysis shows that promotions were dependent on seniority. Yet, 
supervisors’ assessments about the performance of district magistrates in regard to 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct also influenced promotion 
decisions. Magistrates who received a good assessment were promoted faster and their 
probability of promotion conditional on an assessment was higher. That is, magistrates 
with a high performance in implementing the formal institutional framework climbed 
the career ladder faster and had a higher probability to reach the top levels of the 
hierarchy. In practice this meant that those magistrates became city managers 
(Stadtdirektoren) or leading magistrates (Amtsvorstand) in populated and important 
districts or even achieved position at the intermediary or central level of the 
administration. Promotion according to the performance in respect to administrative 
processes and rules of professional conduct can thus be interpreted as an important 
incentive to implement the reforms. 
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Yet, a qualification to this interpretation has to be made. As I mentioned in the last 
section, learning effects took a long time, e.g. district magistrates did not fully adopt the 
new rules and regulations immediately. As a policy remark, this means that reforming 
the institutional framework takes a long time and a social planner who is willing to 
enforce the described incentive mechanism over a longer period. 
There is also a further caveat. The described mechanism was not the sole incentive 
mechanism. Social and material privileges, the latter consisting of a wage premium, old 
age pensions and widows insurance also played a role. Here, a shirking wage mechanism 
seemed to be at work. Because magistrates feared to lose their material and social 
privileges, they stuck to administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. Yet, 
because of a reduction in the wage premium during the second half of the 19th century, 
this incentive mechanism may have lost its influence. 
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4. Bureaucratic Efficiency – The Development of Legal 
Capacity in the Grand Duchy of Baden in the Mirror of 
Court Records, 1829-1877 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters I discussed how the central government of the Grand-Duchy of 
Baden succeeded to enforce formal administrative and legal processes and rules of 
professional conduct among the corps of district magistrates. Yet, the question remains 
whether the implementation of these rules actually increased the efficiency of Baden’s 
Civil Service. For the purpose of this chapter efficiency will be defined as legal capacity; 
that is the state’s ability to protect property rights and support markets. In the absence 
of conventional measures for legal capacity – like the Index of Government Antidiversion 
Policies of the International Country Risk Guide or the World Bank Doing Business 
Indicator – this chapter introduces an alternative, second best measure that is available 
for the 19th century - the number of thefts per 1000 inhabitants registered by local 
district courts. However, this measure has two drawbacks: First, registered thefts are an 
official statistic that tabulates the number of trials a district court settled within one 
year. In the case of registered thefts, this number will be dependent on actual crime 
rates of a district, the efficiency of the district’s police forces and the efficiency of the 
courts themselves and the overall legal framework. While the latter three variables are 
institutional components that influence legal capacity, the former – the actual rate of 
crime – is not. It is therefore necessary to decompose the registered theft rate into its 
different institutional and non-institutional components. The legal capacity measure can 
then be constructed using only the institutional components of the theft rate. 
The direction of influence of the different institutional components on the legal capacity 
measure is not clear a priori. This is most obvious in the case of the police. An increase in 
the efficiency of police or a rise in the number of a district’s police force could lead to 
higher registered theft rates, because more delinquents were caught and prosecuted. 
Alternatively, a change in the efficiency or number of the police could lead to a decline 
in registered theft rates, because of a deterrence effect. In order to decompose the 
different institutional and non-institutional factors as well as to isolate their direction of 
influence, I develop a structural model. This model will be estimated with panel data 
from 79 districts of the Grand-Duchy for the years 1829, 1832, 1837, 1842, 1847, 1852, 
1857, 1862, 1867, 1867 and 1877. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Sections two and three measure the 
influence of institutional and non-institutional variables on registered thefts per 1000 
inhabitants and introduce a legal capacity measure. Thereby section two introduces 
theft rates as a measure for legal capacity and develops the basic structural model. 
Section three then presents the empirical results. Section four concludes. 
4.2. Protection of Property Rights: The Model 
4.2.1 Theft Rates as a Measure for Legal Capacity 
In this chapter I use thefts per 1000 inhabitants that were trialed and registered by 79 
district courts281 of the Grand-Duchy of Baden during the period 1829-1877 as a tool to 
estimate the development of legal capacity in Baden and thus the efficiency of the 
country’s Civil Service. In doing so, I interpret the criminal statistic of the Grand-Duchy of 
Baden as a statistic that measures court activity rather than actual crime rates. This view 
is supported by several studies which question the usability of criminal statistics as a 
proxy for the state of crime during the 19th century.282 As these critics argue, criminal 
statistics are influenced by many factors other than actual crime that they significantly 
deviate from the latter. An often discussed concept is the shadow rate α, e.g. the actual 
share of crimes committed but not reported. According to this view, the rate of 
registered thefts is a function of the actual theft rate in the form: 
                                                                 (1) 
with    ≤  .  
Some scholars have argued that α is constant over time.283 In this case information 
about the real value of α is not necessary. Registered theft rates would then be just a 
constant subset of all actual thefts. However, this assumption is not necessarily true. 
Three arguments should be emphasized here:284 First, the size of police forces rose more 
slowly than population for most of the time during the 19th century. The possibility to 
prosecute criminals and to report crimes was thus limited and maybe decreased over 
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 In total there were 82 district courts. However, because of limitations in the data I had to 
exclude some districts from the sample. 
282
 See for the following: V. A. C. Gatrell/T. B. Hadden, Criminal statistics and their interpretation, 
in: E. A. Wrigley (ed), Nineteenth century society. Essays in the use of quantitative methods for 
the study of social data, Cambridge 1972, pp. 336–396, here pp. 350–361; J. J. Tobias, Urban 
Crime in Victorian England, New York, NY 1972
2
, pp. 14–21 and H. Zehr, Crime and the 
development of modern society. Patterns of criminality in nineteenth century Germany and 
France, London 1976, pp. 14–17. However, the different authors come to different conclusions 
whether or not criminal statistics are a useful proxy for real crime rates. 
283
 See for example: Gatrell/Hadden, Criminal statistics, here pp. 350–351. 
284
 For a more detailed argument see: Zehr, Crime, pp. 14–17. 
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time, which should have increased the α-value over time. This development may have 
been exaggerated if increasing urbanization had stimulated thefts by reducing the 
respect for property and augmenting the possibility for property offences. Actual theft 
rates then would have risen but did not translate into increasing registered theft rates, 
because slow-growing police force were not able to deal with increasing urban crime. 
Second, with growing urban theft rates, citizens might get used to crime reducing their 
propensity to report a theft. This would also increase the α –value. Third, price shocks 
may also lead to changes in the actual theft rate without changing the registered theft 
rate. A rise in the prices for foodstuffs could e.g. lead to an increase of the actual rate of 
property crimes. In such a case people will steal more, because they would die of 
starvation otherwise. Given a fix capacity of the courts and the police forces in the short 
run, delinquents could not be registered and prosecuted and would therefore not 
appear in the official statistics. Given this discussion I propose a more complex 
functional relationship in the form: 
                                                                (2) 
Registered thefts are thus not only dependent on actual theft rates but also on the 
state’s legal capacity, e.g. the state’s ability to protect its citizens from property 
offences. The view that the criminal statistic reflects rather legal capacity than actual 
crime is also supported by the founders of the statistic themselves. Controlling the 
activity of the courts was one of the reasons to establish a criminal statistic in the Grand-
Duchy of Baden.285 
4.2.2 Determinants of Legal Capacity 
Court activity measured as registered thefts per 1000 inhabitants is dependent on 
several factors, both institutional and non-institutional. On the one hand the number of 
thefts trialed is dependent on the actual number of crimes committed, which are 
dependent on socio-economic factors (SE). On the other side institutional factors play a 
role. Here two factors can be distinguished: First, the number and efficiency of the 
police forces (P); this factor may influence the number of thefts that were detected and 
prosecuted by the courts. Second, the formal administrative framework (A) including the 
code of law, the code of procedure and the organization of the court system. These 
factors may influence which offences were defined as crimes, how fast they were trialed 
and which effort judges would invest. In what follows, I will therefore develop and 
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 Moses, Kriminalität in Baden, pp. 102–108. 
95 
 
compute a structural model that estimates the impact of these different factors on 
thefts trialed at district courts. In a reduced form this model can be written as: 
                                                                  (3) 
 
With:  RT = Registered thefts per 1000 inhabitants 
SE = Socio-economic factors that contribute to registered crime 
P = Size and efficiency of the police force 
A = Formal administrative framework 
 
Dealing with such different socio-economic and institutional variables also means that 
the data has to be retrieved from different statistical sources. These sources are quoted 
in table one. The table also hints to another caveat: the data was not always provided 
for the same administrative units. Basically the Grand-Duchy of Baden was organized in 
a three level hierarchy. At the top of the organization the different ministries were 
responsible for a special branch of the administration.286 The country was then 
organized in greater units, called Kreise287 in the case of the civil administration and 
Hofgerichtsbezirke288 in the case of the judicial administration. In the case of the 
financial administration these units were called Steuerrevisoratsbezirke.289 These greater 
administrative units were again divided into smaller administrative units which were 
responsible for the daily administrative and judicial work. These were the administrative 
districts – called Ämter – in the case of the civil administration, the judicial districts, or 
Amtsgerichte (local courts) in the case of the judicial administration and the financial 
districts – called Obereinnehmereien in the case of the financial administration. For most 
of the variables the data were collected for these administrative units as can be seen 
from table 4.1. 
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 There were five ministries in total: the foreign ministry, the ministry of finance, the ministry of 
interior, the ministry of justice and the ministry of war. These ministries were headed by a sixth 
ministry, the ministry of state. 
287
 The Kreise were established in 1809. First there existed ten Kreise. Their number was reduced 
to six and then to four in 1832. In 1863 the Kreise were abolished and their supervisory functions 
were transferred to four high civil servants employed by the ministry of interior. See e.g. Grube, 
Vogteien, Ämter, Landkreise, pp. 104–112.  
288
 The term Hofgerichtsbezirke refers to Hofgericht, a higher court which was responsible for 
offences that were punished with more than four (after 1852 eight) weeks of prison (or its 
equivalent) and sums of dispute above 300 f. In total four Hofgerichte and thus 
Hofgerichtsbezirke existed between 1803 and 1863. Their number rose to eleven in 1863. In 1872 
their number was reduced to six. Above the Hofgerichte only the Oberhofgericht – the highest 
appellate court of the country – existed. 
289
 In 1827 there were six Steuerrevisoratsbezirke. Their number reduced to four between 1832 
and 1837. 
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Table 4.1: Sources and Description of Data 
Data Level Source 
Thefts 
 
Judicial Districts Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege. 
Industrial 
 
Financial Districts GLA 237/13950 and 13951. 
Urbanization 
 
 
 
Administrative Districts Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege, 
Beiträge zur Statistik der inneren 
Verwaltung. 
Population 
 
 
 
Administrative Districts Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege, 
Beiträge zur Statistik der inneren 
Verwaltung. 
Real Wage 
 
 
 
Country Own computation according to: 
(Allen, The Great Divergence 
2001) and (Gömmel, 
Realeinkommen in Deutschland 
1979). 
 
Number of Gendarmes 
 
Administrative 
Districts/Circles 
 
(Steinhauser, Geschichte 1900). 
Police 
 
 
Administrative Districts (Teufel, Südwestdeutsche Polizei 
1999, pp. 65–66) and (Wirsing, 
Gendarmerie 1990, pp. 176–179). 
 
Number of Supervisory 
Institution 
 
Judicial Districts Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege. 
Number of Courts 
 
Judicial Districts Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege. 
Distance to Kreisgericht Judicial Districts Own Computation. 
 
Table 4.1 thus suggests that the data used for computing the structural model comes 
from different geographical units, which would distort the results of the regression 
analysis. However, the problem of geographical dissimilarity can be alleviated. Until 
1857 administrative and judicial districts were unified, e.g. the Ämter were responsible 
for civil as well as for judicial duties.290 In 1857 the two functions were separated 
organizationally. However, in most cases this did not mean a change in geographic 
location; that is administrative and judicial districts remained the same in terms of 
geography. Financial districts on the other side had another geographical shape than 
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 The local courts were not responsible for capital offences or civil disputes which exceeded a 
sum of 300 fl. However, in the case of capital offences the local courts often were charged with 
the investigation of the crime. 
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administrative and judicial districts. In many cases they incorporated two or more of the 
latter, but there were also cases were one financial district was responsible for only one 
administrative district. Wherever possible I assigned the administrative and judicial 
districts to the financial districts using information from the Verordnungsblatt für die 
Beamten und Angestellten der Steuerverwaltung.291 The rest of this section concentrates 
on the description of the variables used in the econometric model. 
4.2.3 Theft Rates 
Theft rates on district level were computed as thefts per 1000 inhabitants. Using district 
level data makes sense because of two reasons: First, an analysis on district level allows 
testing for differences in the influence of socio-economic as well as administrative 
factors on thefts trialed by the district courts. Second, compared to the Hofgerichte, the 
Oberhofgericht (the highest appellate court) and the petty session of the communes, 
district courts had the highest share of crimes trialed (see table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Shares of Registered Crime at the Different Courts of the Grand Duchy of 
Baden (in %) 
 Hofgericht District 
Courts 
Communal 
Courts 
Jury Courts 
Average 1829 – 1847 35.6 64.4 - - 
Average 1852 - 1878 19.5 47.2 31.8 1.7 
Source: Data is from: Moses, Kriminalität in Baden 2006, pp. 381–382. 
Data about registered crime comes from the Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege which 
provides a detailed survey about the different kinds of crime that were trialed at the 
three stages of the judicial system.292 The statistic contains all thefts that were trialed at 
the local district courts. Thus the statistic includes the number of convicts, the number 
of acquittals as well as those cases in which no offender could be identified. Because the 
founders of the statistics were also interested in the social causes of crime, the volumes 
furthermore include several social statistics like the number of population in a district as 
well as some personal information about the convicts. 
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 Finanzministerium, Verordnungsblatt für die Beamten und Angestellten der Steuerverwaltung, 
Karlsruhe. Here I used the issues of September 6
th
, 1833 (No. 12), December 8
th
, 1835 (No. 44), 
December 12
th
, 1835 (No. 45), January 12
th
, 1850 (No. 1) and September 15
th
, 1856 (No. 22). The 
Verordnungsblatt was followed by a new series, called Finanzministerium, Verordnungsblatt der 
Steuerdirektion, Karlsruhe. Here I used the issues: November 24
th
, 1863, July 29
th
, 1865 and 
October 27
th
, 1871. 
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 Cf. footnote 288. 
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Figure 4.1: Thefts Trialed at District Level in the Grand Duchy of Baden (per 1000 
Population), 1829 – 1877 
 
Source: Own computation based on Großherzogtum Baden, Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege 
1829-1879. 
The development of registered thefts at district courts between 1829 and 1877 can be 
divided into four phases (see figure 4.1): a first phase spans from 1829 to 1845. During 
this period theft rates showed a constant upward trend. This trend was exaggerated 
during the years before and after the German Revolution of 1848/49 in which the 
Grand-Duchy of Baden played a major role. Unfortunately, the series has a gap between 
1848 and 1852 when no information about crimes was collected. Theft rates remained 
high until 1855. They then fell to pre-Revolution levels. During the second half of the 
1850’s and the first half of the 1860’s theft rates stagnated on this relatively low level 
constituting the third phase. Since the mid-1860’s, theft rates started to rise again. Yet, 
the trend seemed to be less stable than between 1829 and 1845. Given the sharp rise of 
the theft rate in the years before and after the Revolution of 1848/9 one may wonder if 
theft rates were motivated politically; that is that the government advised policemen 
and judges to prosecute thefts more strictly in order to repress the revolutionary 
movement. Yet, there are two arguments that argue against this hypothesis. First, the 
government had better means of restrictive instruments at its disposal like the 
possibility to convict a revolutionist for treason or incitement of revolutionary acts. 
Second, as Berger and Spoerer point out, the Revolution of 1848/9 was caused by a 
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harsh recession.293 Mounting crime rates during the period of revolution therefore 
reflect a sharp increase of property crimes that were committed due to rising poverty. 
4.2.4 Socio-Economic Variables 
Sociologists and historians have developed several theories about the determinants of 
crime since the 19th century. Adolphe Quetelet294 and Emile Durkheim295 were the first 
who attributed crime on social factors combining social and criminal statistics.296 Their 
theories and methods were expanded and refined by 20th century scholars. The most 
important theories that were developed during the 20th century were the theory of 
anomie, social disorganization and the theory of absolute and relative deprivation.297 
The theory of anomie explains crime with the lag between social values (like economic 
success, social prestige, etc.) and the available means to reach these aims. If society 
denies some individuals or groups the possibility to reach these social values this would 
provoke deviant behavior. According to this theory agrarian societies are stable in a 
sense that social values did not change much over time. Yet, in capitalist societies with 
increasing industrialization social values, e.g. economic success, changed rapidly while 
increasing inequality made it harder for the average person to achieve these aims. This 
gap between the socially suggested wealth and actual wealth may have served as an 
incentive to engage in property crimes like theft and robbery. 
The theory of social disorganization argues that the breakdown of traditional values was 
a main driver for criminal behavior. It is argued that a consistent attitude of the 
members of society towards social values and laws reduces crime while a set of 
competing values stimulates deviant behavior. In this view increasing urbanization rates 
foster the breakup of traditional values and thus criminal behavior, because rapid 
urbanization may lead to the abolishment of traditional (rural) values that were 
substituted by competing world-views of the modern world. Competing social values 
could lead to a disorganization of the individual within society which may increase an 
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 H. Berger/M. Spoerer, Economic Crisis and the European Revolutions of 1848, in: The Journal 
of Economic History 2, 2001, pp. 293–326. 
294
 * 22. February 1796 in Gent, † 17. February 1874 in Brussels. 
295
 * 15. April 1858 in Epinal, † 15. November 1917 in Paris. 
296
 For an overview about Quetelet’s and Durkheim’s work see: L. I. Shelley, Crime and 
modernization. The impact of industrialization and urbanization on crime, Carbondale, Ill. 1982
2
, 
pp. 4–6. 
297
 For a survey see: Shelley, Crime and modernization, pp. 6–10. Shelley lists also further 
theories, as the theory of cultural conflict, differential association and delinquent subculture. Yet, 
these theories are more detailed extensions of the theories mentioned above (differential 
association, delinquent subculture) or are not relevant in the case of the Grand-Duchy of Baden 
(cultural conflict). Cf also Zehr, Crime, pp. 19–28. 
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individual’s willingness to engage in acts of violence which include rioting but also 
robbery. 
The theory of relative deprivation explains criminal behavior with the visibility and 
access to goods for relatively poorer individuals of the society; that is with the feasibility 
of engaging in property crimes. In this context industrialization and urbanization levels 
play an important role. Industrialization, on the one hand, increased the number of 
goods and therefore their visibility, urbanization, on the other hand, made those goods 
more accessible. The theory of absolute deprivation, at last, describes property crime 
that is committed, because of sheer poverty. This would typically be the case during a 
subsistence crisis which was not uncommon during the first half of the 19th century. 
There is also an economic theory of crime developed by Gary S. Becker who introduced 
the analysis of human behavior into economic theory.298 According to Becker engaging 
in criminal activities is a question of economic incentives. Individuals compare expected 
(monetary) rewards from illegal activities with the secure outcome of a legal activity. In 
this model, rewards from illegal activities are interpreted as a random variable that is 
dependent on the probability of detection and the level of fines. If expected rewards 
from illegal activities are higher than those from legal activities, an individual would 
engage in criminal behavior. Individuals thus engage in crime, because their costs and 
benefits related to criminal activities are different from those individuals who pursue 
legal activities. Because of missing data about possible gains from crime, the probability 
of detection and the level of fines, I cannot test this theory directly. However, in some 
sense the economic theory of crime is comparable to the theories of anomie and the 
theories of absolute and relative deprivation. The decision whether or not to commit a 
crime is in all four theories dependent on the possible gains of a crime. When the means 
of an individual to engage in legal activities are restricted, as in the theory of anomie, 
the possible gains from committing a crime are high. The same is true in the case of 
sheer poverty. At last, if the accessibility and visibility of goods is higher, the costs of 
committing a crime are smaller. For example, a higher visibility reduces search costs 
while a higher accessibility reduces the costs of acquisition.299 
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 E.g. see: G. S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in: Journal of Political 
Economy 2, 1968, pp. 169–217 and G. S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior. The 
Nobel Lecture, Stanford 1996. For a broader view see: G. S. Becker/ W. M. Landes (ed), Essays in 
the economics of crime and punishment, New York, NY 1974. 
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 The probability of detection could furthermore be measured by the efficiency and number of 
police forces while the level of fines is dependent from the code of law and the working of the 
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We can test the theories described above by incorporating the growth rate of 
urbanization (social disorganization), urbanization levels (relative deprivation) and a 
measure for industrialization (anomie, relative deprivation) as well as a real wage index 
(absolute deprivation) into the empirical model.  
Data about population on district level is derived from the Übersichten der 
Strafrechtspflege and the Beiträge zur Statistik der inneren Verwaltung des 
Großherzogtums Baden. Urbanization levels were defined as a district’s share of 
population in towns or villages with over 2000 inhabitants. Because of missing data 
about town and village size I could only compute urbanization levels for the years 1838, 
1852 and 1871. Missing data about urbanization levels for the remaining years makes 
the construction of the growth rate of urbanization impossible. Instead, I make use of 
the growth rate of the population on district level as a second best solution.300 Baden’s 
population grew about 27 percent between 1829 and 1875301 (see figure 4.2) 
pauperizing a large part of society, especially in the traditional crafts. This rapid decay of 
wealth may have led to an environment were different world views could emerge. 
Figure 4.2: Population in the Grand-Duchy of Baden, 1829 – 1875 
Source: Kraus, Quellen zur Bevölkerungsstatistik, pp. 40–41. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
courts. The economic theory of crime is thus indirectly incorporated in the model presented in 
this section. 
300
 In this case I assume a constant distribution of population between towns and villages within a 
district. Yet, the distribution between districts may change. 
301
 Population was 1.19m in 1829 and 1.51m in 1875. Data is from A. Kraus, Quellen zur 
Bevölkerungsstatistik Deutschlands 1815-1875, Boppard am Rhein 1980, pp. 40–41. 
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The level of industrialization was measured by using tax data. In Baden, the tax system 
was based on the capital employed in agriculture, industry as well as in housing. To this 
end the financial administration collected data about the capital that was employed in 
these three asset categories. In the case of industry, the financial administration also 
distinguished between the capital that was employed in machinery and inventories and 
the labor income of the owner of the enterprise and its employees. We therefore have a 
relatively good approximation of the working capital within the different financial 
districts.302 For the purpose of this paper I used the share of a district’s working capital 
over the total tax capital as a proxy for the level of industrialization. This is feasible, 
because the two other categories represent the value of agricultural estates or 
unproductive capital. Note that tax data is provided for assessment areas that were less 
numerous than districts. Therefore an assessment area included several districts. 
Districts were allocated to assessment areas wherever possible which reduced the 
number of districts in the baseline model to 79. 
In order to compute real wage I used Rainer Gömmel’s information about nominal 
wages of industry workers and craftsmen in southern Germany.303 One may argue that 
using nominal wages from southern Germany rather than from Baden could distort the 
overall picture. Yet, this would only be the case if there have been different trends in the 
countries of south Germany. But market integration and labor mobility grew during the 
19th century thanks to the Zollverein and the German Bund. Nominal wages should 
therefore rather converge than diverge. Gömmel’s nominal wage series was then 
deflated using Robert Allen’s poverty line consumption basket.304 Because there is no 
detailed information about prices in the different districts of Baden, I used information 
about prices in the Alsace as a proxy for prices in Baden. This is feasible, because the 
two regions were highly integrated. As a result, the movement of prices was highly 
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correlated and prices did not much differ in their levels.305 Thus, using a broader 
measure of real wages should not distort the overall picture much. 
Given the availability of the data, the socio-economic effects influencing registered 
thefts per 1000 inhabitants can be written as follows: 
            
 
 
                                   (4) 
with:  SE = Socio-economic factors that contribute to registered crime 
I = The level of industrialization 
U = The level of urbanization 
   = The growth rate of population 
 
 
 
 = The real wage 
4.2.5 Efficiency of the Police 
Let us now turn to the first institutional factor that influenced legal capacity: the number 
and efficiency of police forces. As in many other German states, there existed two 
different police forces in Baden since the 18th century: a security police, called 
Gendarmerie, and local police forces that were run by the communes. 
4.2.5.1 The Gendarmerie 
The Gendarmerie was established according to the French blueprint. Its focal mission 
was the maintenance of law and order in the countryside. This task mainly intended the 
control of beggars and vagrants and the prevention and prosecution of related crimes 
like theft and robbery. The Gendarmerie was founded in 1829 by reforming its less 
efficient preceding organizations.306 The Gendarmerie was organized like a military force 
with a strict discipline and clear command structures. Gendarmes were mainly former 
soldiers and thus well-trained experts of violence. However, the Gendarmerie paid 
attention to pick young and fit soldiers rather than old veterans. According to the annual 
statement of account of the Commander of the Gendarmerie there existed a good esprit 
de corps and patriotic spirit.307 Together with rewards of good performance trough 
extra-pays, promotion and public acclamation, this implies a high motivation within the 
force. Gendarmes were garrisoned in groups of two and more officers in different 
stations in the administrative districts. Yet, the administrative districts differed in the 
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Gendarmerie), Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Section 236, Fascicles 8098-8100, thereafter cited 
as GLA 236/8098-8100. 
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number of employed gendarmes. Less populated and smaller districts had normally less 
gendarmes. Given the good training of the gendarmes, their presumably high motivation 
as well as the different endowment of administrative districts with gendarmes, one 
could expect a positive relationship between the number of gendarmes and registered 
thefts. The higher the proportion of gendarmes per inhabitants, the more thefts should 
be reported by the gendarmes and therefore registered in the criminal statistic. This is 
what one can call the detection effect. On the other side there could be a deterrence 
effect of good police work. That is, individuals would abstain from criminal behavior, 
because the probability of detection was very high reducing the gains from deviant 
behavior.308 
Data about the number of gendarmes in each administrative district is provided by 
Steinhauser who has a detailed list for the years 1832 and 1899.309 Steinhauser 
furthermore reports changes of the size of the force on the level of the Kreise. Between 
1829 and 1879 this happened in the years 1829, 1834, 1838 and 1849/50. I can thus 
interpolate the change of the number of gendarmes in each administrative district by 
multiplying the number of gendarmes per Kreis with a district’s share of gendarmes in 
1832.310 
4.2.5.2 Communal Police Forces 
The second police force, the local police, was less homogenous than the Gendarmerie. 
During the 19th century two types of local police existed in the villages and towns of the 
country. In most communes local police forces were controlled by majors called 
Ortsvorsteher. Yet, in some towns the central state took away police powers from the 
commune and assigned responsibilities to the district magistrates (called 
Amtmänner).311 In contrast to the state-controlled police forces, communal police forces 
suffered from organizational and personnel drawbacks. Communal-controlled police 
forces often consisted of the local poor or day laborers and had thus no adequate 
training. Indeed, the Gendarmerie and district magistrates complaint that local 
policemen were lousy armed and not seldom old, lame and deaf; some even drank 
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alcohol on duty and would have needed to be supervised by the police rather than being 
policemen themselves.312 Because the communes used the police as a possibility to 
reduce poor relief expenses, local police forces were badly paid and policemen were 
forced to do several jobs and hence could not fully concentrate on police work. As a 
consequence, policemen were hardly able to enforce laws, norms and regulations as 
well as to preserve the peace and prevent citizens from property offences. Especially, 
enforcement of laws vis-à-vis members of the upper classes was difficult because of 
economic dependencies and membership in social networks.313 
Yet, communal-controlled police forces did not only suffer from personnel drawbacks. 
Also, majors usually neglected the enforcement of police rules, prosecuted complaints 
by the gendarmerie reluctantly and did not support members of the gendarmerie 
against insults and physical abuse. These drawbacks were, according to the 
Gendarmerie, due to lacking expertise of the majors in police related issues. Given a 
relatively short term in office, majors had no time to learn how to govern the police 
effectively. Additionally, and maybe even more importantly, the gendarmerie complaint 
that majors had incentives to go easy on “their” citizens in order not to risk votes at the 
next election. Furthermore, it was reported that majors had to fear acts of revenge after 
they abdicated their office and therefore were reluctant enforcing police rules. 
One may argue that the critic by the Gendarmerie was biased in order to stress its own 
importance for the fight against crime. Yet, the view of the Gendarmerie was confirmed 
by the district magistrates. Because the relationship between district magistrates and 
gendarmes was not free of conflict, this can be taken as a clear sign that the 
performance of local police forces was as bad as it was described by the Gendarmerie.314  
Because of the inefficiencies of the communal-controlled police, one would expect no 
effect of these police forces on registered crime. State-controlled police forces were, in 
contrast, better trained and paid. In many cases, the state recruited former gendarmes 
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who were well-trained in police work. State-controlled police forces had also higher 
wages than communal forces allowing policemen to concentrate fully on police work. 
Moreover, there was a special fund from which outstanding work and effort was 
rewarded.315 As in the case of gendarmes, this should have increased motivation. 
Furthermore, local policemen were controlled by district magistrates who were – in 
contrast to the majors – not dependent on public popularity. Indeed, as chapter three 
argues district magistrates faced incentives to implement rules and norms. Control and 
enforcement of police work was therefore higher in towns were district magistrates 
were in charge of the police.316 
Because of these big differences in the quality of communal and state-controlled police 
forces it is reasonable to measure the additional effect on registered crime of the latter. 
Here, the same considerations as in the case of the Gendarmerie prevail: registered theft 
rates in towns with state controlled communal police forces may be higher, because of 
the detection effect or lower, because of the deterrence effect. In order to measures 
these effects, I introduced a police dummy that becomes one if the majority of local 
police forces within a district were controlled by the district magistrates. This was the 
case in ten towns. In the capital Karlsruhe and Mannheim local police forces were 
controlled by the state since 1787 and 1815, respectively. Furthermore, majors lost 
control over local police forces in Baden (1835), Freiburg, Heidelberg, Konstanz (all 
1836), Rastatt (1843), Bruchsal (between 1850 and 1873), Lahr (between 1852 and 
1873) and Pforzheim (since 1857).317 
The middle part in equation three can thus be written as follows: 
                                                                            (5) 
 
with:  P = Size and efficiency of the police force 
G = Number of gendarmes per 1000 inhabitants 
D_SC = Dummy for state-controlled police forces 
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4.2.5.3 The Efficiency of the Police over Time 
So far, we have only discussed level effects. But the theft rate will not only be affected 
by the number of gendarmes or the introduction of state-controlled police forces in the 
communes. The efficiency of these two kinds of police may also rose over time. Such a 
change may be a result of a technological or organizational change which increases the 
productivity of the police. The diffusion of the railway, for example, reduced the costs of 
traveling in some areas of the country making the prosecution of thieves easier. This 
may have increased the productivity of the Gendarmerie. Yet, the first railway of the 
country was built in the Rhine valley between the mid 1840’s and 1850’s. The small 
towns and villages of the Odenwald and the Black Forest were not connected before the 
late 1860’s. A dense railway network that connected almost every village was not 
established until the late 1890’s.318 It is therefore arguable that technological 
improvements played a major role in enhancing the productivity of the Gendarmerie. 
Indeed as table 4.3 shows, the ratio of the number of people arrested by the 
Gendarmerie and the number of registered thefts did not change much between 1830 
and 1870. 
Table 4.3: Productivity of Police: Ratio of Thefts per Number of Arrested (per 1000 inh.), 
1830-1875 
Year Thefts Trialed/Arrested 
1830 0.07 
1835 0.08 
1840 0.05 
1845 0.06 
1855 0.06 
1860 0.06 
1865 0.08 
1870 0.10 
1875 0.12 
Sources: The number of people arrested is from Steinhauser, Gendarmerie, p. 261. The number 
of thefts trialed is from Moses, Kriminalität, pp. 385-388. 
A main organizational change was the introduction of criminal investigation 
departments in cities with state controlled police forces since 1864. At the beginning, 
members of the criminal investigation bureaus were ordinary policemen who were 
delegated to the department of public prosecution. Those policemen were therefore not 
trained for specialized police work.319 A special organization with well-trained 
                                                                
318
 See W. Walz, Die Eisenbahn in Baden-Württemberg. Geschichte d. Bahnen in Baden u. 
Württemberg 1840 bis heute, Stuttgart 1980. 
319
 During the 19
th
 century policemen in the communes were also responsible for public health, 
public security, market rules a.s.o. With these duties the communal police forces operated at full 
108 
 
professionals who were only responsible for the investigation of crimes was not founded 
before 1879. In the case of state-controlled police forces it is therefore hard to make a 
well-grounded assumption about the evolution of the forces’ productivity over time. It 
may be that there were first improvements in police work during the second half of the 
1860’s. Yet, those improvements may also have realized not before the 1880’s. 
4.2.6 The Formal Administrative Framework 
Besides socio-economic factors and the influence of police forces, the formal 
administrative framework may as well influence registered theft rates. In the period 
under examination three important changes of the formal institutional framework 
occurred.320 First, the criminal law and the organization of the criminal process were 
changed in 1852. Until then the criminal law in the tradition of the Carolina remained in 
force. This gave judges much power which led to a high variation of sentences between 
different courts. In 1852 a new criminal law was enacted that restricted the power of 
judges and strengthened the position of the prosecutor and the defender. In this context 
the reform was an important step towards the establishment of the rule of law. The 
reform brought also other changes that were important for the development of the 
criminal statistic. The new law rendered the definitions of prosecuted offences more 
precisely. While definitions were relatively vague under the regime of the Carolina, they 
were now clear-cut. The new law furthermore restructured responsibilities: The 
Hofgerichte transferred some responsibilities to the district courts by increasing the 
penal power of the latter from four to eight weeks of prison (or its equivalent).321 The 
next major organizational reform was the detachment of the local courts from the local 
administration in 1857. Until then, district magistrates, were responsible for 
administrative as well as for judicial issues.322 In this context, some smaller jurisdictions 
were closed and incorporated into their bigger neighbors. This process should have 
automatically increased registered crime in the remaining districts. Although there was a 
specialization of some district magistrates on legal issues before 1857, the creation of 
individual local courts may have further increased specialization resulting in a higher 
efficiency of the courts and therefore also leading to higher rates of thefts registered by 
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the district courts. A new wave of mergers occurred in 1864 in the course of an 
organizational reform of the civil and legal branch of the administration. The reform of 
1864 also increased the number of courts of second instance, now called Kreisgerichte 
from four to eleven. This reduced the number of district courts per Kreisgericht. Because 
the latter were responsible for the control of the former, this may have improved 
detection of local judges’ reluctance to trial a case within the appropriate time. These 
stricter controls may also have increased thefts registered by the district courts. Besides 
these three major reforms of the formal administrative organization, two smaller 
reforms have to be mentioned. In 1865 and then especially in 1872 the number of local 
courts was reduced again. In 1872 the government also decided to close four of the 
recently introduced Kreisgerichte. 
In order to model the three major as well as the two smaller changes of the formal 
administrative framework one could construct year dummies for the periods 1852-79, 
1857-79, 1864-79, 1865-79 and 1872-79. The major drawback of these dummy variables 
is that they contain information about various changes that took place at the same time. 
It is therefore impossible to isolate the individual effect of a rising number of supervisory 
institutions, a declining number of courts or new offences and gains from specialization. 
However, some of the effects described above can be modeled without making use of 
dummy variables. The potential effect of a declining number of local courts can also be 
measured by including the number of local courts into the model. The same is possible 
with a potential effect of the number of supervisory institutions.323 In doing so, we can 
set the 1864-79, the 1865-79 and the 1872-79 dummy aside. The remaining dummies 
then measure only the effect of the separation of the civil and the legal branch of 
administration (the 1857-1879 dummy) and the effect of a new definition of offences 
and a new code of procedure (the 1852-1879 dummy). 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, incentive mechanisms that motivate judges to 
implement legal rules and processes and adhere to the rules of professional conduct 
could have an influence on judges’ effort to trial a crime and have therefore also an 
effect on registered thefts. As the analysis of the career paths of 73 district magistrates 
and local judges shows, promotion to higher ranks and thus an increase of remuneration 
was inter alia bound to the adherence of the formal administrative and legal rules and 
processes and the respect of the code of professional conduct. Although there were 
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some problems in the early years of the new incentive mechanism due to inadequate 
controls, the mechanism ameliorated significantly since the late 1830’s or early 1840’s. 
This was mainly due to the establishment of internal controls that were undertaken on a 
permanent basis following a periodic rhythm. Unfortunately, I cannot control for the 
effect of this incentive mechanism directly. Yet, an indirect test may be applicable. If the 
incentive mechanism described above worked comprehensively there should be no 
differences between court districts due to their geographical proximity to their 
supervisory institutions. That is, drawbacks in the implementation of justice should not 
be more common in courts at the periphery, because supervision of these institutions 
was less strict. In order to control for this factor, I include the distance to the responsible 
court of second instance. 
The last part in equation three can therefore be written as: 
                                                               (6) 
with:  A = Formal and informal administrative framework 
D1852-79 = Dummy for the period 1852 – 1879 
D1857-79 = Dummy for the period 1857 – 1879 
C = Number of district courts 
SI = Number of supervisory institutions 
D_SI = Distance to supervisory institution 
The overall model can therefore be written as: 
             
 
 
                                                     (7) 
Table 4.4 summarizes the variables used in equation seven: 
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Industrial 770 .042 .026 .01 .19 
Urbanization 830 .19 .22 0 1 
Growth Rate of Population 717 0.03 0.20 -.93 .9 
Real Wage 891 .73 .11 .58 .94 
Gendarmes per 1000 pop 745 .30 .15 .045 1.17 
      
Number of Courts 891 73.0 11.5 51 81 
Distance to Kreisgericht 823 36.4 26.0 0 99.5 
      
Longest Distance to Court 858 3.66 1.27 0 7 
Population Density 700 7,068 10,214 1,929 135,370 
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4.3. Measuring Legal Capacity 
Given the panel-structure of the data, equation seven can be re-written as: 
                      
 
 
                                                        (8) 
Registered thefts per 1000 inhabitants in district i at time t, can be explained with:  
(1) Socio-economic indicators including the level of Industrialization (Iit) as well as the 
level of Urbanization (Uit) in district i at time t, the growth rate of population        in 
district i at time t and the real wage  
 
 
   at time t. 
(2) The number of well trained and highly motivated gendarmes per 1000 inhabitants 
(Git) in district i at time t as well as a Dummy (DSC) that indicates the existence of a state 
controlled communal police force. 
(3) The administrative institutions of the country consisting of two dummy variables for 
the sub-periods 1852-79 and 1857-79, a variable that measures the number of courts 
(Ct) at time t as well as variable that controls for the distance of a district court i to its 
supervisory institution at time t (D_SCit). Note that the number of supervisory 
institutions was excluded from the model, because of its high negative correlation with 
the number of courts.324 
(4) A set of fixed effects Xi for each district. 
The model was computed for the year 1829 and then for every fifth year starting in 1832 
and ending in 1877. Data on thefts, business taxes and real wages were available for 
every year.325 In the case of the other variables some adjustments had to be made. In 
the case of population, data points are very near or equal to the benchmark years. In the 
former case, I interpolated population data in order to be more accurate.326 
Urbanization levels are only available for the years 1838, 1852 and 1871. I therefore 
worked with the 1838 data for the time until 1847. The 1852 data was applied for the 
years 1852 to 1867, and the 1871 data for the remaining years. The number of 
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gendarmes was raised in the years 1829, 1832, 1834, 1838 and 1849/50. Between these 
years the manpower of the force remained constant (see table 4.5). 327 
Table 4.5: Available Data Points for the Variables: Theft, Population, Urbanization and 
Gendarmes 
Data Points for 
Variable: Thefts 
Data Points for 
Variable: Population 
Data Points for 
Variable: Urbanization 
Data Points for 
Variable: Number 
of Gendarmesa 
1829 1829 - 1829 
1832 1833 - 1832 
1837 1838 1838 1834 
1842 1845 - 1838 
1847 - - 1849/50 
1852 1852 1852 - 
1857 1855 - - 
1862 1858 - - 
1867 1864 - - 
1872 1871 1871 - 
1877 1880 - 1899 
a
 For the years 1832 and 1899 data is on district level. For all other years, data is on circle level. In 
the latter case district level data was interpolated from the 1832 and 1899 figures (see text). 
Table 4.6 shows the result of the panel regression. While specifications one to three are 
reduced form estimates of equation eight concentrating on one of the three different 
components, specification four contains the full model. Specification five introduces a 
time trend as robustness check. The dependent variable in all specifications is thefts per 
1000 inhabitants. All standard errors are robust. 
In the case of the socio-economic determinants of registered thefts the level of 
industrialization, the real wage and the growth rate of population are significant in 
specifications one and four. All three variables have the expected sign: a rise in the level 
of urbanization and the growth rate of population increases registered thefts, while a 
rise in the real wage leads to a decrease of registered thefts per 1000 inhabitants. 
However, if one adds a time trend the growth rate of population loses significance. The 
coefficient of the urbanization level on the other side is insignificant throughout all 
specifications; although it has the expected sign. 
The coefficients of the two police forces – the Gendarmerie and the local police forces – 
show a positive sign. While the police dummy is significant at the one percent level in 
specification two, four and five the number of gendarmes is only significant in 
specification four. In this specification an increase in the number of gendarmes per 1000 
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inhabitants leads to a rise in thefts per 1000 inhabitants registered by the district courts. 
The same is true for the state-controlled communal police forces. Compared to their less 
well trained and motivated communal counterparts, districts with state controlled police 
have more thefts registered by the courts. It thus seems that the detection effect 
prevailed. A well trained and highly motivated police force prosecuted and reported 
thefts more strictly. However, it may also be possible that state-controlled police forces 
were established, because theft rates were so high in the treated districts. The same 
problem of endogeneity may be at work in the case of the Gendarmerie. Government 
could have staffed districts with high theft rates with more gendarmes per 1000 
inhabitants. The prevalence of the detection effect may therefore be a result of the 
endogeneity of the two variables. This problem will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
Table 4.6: Determinants of the Theft Rate, Fixed-Effects Panel Regression (Dependent 
Variable: Thefts Trialed per 1000 Inhabitants, Robust Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Industrial 12.8***   10.0*** 9.98*** 
Urbanization 0.96   0.66 0.45 
Growth Rate of 
Population 
1.10***   1.22*** 0.36 
Real Wage 
 
-2.56***   -10.4*** -5.39*** 
Gendarmes per 
1000 pop. 
 1.13  2.47*** 0.53 
Police 
 
 1.22***  1.09*** 0.84*** 
D_1852   -1.02*** -1.75*** -3.15*** 
D_1857   0.49*** 1.23*** -0.25 
Number of Courts   -0.03*** -0.11*** 0.01 
Distance to 
Kreisgericht 
 
  0.009* 0.02*** 0.01** 
Time Trend NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 667 745 747 666 666 
F-test 10.9*** 5.89*** 14.8*** 17.6*** 27.0*** 
R2 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.23 0.32 
***, **, and * denote significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. All 
standard errors are robust. 
The last component that determines the number of registered thefts per 1000 
inhabitants was the formal administrative framework. All coefficients in this category 
are significant at the ten or one percent level in specification three and four. 
Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between the distance to a supervisory 
institution and theft rates. This finding disagrees with the assumption that those districts 
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which were farther away from their supervisory institutions were less strict controlled 
and therefore less productive. It is therefore not implausible that the internal incentive 
mechanism which motivated district magistrates and (after 1857) local judges to adhere 
to the formal administrative and legal processes and respect the code of professional 
conduct was actually at work. The coefficient of the variable that measures the number 
of courts also has the expected sign. A decrease in the number of courts led to an 
increase in the number of registered thefts per district. However, if one controls for a 
time trend the variable loses its significance.328 The same is true for the 1857 dummy. 
4.3.1 Endogeneity of the Police 
In the case of state-controlled local police forces there are two reasons why it seems 
that the decision whether to introduce state control was exogenous.329 First, 
government was concerned about oppressing revolutionary movements and their 
propaganda. Because revolutionary circles and propaganda was centered in the bigger 
cities it was reasonable to increase control over these strategically important towns. The 
introduction of state-controlled local police forces had thus political reasons.330 Local 
police in Constance, for example, was assigned to the district, because the town was a 
gateway for revolutionist that lived in Swiss exile. In Rastatt local police was taken away 
from the mayor, because the government was concerned about riots and fights among 
the mass of workers that concentrated in the town during the construction of the 
railway and the fortress. Second, during the 19th century fight against crime was not the 
principal task of the local police forces.331 Police work included duties like enforcing 
market- and fire-regulations as well as regulations on public health and morality. A 
major task, for example, was the enforcement of closing times and the detention of 
revelers. Fighting crime and investigation of criminals was thus only a smaller part of 
overall police work. This view is sustained by the fact that a specialized criminal 
investigation department was not created before 1876. A last indicator, that the 
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 This may be due to the high negative correlation between the time trend and the number of 
courts (corr = 0.84). Indeed, the number of courts was strictly decreasing over time while the 
time trend is by definition increasing over time. 
329
 For the following see Eibach, Staat, pp. 150–160 and Wirsing, Gendarmerie, pp. 177–179. 
330
 For a history of the origins of the political police in Germany see W. Siemann, "Deutschlands 
Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung". Die Anfänge der politischen Polizei 1806 - 1866, Tübingen 1985. 
331
 For the U.S. cf. E. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, in: M. Tonry/ N. Morris (ed), Modern 
Policing, Chicago 1992, pp. 547–580. 
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introduction of state-controlled police was exogenous to thefts during the 19th century is 
the fact that government planned to realize a fix ratio of police to inhabitants.332 
In the case of the gendarmerie, there are no arguments why the number of gendarmes 
per 1000 inhabitants should not be endogenous. But the functional relationship 
between the number of gendarmes and the number of thefts can be modeled explicitly. 
Therefore, endogeneity can be eliminated using a three stage simultaneous equation 
model.333 The number of gendarmes per 1000 inhabitants can be assumed to be 
dependent on the number of registered thefts per 1000 inhabitants as well as on the 
density of population,334 the size of the district335 as well as its level of industrialization 
and urbanization. Districts may have a higher demand for security, because of the high 
concentration of population and capital. However, there may be also districts with low 
urbanization rates but nevertheless a high density of population. At last, the size of the 
district may also determine the number of gendarmes that were deployed, because an 
effective control is only possible, if there are a sufficient number of gendarmes per 
square kilometer. Equation nine describes these considerations: 
                                                                           (9) 
with:  Git =  Number of gendarmes per 1000 inhabitants in district i at time t 
 RTit =  Number of thefts registered by district courts in district i at time t 
 Iit =  The level of Industrialization in district i at time t 
 Uit =  The level of Urbanization in district i at time t 
 Dens_Popit = The density of Population in district i at time t 
 AREAi = The size of district i in square miles. 
Together with equation eight this describes the system of simultaneous equations that 
will be estimated here. The model was computed using the three stage least square 
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Cf. Wirsing, Gendarmerie, pp. 177; 182. The ratio was 1:1000. Yet there was a high variation 
between cities. Cf. Eibach, Staat, p. 150. 
333
 The standard approach in the literature to deal with the problem of endogeneity is the 
instrumental variable approach. However, as Levitt argues, in the case of the police it is difficult 
to find good instruments. In his classic 1997 paper, he uses electoral cycles as an instrument for 
the number of policemen (see: Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles). Yet, this approach is not feasible in 
the case of the Gendarmerie, because the decision about an increase of the force was made by 
the ministry of interior and not by the elected diet. Therefore, I use a different approach to 
eliminate the problem of endogeneity: the three stage least square approach (3SLS) proposed by 
Zellner and Theil (see: A. Zellner/H. Theil, Three-Stage Least Squares: Simultaneous Estimation of 
Simultaneous Equations, in: Econometrica 1, 1962, pp. 54–78). The approach combines a 
simultaneous equation model with the two stage least square approach. 
334
 Population density was computed as population divided by the size of a district in square 
miles. 
335
 Data about district size is from the Übersichten der Strafrechtspflege. 
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estimator proposed by Zellner and Theil.336 The panel structure was modeled by 
introducing dummy variables for each district. A time trend was also included. The 
results of the regression are presented in table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: 3SLS Simultaneous Equation Model (Endogenous Variables: Theft per 1000 
Inhabitants, Gendarmes per 1000 Inhabitants 
 Dep. Var. Theft per 
1000 Inhabitants 
Dep. Var. Gendarmes 
per 1000 Inhabitants 
 
    
Industrial  20.4*** Industrial 1.67*** 
Urbanization 2.68*** Urbanization 0.19*** 
Growth Rate of Pop. 0.34 Population Density -2.92e-6*** 
Real Wage -4.88*** Area -0.003 
    
Gendarmes per 
1000 Inhabitants. 
-6.91** Theft per 1000 
Inhabitants 
-0.006 
Police 0.78***   
    
D_1852 -3.03***   
D_1857 -0.32   
Number of Courts -0.02   
Distance to 
Kreisgericht 
 
0.009**   
Observations 631 631  
Chi2 759.2*** 1174.5***  
R2 0.45 0.65  
 
Apparently, the sign of the coefficient of the numbers of gendarmes per 1000 
inhabitants turns now negative indicating a decline in the registered theft rate when the 
number of gendarmes rises. It thus seems that the deterrence effect prevails.  
4.3.2 Efficiency of the Police 
In the previous subsection I discussed the question whether the productivity of the 
police rose over time; e.g. due to technological or organizational improvements. In the 
case of the Gendarmerie there was only little support for such an assumption. In the 
case of the state-controlled communal police forces, on the other hand, it is not 
implausible to assume that productivity rose since the mid 1860’s or at least since the 
1880’s. These hypothesizes can be tested by adding to equation eight a time trend and 
an interaction term for the Gendarmerie variable and the police dummy, respectively. If 
the productivity of the two kinds of police rose over time the interaction terms have to 
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 Zellner/Theil, Three-Stage Least Squares. 
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be positive. This is only true for the police dummy but not for the variable that measures 
the effect of a change of the number of gendarmes. In the former case, the interaction 
term is positive and significant at the one-percent level while the police dummy 
becomes insignificant. This indicates a rise of the productivity of state-controlled police 
forces over time.337 
4.3.3 The Evolution of State Capacity in Baden during the 19th Century 
The previous sub-section also allows us to make some predictions about how the police 
forces and the formal administrative framework affect the theft rate. Given this 
information, it is possible to construct a Legal Capacity Measure. In the case of the 
formal administrative framework the combined effect of all four variables is negative. 
This is mainly driven by the strong negative influence of the 1852 dummy. 
Unfortunately, the dummy stands for three different developments: more precise 
definitions of offences, a stricter code of procedure and a rise in district courts 
responsibilities in terms of punishment-levels. In the case of the first two developments 
it is plausible that they may have reduced the number of thefts trialed at the district 
courts. An increase in the responsibilities of district courts in terms of punishment levels, 
on the other hand, would rather have increased the number of thefts trialed. This makes 
a reasonable interpretation of the 1852 dummy almost impossible. The 1857 dummy 
and the variable that measures the number of courts support the negative trend; 
although their coefficients are insignificant. Only the distance to the supervisory 
institution has a slight positive effect on the theft rate. The number of gendarmes per 
1000 inhabitants has a strong negative influence on the theft rate. The negative 
influence of the Gendarmerie is so strong that it offsets the positive effect of the dummy 
that measures the efficiency of state-controlled police forces. 
Given the empirical results the number of thefts per 1000 inhabitants can be used to 
construct a proxy for legal capacity. Apparently, the number of registered thefts is not 
only dependent on socio-economic factors, but also on administrative factors as well as 
on the number and the efficiency of the police forces. These latter two components 
directly influence legal capacity, e.g. the state’s ability to protect its citizens from 
property offences. It is therefore possible to derive a measure for the development of 
legal capacity. This measure was constructed in two steps. In a first step, I derived an 
adjusted theft rate by subtracting the influences of the socio-economic variables and the 
time trend from the predicted values of the registered theft rate in the three stage 
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 In terms of magnitude and significant of the coefficients, the regression does not deviate 
much form specification five in table 4.6. 
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simultaneous equation model. The adjusted theft rate for district i at time t can be 
written as:  
                                                                    (10) 
with: ADTit = Adjusted theft rate for district i at time t. 
Trend = A positive linear time trend that is 0 in 1829. 
The adjusted theft rate is decreasing over time and contains negative values. Given the 
strong negative effects of P and A, a declining adjusted theft rate can be interpreted as 
an increase of legal capacity. The adjusted theft rate was therefore, in a second step, 
multiplied by -1 and normalized by adding one plus the absolute value of the absolute 
minima of the adjusted theft rate to every observation. The legal capacity measure for 
district i at time t can therefore be written as:  
                                                                    (11) 
Figure 4.3: Development of State Capacity in Baden, 1829-1877 
Note: Each marker represents the value of the legal capacity measure for an individual district. 
The development of the legal capacity measure is depicted in figure 4.3. Each marker in 
the figure represents the value of the legal capacity measure for an individual district. 
That is, figure 4.3 does not only traces the development of the level of legal capacity in 
Baden, but also the variation of legal capacity between the 78 districts that were 
examined here. Over time, the legal capacity measure increased. The major break 
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occurred around 1850 when the legal capacity measure jumped considerably. But there 
was not only a change in the level of the legal capacity measure. Except for some 
outliers, variation between districts also declined during the second half of the 19th 
century. This convergence is confirmed by the declining coefficients of variation 
presented in table 4.8. As figure 4.3 suggests, convergence was very strong during the 
1850’s when the coefficient of variation dropped from 0.22 in 1847 to 0.15 in 1852 and 
0.12 in 1857. 
Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics of the Legal Capacity Measure 
Year Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
1829 4.74 1.40 .30 
1832 4.90 1.32 .27 
1837 5.21 1.23 .24 
1842 5.56 1.25 .22 
1847 5.48 1.22 .22 
1852 9.15 1.34 .15 
1857 9.49 1.13 .12 
1862 9.35 1.14 .12 
1867 9.77 1.09 .11 
1872 9.82 1.14 .12 
1877 9.80 1.17 .12 
Total 7.45 2.50 .34 
Source: Own Calculation 
That is, the legal capacity of the Grand-Duchy of Baden did not only ameliorate during 
the second half of the 19th century; it also was more equally distributed among the 
administrative and judicial districts indicating a convergence of administrative and legal 
quality. These results are in line with other findings of this thesis. As chapter one and 
three show, the implementation of newly introduced formal administrative processes 
and rules of professional conduct through state officials ameliorated since the 1840’s. 
Those formal administrative processes and rules of professional conduct, however, were 
designed to increase the transparency of the administration and reducing arbitrary 
decisions and judgments of local district magistrates and judges; that is: they were 
designed to increase the state’s legal capacity. 
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4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the development of legal capacity in the Grand-Duchy of Baden 
between 1829 and 1877. In doing so, I decomposed data of thefts per 1000 inhabitants 
registered at district courts in their institutional and non-institutional components. This 
approach allows us to make sure that institutional components actually played a role for 
the development of theft rates and therefore can be used for constructing a legal 
capacity measure. Using panel data from 19th century Baden one can conclude that 
institutional as well as non-institutional components played a role in determining 
registered thefts per 1000 inhabitant. It is therefore possible to construct a legal 
capacity measure which – in the absence of other indicators for legal capacity like the 
Index of Government Antidiversion Policies of the International Country Risk Guide or 
the World Bank Doing Business Indicator – can serve as second best indicators for a 
state’s legal capacity and hence for the efficiency of its bureaucracy. 
Constructing a legal capacity measure makes knowledge about the direction of influence 
of the individual components on theft rates necessary. In the case of socio-economic 
factors some of the traditional sociological and economic theories of crime are 
confirmed. A greater variety of goods, larger income gaps, pauperism, as well as the 
breakup of traditional values seemed to increase theft rates. 
The analysis presented above gives much credit to the effect of the formal institutional 
framework that governed the organization of the civil and judicial administration. Those 
factors mainly had a negative influence on theft rates. Especially, the strong influence of 
the 1852 dummy has to be mentioned here. However, this dummy is hard to interpret, 
because it measures a mixture of different effects like the introduction of more precise 
definitions of offences, the introduction of a more strict code of procedure as well as an 
expansion of the local courts responsibilities in terms of punishment-levels. 
At last, the existence of a well-trained and motivated police also influenced the activity 
of the courts. Compared to communal police forces, state-controlled police had a 
positive influence on theft rates. That is, the detection effect prevailed. This is not 
surprising given the relatively good organization, education and endowment of 
policemen in state-controlled police forces. In the case of the Gendarmerie, on the other 
hand, the deterrence effect prevails. The difference in the two police measures can be 
explained by the design of the two variables. While the gendarmerie-variable measures 
the influence of the number of gendarmes on the theft rate, the local police-variable is a 
dummy that compares a relatively efficient state-controlled organization with its 
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inefficient communal counterparts. The latter variable thus measures whether state-
controlled police is better than communal-controlled police forces; while the former 
variable measures the overall effect of a change in the number of a police force on legal 
capacity. 
Given these considerations, one can conclude that legal capacity and thus bureaucratic 
efficiency in Baden increased considerably in the second half of the 19th century. During 
this period, legal capacity became also more equally distributed between districts and 
therefore also among citizens. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis analyzes the enforcement of growth-enhancing formal administrative and 
legal processes as well as rules of professional conduct among local bureaucrats, called 
district magistrates, in Baden during the 19th century. As a result of these reforms the 
efficiency of the bureaucracy rose since the second half of the 19th century. 
Interestingly, efficiency did not only rise in levels but also converged between 
administrative districts adjusting economic perspectives of individuals within the 
country. 
While administrative and legal processes were only vaguely defined during the 18th 
century, they were reformed at the beginning of the 19th century becoming more 
predictable and more transparent. The professionalization of the bureaucracy also rose 
due to stricter rules of professional conduct and meritocratic recruitment. As chapter 
one argues, these reforms created an institutional framework that was more conducive 
to growth than in the 18th century. Yet, chapter one does not discuss how the beneficial 
formal administrative framework was actually enforced among district magistrates. 
Indeed, one observes a lack between the reform of the formal institutional framework 
and its actual implementation. On the one side this was due to missing implementation 
rules that were not enacted before the 1830’s. On the other hand it also seems as if 
district magistrates were very reluctant to implement the new administrative and legal 
processes. This was especially true for those magistrates who were employed before the 
reforms. Chapters two and three therefore take a closer look at the internal dynamics of 
the administration in order to answer the question how district magistrates were 
motivated to implement formal administrative and legal processes as well as to adhere 
to rules of professional conduct. 
Three incentive mechanisms played an important role: First, during the second decade 
of the 19th century the terms and methods of payment were reformed. The old system 
of remuneration that rewarded district magistrates with a participation in office fees, 
court charges, taxes and other dues as well as payments by the communes and 
remuneration in kind was abolished. In return local bureaucrats were paid fix 
remuneration by the central state that consisted solely of hard money. This made 
district magistrates less dependent on the communes and abrogated the need to extract 
resources from the district’s subjects reducing incentives to engage in corrupt behavior 
vis-à-vis subjects (e.g. via blackmailing speed money) and the state (e.g. by helping 
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communal elites to embezzle taxes). On the other side, the new scheme of 
remuneration made district magistrates more dependent on the prince and his central 
government. Hence, the reform of the terms and methods of payment brought the 
interest of district magistrates in line with the aims of the central government. This basic 
reform was considerably supported by the introduction of an internal labor market for 
Civil Servants during the same period. Promotion within this internal labor market was, 
inter alia, made dependent on supervisor’s assessment about the performance in regard 
to the implementation of administrative processes as well as adherence to the rules of 
professional conduct. That is, district magistrates that behaved in line with the 
government’s rules of professional conduct and showed a high performance in 
implementing the formal institutional framework had a significantly higher probability of 
being promoted.  
Yet, there was also another mechanism that made district magistrates more dependent 
on the central state. Besides paying fix remuneration, the government also granted 
social and material privileges, the latter consisting of a wage premium, old age pensions 
and widows insurance. Here, a shirking wage mechanism seemed to be at work. Because 
magistrates feared to lose their material and social privileges, they stuck to 
administrative processes and rules of professional conduct. Yet, because of a reduction 
in the wage premium during the second half of the 19th century, this incentive 
mechanism may have lost its influence. 
However, the three incentive mechanisms described above did not work immediately. 
This is especially true for the more sophisticated internal labor market mechanism. The 
mechanism was highly dependent on the quality of controls; that is the supervisor’s 
assessments of district magistrates’ performance. But the quality of control was weak 
until the 1830’s and did not improve until personal visitations were introduced. This was 
mainly due to two drawbacks. First, during the early decades of the 19th century 
supervisors were reluctant to control their subordinates more strictly, because both 
sides interpreted stricter control as defamation. This did not change until the 1830’s 
when those supervisors were replaced. Second, the introduction of personal visitations 
was accompanied by the introduction of clearly defined categories of control that did 
not exist before and made an objective assessment of district magistrates’ performance 
difficult. Yet, the introduction of clearly defined categories of control was not possible 
before the 1830’s. Those categories build on implementation rules that defined how the 
administrative and legal rules which were introduced at the beginning of the century 
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should be implemented into processes. But these rules of implementation were not 
enacted until the late 1820’s. Thus, there were two stages of reform that spanned from 
the first decade of the 19th century to the late 1830’s. Thereby, the 1820’s were a 
decade of relative stagnation. Yet, it was not only the reform of the formal 
administrative and legal processes that took a long time. It also seems that there were 
considerable learning effects among district magistrates. It took some time until district 
magistrates realized that the adoption of the new administrative and legal processes 
was rewarded financially and opened wider career prospects. Learning occurred most 
visibly along generational lines. The generation of district magistrates that was 
employed before the reforms had the greatest problems to accept the new formal 
institutional framework. This group also suffered from missing implementation rules and 
therefore only ill-defined administrative and legal processes. The generation of district 
magistrates that was employed around 1830 did much better in regard to the 
implementation of the formal administrative and legal rules and newly introduced 
processes. However, even in this generation there were some district magistrates who 
found it hard to subordinate themselves to the strict rules of professional conduct and 
the rigid formal administrative and legal processes. But the number of district 
magistrates who were unqualified for the needs of the administration reduced 
considerably until the 1850’s. 
Hence, the introduction of clearly defined implementation rules and stricter controls 
through personal visitations as well as learning effects among district magistrates led, 
after a considerable delay, to the implementation of the formal administrative 
framework. This should have a positive impact on the efficiency of the bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratic efficiency can be measured quantitatively. For the purpose of this thesis 
efficiency was defined as legal capacity; that is the ability of the state to enforce private 
contracts and to protect its citizens’ property rights. Legal capacity was measured by the 
number of registered thefts in a district court that can be explained by the efficiency of 
the police forces as well as with the formal administrative and legal framework. 
According to this measure legal capacity and therefore bureaucratic efficiency raised 
during the second half of the 19th century. But there was not only a level effect. The 
variation of legal capacity between the administrative districts was also reduced during 
the second half of the 19th century leading to “administrative and legal convergence” 
within the country and creating an important prerequisite for Baden’s successful late 
development. 
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Baden is thus a positive example for successful state building. However, it is striking that 
the reforms of the formal institutional framework that started during the first decade of 
the 19th century bore fruits not until mid-century. Baden’s rulers have proofed stamina 
and patience in regard to their aim to reform the state. Yet, the question remains why 
they were willing to invest so many resources including a costly pension system and 
relatively high real wages. Therefore, one may ask why the 19th century state of Baden 
was successful in increasing its state capacity, while other states in other times did not 
succeed in doing so. In other words, one can pose the question why the reforms of the 
early 19th century were not rolled back. Given the widespread opposition to the reforms 
among district magistrates, the problems to implement a sound working supervisory 
system as well as the pronounced learning effects this would not have been surprising. 
The successful state building process in the Grand-Duchy of Baden was thus not 
inevitable; it may have gone wrong. This may serve as a warning for the reform process 
in Greece and the ongoing state building processes in the states of the Arabellion in 
Northern Africa. A simple reform of the formal institutional framework by introducing 
new laws or constitutions is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful 
reform and state building. It is the implementation of these formal rules that matters. 
This, however, is a long lasting process that is not achieved within a year or two; in 
Baden it took decades.  
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Appendix 
A1. Names and Shelf Marks of District Magistrates Used in the Panel and Logit 
Model 
All records can be found in the section 76 of the Generallandesarchiv in Karlsruhe. 
Bach, Johann Joseph  203-204 
Bannwarth, Raimund  278-280 
Bauer, Franz Joseph   357 
Bauer, Alois   343 
Baumgärtner, Carl  404-406 
Baumüller, Karl August  416 
Beck, Karl    446 
Beck, Anton   486-487 
Beck, Franz   490, 10268 
Berolla, Nepomuk  708 
Betz, Julius   738 
Betzinger, Johann Baptist 742 
Bleibinghaus, Joseph  838 
Bode, Philipp   896-901 
Deurer, Wilhelm  1542-1543 
Dietz, Sales   1574-1576 
Eckstein, Vinzenz  1856-1857 
Engelhorn, Eduard  9337 
Ernst, Franz   2070-2071, 2074-2075 
Fahrenschon Karl  2146 
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Faller, Franz   2142-2143 
Fecht, Julius   2174 
Felder, Leopold   2197 
Felleisen, Markarius  2200-2201 
Flad, Philipp   2295-2296 
Hebting   9414 
Hennin, Graf Rudolph von 3437-3438 
Hübsch, Wilhelm  3827-3828 
Hufschmidt, Ernst Philipp 3839-3840 
Jacobi, Karl   3881 
Jägerschmid, Gustav Friedrich 9450 
Kaiser, Joseph   4035 
Kern, Franz Otto  4140-4143 
Kirchgeßner, Karl  4221 
Kohlunt, Heinrich  4389 
Künzer, Karl   4549-4550 
Lang, Alois   4624 
Löw, Clemens   4932-4933 
Mainhard, David  5031 
Mallebrand, Franz  9177, 10751 
Messmer, Demetrius  5284-5285 
Mühling, Wilhelm  5443-5442 
Müller, Franz   9555 
Pfeiffer, Philipp   5862 
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Picot, Karl   5890-5891 
Porbeck, August von  5935-5936 
Preen, Friedrich von  9583-9584 
Ravensburg, Göler von  9406 
Reichlin-Meldegg, Joseph von 6101 
Rettig, Conrad Ludwig  6190 
Richard, Carl   6211 
Rieder, Leopold  6221 
Riegel, Joseph   6224 
Riss, Ferdinand   6265 
Rücknich, Anton Felix  6419 
Ruef, Ferdinand  6439 
Rüttinger, Joseph August 6457-6458 
Scherer, Otto von  6748-6749 
Schey, Johann   9636 
Schönle, Anton   7003-7004 
Schwarzmann, Walter  7170-7171 
Stößer, Karl   7687 
Stößer, Franz   7678-7679 
Sulzberger, Johann  7770-7771 
Süpfle, Heinrich  7759 
Theobald, Ludwig von  7833 
Wänker , August  8177 
Wasmer, Peter   8344-8345 
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Wedekind, Joseph  8392-8393 
Weinzierl, Raphael von  8424 
Wetzel, Johann   8535 
Wilhelmi, Ludwig  9215-9216 
Winter, Camille   8671-8672 
 
A2. Further Records 
Generallandesarchiv (GLA): 
Section 74: 1601, 1692, 2823 
Section 120: 230, 232, 1183 
Section 134: 32, 57 
Section 229: 353 
Section 233: 3387, 30343 
Section 236: 8098, 8099, 8100, 8162, 8989, 23317 
Section 237: 13950, 13951 
Section 239: 4889 
 
Staatsarchiv Freiburg (StAF): 
Section A88/1: 247 
Section A89/1: 12 
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